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If You Don't Mind My Saying So . . . . . .

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

A few weeks ago my wife and I sat with three friends on the very spot (so Schliemann liked to believe) where Hector said his last farewell to Andromache. There we read aloud the famous passage that describes the parting and the equally famous one in which Priam comes to plead for the body of his son. Then my mind went back more than forty years to the time when Mark Van Doren and I, on our first visit to Europe, sat down by Green-head Ghyll to read Wordsworth's "Michael." Evidently I had not changed much if I could still take satisfaction in ceremonies so completely what this generation would call corny. Neither, of course, did it seem that human nature as Homer described it had changed much in some three millenia. Both man's inhumanity to man and the pity that it generates are much the same as they were in his day.

I would not intrude so commonplace a reflection if I did not still have vividly in mind the Spring number of the SCHOLAR in which some (but certainly not all) of the contributors argued earnestly the thesis that we are upon the threshold of a new human nature as well as of a new physical world. I do not much regret that I shall not live to see the full development of that brave new world of still greater speed, power and noise. I can accept for others what many anticipate as an agreeable inevitability, and when one writer assures me that Euclid and Archimedes have become "simply irrelevant," I can take even that. But if certain other writers are correct, not only Euclid and Archimedes but also Joseph Wood Krutch is "simply irrelevant."

Naturally, I would not like to think this a necessary conclusion but when I read, for instance:

> The new world in which we live is so unlike the past, even the past which is close to us, that in proportion as we are saturated in the Western cultural tradition, we are incapacitated for looking clearly at our actual situation and thinking constructively about it. The better we are educated, the more we are fitted to live in a world that no longer exists,

I cannot doubt that the very distinguished contributor sees me as one of those trying to live in a world that no longer exists.

When another distinguished contributor quotes with approval the remark of a young man from Harvard University: "You see, my generation does not have goals. We are not goal-oriented," I cannot understand this as anything except a radical denial of what anyone saturated in (or even superficially affected by) "the Western cultural tradition" has always taken to be fundamental, namely, the assumption that one thing, one experience, or one action is better than another and that nothing is more important than the attempt to choose one or another upon the basis of a value judgment. Here we are bid to accept what is commonly called the because-it-is-there imperative or what I myself define as the I-don't-know-or-care-where-I-am-going-but-I-sure-am-getting-there-in-a-hurry philosophy.

Obviously if either of these contributors is correct, then my reading of Homer was rendering me less capable of "seeing our situation as it really is." I would, as another contributor suggests, have been better employed listening to the Beatles who are, so he says, "trying to tell us by the anti-

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environment they represent just how we have changed and in what way." Then the *coup de grâce* is given in the explanation that the school dropouts "represent a rejection of nineteenth-century technology as [this is] manifested in our educational establishments." People like me then stand revealed, not as the sturdy defenders of the humanities in an age that tends to deemphasize them, but simply as "dropouts" from the civilization of which we refuse to be a part. What used to be described as "the best that has been thought and said" should be forgotten as soon as possible. After all Matthew Arnold lived in the dark age before computers and atomic fission. Mechanized brains had not yet been developed beyond Babbage's elementary contraptions and even dynamite was a new invention. What could he know of good and evil, of wisdom and folly? Like many of his contemporaries he was even "goal-oriented."

To my obsolete ears the language written by my more up-to-date contemporaries does not seem to be an improvement on that of the older cultural tradition as when, for instance, an enthusiastic proponent of a thoroughly mechanized world wants to say that man can be as happy in a very big city as anywhere else but prefers to speak instead of the "hedonic potential" of Megalopolis. Neither do I think that "the young person today is a data processor on a very large scale" is a better way of saying "is exposed to much information."

From certain other contributors to this alarming issue I do find some support. Thus when Buckminster Fuller writes that "all life has been able to succeed owing to the anticipatory design of a regenerative ecological energy exchange," it takes me a little while to understand the language, but I think he means very much what Thoreau meant when he said: "In wildness is the preservation of the world" and what I meant by glossing that passage with a comment to the effect that of all cybernetic machines the balance of nature is the most perfect. I am also reassured when the same contributor quotes Dr. Wilder Penfield, head of the Neurological Institute at McGill University, who wrote: "It is much easier to explain all the data we have regarding the brain if we assume an additional phenomenon 'mind' than it is to explain all the data if we assume only the existence of the brain."

Richard Hoggart, professor of English at the University of Birmingham, in England, is ready to defend literature against those who regard it as no more than part of the pestilential Western cultural tradition. "Good literature re-creates the immediacy of life," he says, and to me it seems that this is possibly the most important of its functions in an age when science insists more and more strongly that neither the experience of our senses, of our emotions, nor even the logical processes of our minds are relevant to a reality from which we inevitably feel ourselves more and more alienated. This it is that makes literature even more important for us than it was for our predecessors—because we find in it something that "re-creates the immediacy of life." But I fear that many other contributors, and on the whole those most deeply immersed in the new sciences and the attitudes these sciences encourage, would dismiss Mr. Hoggart and me as "simply irrelevant" because we are fitted to live only in a world that no longer exists.

Since I do not want to become a man so completely new that everything I have thought or hoped for has become irrelevant, I take some consolation in the thought that in some very important respects man has not changed as much as the changes in his physical environment and his way of understanding the universe might suggest. Homer's physical world was almost inconceivably different from ours; so were his notions about physics, astronomy and biology. Much of his philosophy and a few (but very few) of his standards of value are obsolete. Yet in reading him, I still have the sense that, so far at least, the man of the twentieth century is not a new man at all but is as old as Hector saying good-bye and Priam begging for the body of his son.

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Homer had never seen either the simplest wind or water mill. The machine that so dominates our lives hardly existed at all. His universe was governed by gods whose passions, prejudices and vices were exactly the same as (or perhaps a little bit worse than) those of his fellows, and neither Archimedes nor Euclid had yet begun the process of making these gods "simply irrelevant." Still we have no difficulty in recognizing his heroes as creatures very much like ourselves.

Does not that suggest that what we call human nature and what we are accustomed to recognize as the most vivid of our experiences are actually less determined by technology or the kinds of knowledge it creates and is created by than some now hope and some now fear?

Is the scientific and technological revolution now in progress actually any more sweeping than that which took place more slowly during the three thousand years since Homer wrote? Is not the difference between the scienceless and machineless world of his time and that which the twentieth century now possesses and cowers under as great as any that is likely to be between our present world and that of the twenty-first century? The heroes of the *Iliad* would be as bewildered in New York or San Francisco as we would be distressed by Troy, Ithaca or Mycenae. But if we could meet together in some grove or porch where nothing need remind us of the presence or absence of those changes that time has made in our environment, and if we were to discuss not religion, technology or science, but love, hate, tragedy, pathos, and the paradox of man's persisting inhumanity despite his capacity for pity and tenderness, then I think we would understand one another quite well and realize that in many important respects—possibly in the most important of all—we are not new men but the same old paradoxical creatures, "the glory, jest, and riddle of the world."

Bernard Shaw once expounded the thesis that the length of time a literary work remains relevant depends upon the extent to which it is concerned with manners, with morals, or with passions. The first, so he said, change so rapidly that a pure comedy of manners soon loses all point. Our moral judgments, he argued, change much less fast than our manners, but have changed importantly since the time when our earliest surviving masterpieces were composed. The passions, on the other hand, have changed so slowly that we have no difficulty in recognizing the representation of them in these same older specimens of the literary art.

Taking the *Iliad* as an example, he said that it was still alive because the passions of its heroes were fully understandable but that we could not understand the moral attitudes involved. Achilles was a noble hero, but to us his refusal to yield up the body of Hector and his barbarity in dragging it around the walls of Troy make it impossible for us to accept him as anything of the kind.

It is true that the manners represented in Homer are completely strange to us. But it seems to me (and I believe it will seem to most) that Shaw missed the meaning of the poem in his eagerness to make his point. Is it not plain enough that the poet did *not* regard Achilles' behavior as noble but as a blot on his reputation; in short, that the moral judgment passed on the actions of the characters is so very close to that which we pass upon them that our sense of an essential identity with Homer is, in that respect also, almost as complete as it would be if neither Archimedes nor Euclid, to say nothing of Watt, Edison, Einstein and Oppenheimer, had ever lived? I wonder if the recent exploits of the new physics and the new technology will really change us much more or if, supposing that they do, the change will be for the better.

One aspect of Homer's modernity is not reassuring, even for me. He and we are equally aware of the senseless horror of war and equally incapable of imagining how it could be abolished. The proponents of the new man will no doubt insist that this is one of the many new things that their new man will know how to do. But to date, I see no evidence to support this hope. Ad-

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vancing technology certainly makes wars worse, but it is so far from preventing them that they have been, during the few years just past, more nearly ubiquitous and continuous than at any time since the Dark Ages. A careful reading of selected passages from the *Iliad* might be more likely to inspire at least a desire for peace than the pursuit of technological know-how by those who are not "goal-oriented."

It might at least suggest a goal. Rereading it refreshed my belief in the sanity and helpfulness of the European cultural tradition. Reading some of the contributors to the Spring SCHOLAR confirmed my fear that many of the most able masters of the new knowledge and the new technology are very unlikely to shape for us a better or even a, to me, tolerable future.

Many readers are no doubt too young to remember that thirty years ago we went through something rather like this once before. At that time it was Marxism and the rise of Communist Russia that were making all the ideas and all the culture of the past obsolete and were creating a new, socially oriented man, while those who clung to the cultural traditions of Western Europe were already anachronisms. Lincoln Steffens, who was then in his I-have-seen-the-future-and-it-works phase, paid me the compliment of analyzing my attitudes as typical of those that were fast disappearing, and John Strachey devoted considerable space in his *Literature and Dialectical Materialism* to an analysis of me as a representative of a dying culture. Acquaintances who failed to convert me took me aside to suggest that, since people whose attitudes were like mine would soon be liquidated, it would be prudent of me to cast my lot with the new men even if I would prefer not to do so. Homer, as well as other portions of the culture of Western Europe, have survived while most of the socially conscious proletarian literature of the thirties is forgotten.

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Editorial

There is a rather lame and winded platitude to the effect that an anniversary is an occasion that invites taking stock of the reason for celebrating. But it is the nature of platitudes to carry their small burden of truth. On an anniversary, one does look back, and that very action leads one to appraise.

THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR has been published by the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa for thirty-five years. Its first editor, and a prime mover in its establishment, William A. Shimer, held the post until 1943. When Mr. Shimer resigned, Marjorie Hope Nicolson, then President of the United Chapters, acted as editor. Thereafter, I was offered the post and accepted in February, 1944.

Looking back over the past twenty-two years, I find much to be grateful for. The magazine has grown and prospered, having now some forty thousand paid subscribers, easily ten times the number of twenty years ago. Moreover, its editorial contents, I believe, have kept to a high standard of quality. This I attribute primarily to that extraordinary group of people who have been members of the Editorial Board. The roster reads like an intellectual *Who's Who,* but the most unusual thing about them has been their vigorously active participation. Three times a year this Board meets; suggestions both for topics and writers frequently have provided, in a single evening, enough potential material for three issues. And finally, there has always been such a variety of professions and outlooks represented on the Board as to insure lively challenges and disagreements. I do not know whether this aspect of nourishing a magazine is unique to the SCHOLAR; I do know that it has been immeasurably helpful to the Editor, the Managing Editor, and the staff in general.

I am assuming, of course, that the way in which THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR is administered is of interest to its subscribers. The veteran subscribers have at least vaguely been aware of the coming and going of members of the Editorial Board if they have even oc-

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casionally glanced at the title page and masthead. I wonder, however, how often, if indeed at all, any subscriber has paused on reading the title Consulting Editor and wondered what it meant. The Consulting Editor holds his post ex officio as President of the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa. Each president has served a term of three years, with the exception of Miss Nicolson, who valiantly carried on throughout World War II, serving two terms, covering the years 1940 to 1946.

I find myself on this anniversary particularly interested in the role these presidents have played in connection with THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR. Not all of them have been able to attend Board meetings regularly, but all have fulfilled with wisdom and generosity the role that their editorial title suggests. Each interpreted his function as an advisory one, always being available for the Editor in time of stress. Each in his own way has said at one point or another during his three-year term: "Phi Beta Kappa is the publisher of the magazine, but you and your Board are the ones to determine its policies and conduct its affairs. Nevertheless, come to me freely whenever you think I can help."

I came. I wish I could indulge myself in sufficient space to do justice to the wisdom and thoughtfulness of these men. Within these editorial pages, however, I can for the most part only name them as a token of gratitude: Christian Gauss, the Dean of Princeton University; Guy Stanton Ford, President of the University of Minnesota and later editor of the *American Historical Review;* Goodrich White, President of Emory University; William T. Hastings, Shakespeare scholar and professor of English at Brown University; Laurence Gould, geologist and President of Carleton College; William DeVane, longtime Dean of Yale College; and most recently, Whitney Oates, professor of humanities at Princeton University.

I have written "for the most part." I would like to make one exception and devote a paragraph to Dean DeVane. His sudden and premature death, a little more than one year ago, deeply affected everyone who knew him. I had seen him last only several weeks before at Martha's Vineyard, which had become a summer haven for him and his family. That occasion, too, was in a sense,

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an anniversary. For it was just one year since I had gone to him with one of the most difficult problems I had ever faced. Those who knew him will not be surprised that he saw me through it with wisdom, with his unfailing cheerfulness and with kindness. Anyone who knew him, for that matter, will not be surprised at anything good I would say about him. But his special quality defies easy definition. Faithfulness, I suppose, is the word that comes closest to it. We have become accustomed, most of us, to that ambiguous mixture of self-serving, shiftiness, quixoticism, and sympathy for others, that constitutes most human motivation. William DeVane seemed to me an exception. It was as though he had made some early inner pact to keep faith with himself, and therefore with others. He was one of those steadfast people whom success could not tarnish nor defeat embitter.

A belated salute to the Consulting Editors.

HIRAM HAYDN

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Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Vietnam

AUGUST HECKSCHER

ONE OF THE OLDEST AND MOST PERSISTENT problems in a democracy is the degree to which there can be popular control of foreign policy and popular participation in decisions affecting war and peace. The classic observers of American democracy, Tocqueville and Bryce, agreed that the democratic form of government, which might be admirably adapted to managing domestic affairs, was a poor instrument for discerning and acting upon the nation's interests on the world scene. Before them, Aristotle had defined democracy as being a kind of government well suited for telling "where the shoe pinches." In foreign affairs, the shoe quite often does not pinch at all, or at least does not pinch in a way that the ordinary citizen can feel.

The war in Vietnam has brought the old questions to the fore. It has presented them, moreover, in a way that is novel to many of us who, for the first time, find ourselves seriously at odds with a major aspect of the nation's foreign policy. It was easy enough, when the task appeared plainly to be that of defending traditional allies and deeply rooted freedoms—as in Europe before World War II—to urge strong Presidential leadership. We could forgive Roosevelt, who campaigned against war and then took steps—what we considered proper and inevitable steps—to put the country on the side of those fighting against nazism. We could understand the even more flagrant example of Woodrow Wilson, who in 1916 had run on the slogan "He kept us out of war," and shortly thereafter resolutely led us in. These shifts in stance seemed part of an inexorable law: when the nation's vital interests are at stake, the President—regardless of past commitments or of popular preferences—must act as he thinks necessary.

✪ AUGUST HECKSCHER, director of the Twentieth Century Fund, was formerly the chief editorial writer of the New York *Herald Tribune*. Mr. Heckscher is a member of the Editorial Board of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR.

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During the postwar period the United States was engaged in a vast design: shoring up the free governments that victory or defeat —the former sometimes more fatally than the latter—had left drained and weakened; shaping alliances and leading a diverse coalition of states. Once again, Presidential initiative seemed essential. It was enough if popular opinion could give its sometimes uncomprehending assent to what had already been put in train. All the great world systems, we were reminded, from Rome in the ancient world to Great Britain in the modern, had been governed by aristocratic institutions. To conceive and execute long-range projects was not something that could be accomplished by taking polls, waiting for consensus, or encouraging active citizen participation in government.

It is well to remember these earlier feelings; they were, I am convinced, largely right. Even now, when some of us feel frustrated and (if the word is not too strong) betrayed by the government's step-by-step involvement in Vietnam, not only without the rational consent of the governed but against the clear wishes of the majority as expressed in the last election, one must still admit that democracy and foreign policy form an unhappy marriage. One may disagree with the President's course, yet the need for having him lead and make decisions cannot be denied. It is necessary that he should be able to make decisions that go against prevailing opinion (even *our* opinion!) and that he should occasionally be part of a very small minority.

Those who think that some kind of popular referendum would restrain the President and lead to a more pacific course are fooling themselves. Once the issue of war has been raised, an overwhelming expression of support can be mustered. When foreign policy is involved (as recent public opinion polls show) the President is strongly backed in proportion as he may be in trouble and people may be in doubt about his policy.

Admitting all this, the fact remains that the democratic process seems to have been disturbingly ignored and democratic traditions slighted over the past year. Even those who fully support the Vietnam war will, if they are honest with themselves, confess to an uneasy feeling about the way successive decisions have been made and changes of direction undertaken. If trying to set limits

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on the President's freedom of action is vain and misguided, as is an effort to give the people a more direct means of intervention in the ultimate choice of foreign policy, still there must be some way of keeping popular government meaningful and relevant. It must be possible to make democracy work where foreign policy decisions are paramount. To deny this is to say that democracy is adequate in matters that are relatively unimportant, but that where the really important issues are involved our much-vaunted system of popular government must become merely a symbol.

Before speaking of government and the Administration, something needs to be said about the deplorable failure of individuals to arrive at clear judgments in regard to the war. When it became obvious in the spring of 1966 that confidence in the President's management of affairs was declining, commentators were uncertain whether this was because the people objected to his having gone so far in committing the country to an undeclared war, or because they felt he should have gone all out. In fact the people—very often the same people—seemed to be taking both these positions. They didn't like what was being done—but since it was being done they wanted it over as quickly as possible. This position may be understandable in human terms, but in terms of responsible citizenship it is, to say the least, scarcely laudable.

From a judgment thus based on emotionalism and personal frustration there are excluded almost all the factors that should weigh with the citizen trying to judge his country's course. The ability to recognize a wrong series of actions is a desirable and even necessary quality; the ability to correct errors should be an essential part of free government. Not to approve of what has been done, and then to urge compounding the error—to dislike a certain policy and then to urge more of the same—is a course of despair and a denial of responsible citizenship.

What happens in the making of such a judgment is the application of private and personal standards of conduct to questions that are not private, but are public and, in the exact sense of the word, political. If a man in private life finds himself in an untenable position he may very well choose to bully or bluff or fight his way out. But with a nation matters are not so simple. The in-

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terests involved are more subtle, fateful and long-range. The solution will very probably require a remedy more cool and objective than that proposed by a simple visceral reaction.

An example of the tendency to treat public issues as if they were private and personal is suggested by a recent editorial in the *Wall Street Journal*. This newspaper has been as independent and enlightened as any in the country, but when it comes to defending a major step in the escalation of the Vietnam war it argues (June 30, 1966) as if the matter were to be disposed of by a sort of cracker-barrel comment. After summing up its reasonable doubts about the conflict and the way it has been managed, the paper supports the bombing of the oil depots at Hanoi and Haiphong by comparing it with "situations in ordinary life" where "finding oneself in a seemingly hopeless spot does not automatically argue for withdrawal."

"To take a homely domestic instance," says the editor, "the realization of an unhappy marriage isn't necessarily proof that the solution is immediate divorce." America's involvement in Vietnam is characterized as "a dubious enterprise from the standpoint of the national interest"; then the analogy with a private quarrel is reverted to, and the conclusion is reached that "one proved way to finish a fight is to fight to win."

This failure of even the more intelligent representatives of the public to take their stand on the national interest, and to confuse it with the logic and rationale of "homely domestic instances," is matched by other deficiencies. For example, people are constantly asserting that they don't "know enough" to have an opinion on the war. But the idea that only those on the inside have enough information to form an intelligent opinion is contrary to all the assumptions on which democracy rests. A sound judgment on great issues requires such qualities as wisdom, historical perspective and philosophic consistency. These the citizen should at least feel able to aspire to. A firm opinion that for the United States to engage in a land war in Asia is basically unsound does not depend on the latest intelligence reports. A conviction that massive bombings do not settle what is essentially a political dispute does not rely upon some arcane factual data only in the possession of the President.

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One other weakness in the public's way of thinking may be noted: the failure to insist that the words used in the public sphere have precise meanings and that they be used with a reasonable respect for what they signify. Rarely has there been so wide a gap as today between the rhetoric used in public discourse and the conditions to which the words supposedly apply. The Vietnam war is described in terms that might fit the defense of an ancient European state of long-established constitutional traditions. The terms are quite irrelevant to South Vietnam, the fragment of a nation, wholly inexperienced in free government, and torn by civil war. Similarly, military phrases are used to describe the kind of situations with which Americans have been familiar in the past. The American press is continually informing us that the enemy has "fled," when it has in fact successfully evaded the attackers. A local "victory" is announced when the truth of the matter is that the enemy has melted effectively into the countryside.

The misuse of words can be carried to more dangerous limits, as when the "honor" of the United States is said to be at stake in the conflict, or its "safety" threatened by the activities of the Viet Cong.

To use words accurately is not necessarily to settle a problem. Thus it is undoubtedly accurate to say our "prestige" is involved in Vietnam: but whether that prestige is more damaged by fighting an ever larger and more frightful war, or by accepting compromise and a limitation of our objectives, is something to be argued about. The use of precise words to describe actual conditions does, however, provide at least the basis for a true judgment. To settle for the shoddy rhetoric that characterizes so much of today's discussion poisons the roots of democracy and makes rational opinion impossible.

So much needs to be said about the citizen's role in the present situation. The substitution of private for public criteria, the collapse of the intellect before the illusion of unknowable facts, and the loss of a meaningful public language—these by themselves make it difficult for public opinion to exert a consistent or relevant influence upon our Vietnam policy. But there is another immense factor—the way the President and his chief aides have dealt with the public in relation to the war.

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The fact (as I argued at the start) that the President must often act outside of public consent in the shaping of foreign policy makes it incumbent upon him to move within particular limitations—to be especially careful and solicitous toward those who disagree with him. President Johnson did, up to a point, seem to recognize the validity of a certain amount of vocal dissent. It was, indeed, almost essential that he do so. He had won the election of 1964 by opposing a Republican candidate who advocated bombing North Vietnam and in general escalating the United States military commitment. Yet in the White Paper of February, 1965—without there having taken place any demonstrable or overt change in the military situation—Mr. Johnson laid the practical and theoretical groundwork for just such an escalation. He pursued in the following months a policy that could hardly have been different had Senator Goldwater been elected. The impact of this reversal was made tolerable by a kind of deference toward the widespread public disagreement. The impression was created that this disagreement was helping to modify and set limits to the military policy.

By the spring of 1966 the Administration's mood had changed. The President's Omaha speech, delivered at a partisan political rally, denounced critics of the Vietnam war; subsequent statements came close to impugning their patriotism. The Hanoi-Haiphong bombings were the signal for an even harder Administration line. It would be unjust to the President, and an oversimplification of the truth, to say that these bombings were undertaken with the idea of drowning out the opposition at home and building up the President's declining popularity. The bombings were made in answer to long-standing military requests; but that they should have been made at this particular time was undoubtedly influenced by other than strictly military factors. It is indeed something more than a coincidence that immediately after the bombings the President announced his vital interest in the Congressional campaigns of this autumn, and started out on a political tour of the Midwest.

It is invariably dangerous to use military means for other than direct and self-evident military ends. Yet bombings once before had been admittedly resorted to as a factor to influence a political

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situation. The first bombings of North Vietnam were defended by the Administration on the grounds that they would strengthen the morale of the South Vietnamese. They failed notably in this, as they failed to stop infiltration from the north. But with such a precedent it was not surprising that the new bombings should have been conceived with a mixture of military, psychological and political motives.

The political motives were of two kinds. The first was to give an impression to the North Vietnamese and their allies that United States opinion was united and that nothing at home would cause the war effort to weaken. The second (although perhaps unavowed and probably lesser) consideration was to strengthen the consensus for the purposes of American domestic politics. That this latter effect has been achieved, at least temporarily, cannot be denied. A show of strength, particularly when it brings no immediate or proportionate costs to the home front, is bound to be popular. It is capable of being exploited so as to evoke all the mass emotions that make war so incompatible with free opinion. Indeed the politics of consensus becomes in such circumstances a fatal game. Each new escalation reinforces the consensus. Total consensus and total war constitute, in the last analysis, an ugly and inseparable pair.

Any President would find himself in a dilemma, given the circumstances of a large, growing, undeclared war. He might have the most sensitive concern for preserving the free play of opinion and maintaining democratic standards; he might exercise this conscientiously in all decisions relating to the conflict. But he would still be bothered by the degree to which an enemy might misinterpret the expression of dissent at home. And he might still look in vain for some means of consulting the public without in the process raising the war fever.

The most obvious way to make democracy work, it might seem, would be to get the question of Vietnam openly and fairly into the political campaign, so that the voters might have a choice of policy. But the President who was conducting a war would invariably and necessarily be supported against a candidate who was urging compromise, withdrawal, or even more limited effort. Moreover the public would know that the results of the cam-

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paign need hardly be controlling. A Republican candidate in 1968 campaigning for a more moderate Vietnam policy could well reverse himself after getting into power. This happened in 1964; something quite like it has occurred before in our history. Moreover it might be legitimate and necessary that it should happen again.

Before hostilities have broken out, the candidate who talks peace has the overwhelming preponderance of support. But after they have broken out, the same degree of support goes to the candidate who waves the flag and calls for the most vigorous possible prosecution of the war effort. In neither case does it seem that introducing the great questions of foreign policy into a political campaign is a good way of defining and defending the nation's true interests.

The difficulty of reconciling democratic government with the choices of war and peace puts the final burden upon the individual who speaks out strongly for himself, according to the truth as he sees it. The services to the country of a public servant like Senator Fulbright, a commentator like Walter Lippmann, and of a few influential newspaper editors across the country, have been beyond price in the crisis of democracy through which we have been passing. Even if one disagrees with these dissenters from the war, one must admit that they fulfill an indispensable task. When organized political opinion is confused and impotent and when the processes of democracy seem incapable of providing light without adding to the heat, it is through such men alone that the great argument is maintained. They make it possible for the run of men who are cut off from the general dialogue that ordinarily feeds and sustains them to have views and ultimately to make themselves felt. They make it possible for a public and political opposition to prepare itself so that in due course it can play its indispensable role in a free state.

It may seem an anticlimax to come back in the end to a handful of individuals as the only solution to keeping democracy vital in a time of undeclared war. But the individual has always been at the heart of democracy. The saving remnant has always been composed of the few and the courageous.

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Prologue to an Autobiography

CONRAD AIKEN

I WAS BORN IN A BOARDINGHOUSE, and not a particularly distinguished one. That has always seemed to me an excellent democratic antidote to my family's tradition of being in some vague way "wellborn," for, like innumerable other Americans, they arrived, if not in the Mayflower itself, at any rate not long after: shall we say in the Trailing Arbutus. (As a matter of fact, two of them *did* come in the Mayflower, one of whom came to a bad end after making off with some of the Company's money.) How important this inheritance is, I have never been able to decide. For a long time it never occurred to me to consider it at all—not, perhaps, till I was sent to boarding school, where such things inevitably became part of one's masculine protest, so to speak, to let it be known that one's background was rich, mysterious and far-reaching. My own background, when I had begun tentatively to discover it, in bits and pieces—for my childhood was a scattered one—was really on examination not so notable as all that. It went back far enough, to be sure, but the lineage consisted, apart from the De La Noyes, or Delanos, of simple farmer folk, good yeomen, and sea captains, hardheaded and religious: not till the Revolution did it produce a Colonel and a Captain. The Colonel, it is true, became famous as the builder of an extremely famous ship for the Navy, *Old Ironsides*. The launching of this ship in Boston was the occasion of a tremendous celebration, attended by dignitaries from all over the world. Talleyrand shook my great-great-uncle's hand, posters warned the spectators not to stand too close, lest the tidal wave from the launching sweep them away to sea. All this seems to have gone to the poor man's head; it is the tradition in the family that it completely spoiled him. He became insufferably conceited, never

✪ CONRAD AIKEN, poet, short story writer, novelist and critic, has been writing since he was nine years old.

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did another lick of work, as unsuited to a gentleman, and died on his estate in New Bedford a thoroughly lonely and unpopular man.

After him, the family tree began putting forth, perhaps quite naturally, when one considers its three hundred years of Puritanism and Quakerism, a series of teachers and preachers, together with a few dipsomaniacs. In all of these alike there was, however, a noteworthy liberalism, a characteristic of the family that has persisted ever since. The preachers found few things they could entirely believe in, they were always in trouble with their parishes, trying to lead them out of one cherished dogma after another; the teachers were often in trouble with their school boards because of an unfortunate tendency to socialism or internationalism—they weren't very good patriots, at a time when patriotism was pretty heavily starred and striped. These men were natural liberals, and so were the drunkards, and so too were the whalers and clipper ship captains and the China traders. The China traders brought back from China a love of painting, and money with their notions. They filled their cupolaed houses in County Street with odd and beautiful things, and their children's heads with a sense of the far and strange which has come down from father to son ever since. Of the drunkards, the most distinguished was a murderer. Himself the father of twelve, eleven of whom died of tuberculosis, and his poor wife as well, it was a child, a small boy, whom he killed: one of a group of imps who were accustomed to dance in a taunting ring around him when he staggered homeward at twilight from the corner saloon. Charging his tormentors with his walking stick, and lunging with it as if it were a sword, what was his horror to find that he had pierced the boy's belly. There was a mere form of a trial, and he was let off. It needed all the combined respectability of the teachers and preachers to restore the family name to its former modest luster.

But all these things, together with the innumerable legends that surrounded them—stories of New England farmhouses, New England winters, of cousins and uncles lost at sea, and spanning, of course, the transition from the plain living and high thinking of the Quaker farm to that, scarcely less plain, of the teacher's desk and the preacher's pulpit—all these things were only to be really

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known, or understood, later. This was the "family" world, which waited for me to approach it, disclosing itself only item by bewildering item, over a long period of time; changing, too, even as it was approached; and, in the end, never to be wholly understood at all.

And first, of course, I had to be born, in my undistinguished boardinghouse, and into that half-sleep which is the beginning of life, and from which one wakes so slowly—so slowly, indeed, that one is hardly really awake, and alive, before one finds that again one is falling asleep. I know the room in which young Merrymount Nipmuk was born—a name I chose for myself, joining, as it did, that of one of the less important Massachusetts tribes with Merrymount, where perhaps some libidinous ancestor danced around that drunken Maypole—yes, I know that room and in every detail, for my father drew a pen-and-ink picture of it to send to my grandmother. It was one of those ordinary combined sitting room and bedroom affairs, which are so common; a washstand in one corner, a draped table in the center, a chest of drawers with a mirror, the bed, the crib, and a bamboo table beside the bed. Millet's "Angelus" hung on one wall, "The Man with the Hoe" on another. And there, in the middle of it all, naked except for diapers, and bald except for one upright hair which stood up straight from the top of his head, squatted little Merrymount, the new inheritor of the virtues and vices of the Nipmuks. There is something that one can only call flagrant in that scene. In the crude drawing, which I still possess, my father has dramatically conveyed that feeling every man experiences, when he first becomes a father, of the sheer effrontery and impudence of life. The egoism of the egg is only surpassed by that of the baby, and *au fond* one resents it profoundly. One has been put in his place, and with a vengeance. This first portrait of little Merrymount is a caricature, in which the father's anger and pride, animal pride, contend for mastery. Didn't that dreadful child really know it, and that he already had the upper hand? It was his destiny to be a powerful, insidious and treacherous usurper. His father and mother were already as good as dead.

As for the room, the palmetto trees were like dark hands out-

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side its windows: the mosquito netting which hung over the bed was like a part of sleep itself: the bells that rang for mealtimes, and sent footsteps echoing up or down the wide curved stairs were like the beating of one's own pulse. What does one really remember of all that? Does one really remember anything whatever? Not, certainly, if one looks straight at it. The precise point at which one begins to remember simply cannot be found. There is, of course, the first "scene," which comes out of nowhere, but is suddenly just *there:* there are ladies downstairs, at the bottom of the stairwell, having tea; conversation floats up from them; and then one's hand, between the dark uprights of the banisters, releases one's sister's milk bottle, downward. That is all. There is nothing before, and nothing after, or only a feeling that there *was* an aftermath. Doubtless a sensation was caused, and no doubt too it was calculated, and presumably there were consequences. The usurper was at work. But to say that this was the earliest recollection, and to say that it must have been when Merrymount was three, is only in a very partial sense true. What one also remembers, although in a less provable way, and perhaps even long before this episode, is the light, the sound, the touch, the vibration of very being, that is still one's own when one stands alone in a pasture, or on the top of a mountain, in very early morning; or when walking alone along a pitch-dark road at night; or at the moment of waking from a terrible or delicious dream, and to find oneself separate from it, yet still enclosing and beholding it. This is a sort of cloud which has always accompanied us, and out of which we have gradually, if partially, emerged, for more or less regular intervals; it is as much part of us as our bodies; but although we can learn to stay out of it for longer and longer periods, as we grow older, we know too that like the mammals of the sea we must more and more often, and for periods of increasing length, go back into it. And this, as we look back upon it, or into it, seems to reach behind us really forever. More even than mother and father, this *is* mother and father.

The trees now were taller, much taller, and farther apart, with now too a greater feeling of distance beyond them; and at the ends of the aisles of vision thus opened into blue light were tremendous

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and extraordinarily beautiful buildings, of an unimaginable intricacy, which teased the eye, and sent a sensation as of *tracing* something into the fingertips. Among them, too, was a red tall tower of odd shape and very spindling legs, like a kind of giant insect. There was a wall, of what seemed interminable length, over which hung an alarming tangle of tropical vines full of bright flowers, and from behind which came a strong, curious and very unwholesome smell. There was a picture of a fat pig, which was forever being drawn again, not always satisfactory, not always quite exactly the same, and a trifle sinister: years later, one was to find the very last of these, folded away, and a little faded, in the pages of *The Young Yägers,* by Mayne Reid, and to feel as if one were looking through a tiny window into a microscopic life of extreme brilliance and intensity. Yes, this was Mother's favorite pig, the one thing she could draw with something like verisimilitude: her one vanity, her one trick. In the years that were to come, when there were two other brothers in the nursery, how often was I to hear Wide or Handsome (my father called the three of us, with some point, High, Wide and Handsome) crying Mama, draw me the smiling pig! And then she would draw, on any scrap of paper, even a paper bag brought back from the morning's shopping, the six-cylinder pig, with the corkscrew tail, and the smiling eyes, small as buttons, at the same time telling us that her mother (now *how* could she have a mother—?) had drawn this very same pig, but a long, long time ago, for herself and Uncle Charlie.

Lights were of immense importance. And, with lights, colors too. Lying very still, and looking upward for a long time at something blue—and this was a so-called memory that had permanence —could this be simply sky? Or was it possibly the blue undersided hood of a crib, or baby carriage, or what Swinburne so remarkably and revoltingly called a push-wainling? But a door, opening, or a window, opening, or a lamp at night approaching (for in those days one carried lamps in one's hands), or the sudden spurting creation, out of darkness, of the red-and-gold fishtail flame of a gas jet, these were amongst the most startling and delicious and heart-warming things that life had to offer. As one was later to discover during those long periods when one was ill—malaria, was it? Never

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to be known. But then the slow solitude of fever was to be punctuated in the same way, by the same things, and one would recall for no apparent reason a very particular time—Papa holding up his hand against the light, so that we might see the pinkness of the blood that flowed there, and almost hear it humming: or Mama, clasping the little flat valve of the gas jet, just before she put us to bed, and reciting the magic words: One—two—three—out—goes-she! and timing the word "she" quite miraculously and alarmingly with the sudden extinction of the light, the terrifying extension of the dark. Or, and even more magically, the lighting of a tiny candle inside of one of those little stained-glass-windowed houses, made of cardboard, the stained-glass windows of transparent paper, so that the jeweled colors were illuminated like those of a little church. Perhaps in all of one's life there was never again to be an experience quite as wonderful as this.

But these things happened after we moved, of course: from the undistinguished but handsome old boardinghouse to our own incredible house in the Avenue. The actual transition from one to the other remains totally invisible, a sort of actionless glide; we were simply *there,* as if we had always been there, and would remain there forever. The brick stoop, with its brownstone stairs and the iron railing, back to back with the similar stoop of the house next door, this was the real essence of the house and the place, this and the two giant trees which grew before it, and which, whether in sunlight or moonlight, kept forever a moving pattern of leaf-shadow turning and revolving over the tall house-front, like an evanescent stenciling. Live oaks, holm oaks—those were one's first trees, the symbol thenceforth of all that was meant by tree: the whole notion of greatness and rootedness, of earth-living and earth-dying. Under these came the Italians, with their funny little one-legged hand organs, and the wizened-faced monkeys in their dirty suits and caps, the suits with a hole for the tail, and holding out their caps for pennies. Under these too, and more alarmingly, came the other strange men with the dancing bears, the huge animals skipping heavily, their fat sides shaking, in a tethered circle, the saliva dripping from their tongues, while the men pretended to be frightened, and beat the ground with their

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long staves. And up one of those trees, on that never-to-be-forgotten morning, one of the bears was sent to climb, while the whole family, papa, mama, sister and myself, and Wide and Handsome, and the two nurses and the cook, clung to the railings in delighted terror. It was as good as a circus, it was in fact better—for the bear, having hugged his way up to the main fork in the tree, and a little above our level on the stoop, settled himself there happily, and refused to come down. He positively seemed to be smiling. Was the whole thing a "game," played for our benefit, and the owner's agitation and grief simply a bit of playacting? He implored and begged, in a strange language, he even put his head against the bark of the tree and wept, but it was all no use. And then, to our astonishment, the second bear was sent up the tree after the first, to bring him down. Two bears in our own tree! The whole thing was beyond belief. But there it was, before our eyes, and there, what's more, the bears stayed, all that wonderful morning.

The stoop was many things, it was always, according to weather or state of mind, or time of day, changing its character. But most of all it was a ship at sea and as one descended the worn brown steps one moved down closer and closer to the water, which surrounded it on all sides. The brick sidewalk was the sea, and on this one could set sail for New York, or New Bedford, or the Cotton Islands, or Tybee Beach. It was possible to step, holding hard to the railings, from the back of our stoop to the back of the one next door, over a gulf of great depth—a dank smell of earth and mold came up from this, it all felt very dangerous indeed, and this was the highly perilous business of transferring in mid-ocean from one storm-tossed ship to another. But best of all, on a sunny day, was simply to stand there, with one's hands on the railing, and sail past the whole wonderful world, and all the extraordinary things it always brought to light—the endless miracle of texture itself, the very stuff of life. One could never get enough of this, and one never tired of it. The incredible *nearness* of everything was a part of the magic of this, but another part of it, although one had then no name for it, was the sense of infinity, of endlessness. One felt acutely alive, but also one felt terribly alone.

It was when I was going down the steps of the stoop with

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Mama, one day, and as she was pulling on her long white gloves, that she told me my grandfather was dead. Did I really remember him, or is it only that she herself said something that reminded me of him—? But no, I remembered him, and still do. He had taken me, the year before, and all by myself, to a park, where there was a zoo, and many animals in smelly cages; and we had watched a bicycle race; and after that we had sat together at a rustic table on rustic seats in a wood and he had made, using a penknife, cups and saucers out of green acorns. This was Grandfather, the man with the white beard and the marvelous revolving bookcase, who lived alone in a big house, and preached sermons on Sunday. But what was it to be dead? How was he dead? Evidently it was important, for a telegram had come to us, and now I had been asked by Mama to walk to the telegraph office with her, an expedition, too, for which I had been especially dressed. The other children were too small to go, and some point was made of this, a fact that threw into relief my own invited presence at what really amounted to a ceremony: it was like a formal announcement that I was now a full-fledged member of the family. It is for this reason that I have always remembered the scene so vividly—for it is like a photograph—and with a definite sense of its importance? Or was it the notion of death, now for the first time brought into consciousness, even if not at all understood? No doubt the idea of death was very intriguing, and it must be that my mother tried to explain to me a little of this mystery; it seems to me that this is so, and that our walk through the Christmas streets, and past shop windows gay with toys and tinsel and the splendid Roman candles and rockets with which the South, in those days, celebrated that season, was colored by this discussion, and thus fixed in my memory, exactly as a drawing is fixed. But more even than this the formality itself impressed me, and the feeling that in some peculiar and attractive way my relation with my mother had been changed. Thus too it comes about that it is in this episode, and above all as she stood on the stoop, drawing on her long white "party" gloves, that I can first recall really seeing her—even the sharp-winged hat, which sat rather far forward on her head, and gave her a little the effect of flying. To be sure, my father later took a photograph of her in this very

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costume, and in this attitude as well, and won a prize with it, hat, gloves, and all, and one knows only too well how easily one substitutes another's vision for one's own, or another's description. Later in life one is told a story about something one did or said when a child, and in a little while, through some chemistry of the unconscious, the experience has been taken over with all the vividness and conviction of personal knowledge. But no, not in this instance. For this walk to the telegraph office, on the occasion of Grandfather's death, is the first recollection of a *continued* action or scene, or of *continuity* in one's own existence, that I possess. It marked the beginning of a new kind of being.

And perhaps too the beginning of separateness, that profound and embarrassing and enthralling problem, which, a little later, or even perhaps already, was to face one, as in a looking glass, with the eye-searching question: Who are you? How is it that you are here, and why are you not someone else altogether? How did you get here in this particular shape, and why is your name Merrymount Nipmuk, and not, say, Peter Jones? And if your name *had* been different, would you too be different? And suppose, further, that you had a different father and mother, well, what then—? Would you have been the same without them as with them, or, if, for example, *they* had never existed at all, would there then never have been the existence, the palpable you, that was so obviously and presently the realest thing in the world—in fact, the world itself—? Yes, that separateness, which began, of course, with the discovery that one's hands and feet were one's own periphery, the outlying districts of a privately and completely controlled universe of one's own: the great initial autonomy.

But the new separateness meant other evolutions and explorations as well. Just as mobility had enlarged one's experience of the nursery, and from this of a whole floor, and then, the stairs at last conquered, the conquest of the whole house, with its gleaming banisters and mysterious corners, and the living patterns in the carpets, which were like things growing under one's feet, and the inviting shadows and caves under tables, or the fringed and fragrant hollows under sofas in halls—for one's earlier adventures are quite absurdly like a cat's or dog's—so now the important

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separateness of oneself as an individual (which in a sense had been marked out forever by the walk with Mama to the telegraph office) began its own necessary expansions and discoveries.

Of which, of course, the inevitable first step, naturally and secretly, was down the long straight back stairs, which led first to the pantry, which served also as Papa's "darkroom" for developing photographs, and then by the outside stairs to the backyard, the kitchen porch and the old outhouse. Through the outhouse, beyond peach tree and chinaberry tree, a dark passage led to the outside world: those trees were the symbols of a new birth, for it was indeed little less than that. And between them I set forth into the squalor and violence of the stinking lane, or alley, that ran behind the house, to take possession of, and in the end to be possessed by, my own beautiful and dreadful world.

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The Shadow-hunter

LOUIS SIMPSON

The man points, and the child
Runs after a butterfly.
Rising and floating in the windy field,
That's how they learned to run—
Plenty Coups,
Red Cloud, Coyote, Pine Marten.

Now I will lie down in the grass
That Plenty Coups loved.
There are voices in the wind, strong voices
In the tenderness of these leaves,
And the deer move with the shade
Into the hills I dream of.

There the young men live by hunting
The shadows of ideas,
And at night they march no further.
Their tents shine in the moonlight,
Their thoughts lie in the moonlight.
What joy is in their hearts, no one knows.

✪ LOUIS SIMPSON teaches at the Unversity of California in Berkeley. In 1964 he received the Pulitzer Prize for Poetry.

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Gandhi's Autobiography: The Leader as a Child

ERIK H. ERIKSON

THE "PRESENCE" OF MAHATMA GANDHI does not come through in the printed word, least of all in what he is reported to have said about himself. His autobiography was written in his native Gujerati, a language spoken only by a fraction of his countrymen. For the vast majority it had to be translated into other regional languages. For us it was translated by his faithful secretary who sacrifices to an almost schoolboyish fidelity much of the passion, the poignancy and the humor that (so I have come to believe) shines through in Gandhi's Gujerati as well as in his own use of English. This accounts for some, but not for all, of the haze surrounding the intimate events of his first fifty years which are recorded in his autobiography, the standard history of his beginnings. Out of this text there has emerged a stereotyped Gandhi who is almost too open to fragmentary psychoanalytic interpretation, while in many ways he fails to make psychological sense. I have been trying to visualize him and to "hear" him in his middle years, just before he became the Mahatma. In what I have perceived he stands out almost hauntingly as a man who while small and ascetic was of infectious agility and energy, totally serious and yet of a pervasive gaiety, always himself and yet attuned to each counterplayer, and most of all utterly and always *there*. Such a man, of course, can on occasion also be demonstratively tired and desperately sick. And he is by no means always likable. The level of "liking," however, seems hardly to apply, unless one has special reasons

✪ ERIK H. ERIKSON, a member of the Editorial Board of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, is professor of human development and lecturer on psychiatry at Harvard University. His books include *Childhood and Society, Young Man Luther* and *Insight and Responsibility*. This essay is an excerpt from a manuscript on one of the early applications of Gandhi's "nonviolent" technique in India.

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(and surprisingly many Indians do) to dislike him. But after having read him or having talked to men and women who knew him, it comes as a shock almost conducive to tears to hear his clear, calm and maternal voice on a noisy old record or to see him move about gaily in a jerky amateur movie.

I have also tried to visualize the child who was to be that man, and have been similarly moved by stiffly posed photographs depicting little Moniya or young Mohandas. One senses that he was ever so much more exquisitely put together than the sum of the stories told about him would suggest. Who can describe, who "analyze" such a young man? Straight, and yet not stiff; shy, and yet not withdrawn; fearful, and yet determined; intelligent, and yet not bookish; willful, and yet not stubborn; sensual, and yet not soft: all of which adds up to an integrity that is, in essence, unexplainable, and without which no evaluation holds. Imagining the life that was ahead of that boy and that young man, one cannot help thinking that the funeral pyre that consumed his remains to the bones was an elemental event of pity and charity, compared to the totem meal by which his memory is now devoured by friends and adversaries alike. Many feed on him, deriving pride from having owned him, or from having intelligently disposed of him, or from being able to classify the lifeless pieces. But nobody thereby acquires (for that is the archaic illusion of a totem meal) that grace which held him together and which gave him—and through him, millions—a special and most rare kind of aliveness. But it must be granted that his own references to himself as a child (and I shudder to think how a computer would judge his inventory of self-images) are deadeningly repetitious to the Western ear. He was, we are told, not a good student, but somehow did quite well without half trying. Most jealously watching his own character, he became tearful when doubted. Very shy and seemingly uncritical of elders, he was intensely aware of their foibles, and attached to them by *his* wish to serve *them*. Not given to playful levity, he preferred fantasies and stories extolling devotion to parents. Married at thirteen to a girl who would not be taught by him to read and write, he made her accept him as a husband driven by carnal desire of an alleged magnitude that might have debilitated

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them for life. He tried desperately to reform his friend and "evil genius," a Muslim boy who went to unbelievable lengths to counterreform him in the worldly ways of meat-eating and prostitution. Such a stereotyped record is all that many a reader will remember. Two scenes stand out and must be read with a fresh eye by any would-be interpreter. They both concern the ailing father who had been invalided in an accident on the way to the boy's wedding. One is a formal confession among all these confessions, the other an account of the death of the father whom the boy had nursed passionately. This is (to use Kierkegaard's word) the Curse in the story, for the father died in an uncle's arms while Mohandas was lying with his (pregnant) wife.

Since the "reconstruction" of leaders as the children they may have been has become an inescapable pursuit, I propose to reevaluate here Gandhi's version of his childhood and youth. The analytic genius of Freud has bequeathed to us a certain grammar and syntax of what may be called traumatology, which makes it almost impossible, given some goodwill seasoned with more or less therapeutic intent, not to see what is basically "wrong" with somebody. In applying my traumatological métier to young Luther I have attempted to understand also the fabulous restorative energy of youth which helped his native genius to reaffirm Christian faith with new liveliness and power. In studying middle-aged Gandhi, I must try to trace indications that such a leader started to develop his singular effectiveness as well as his great concerns rather early in life, and that attempts to reduce the quality of these concerns to earlier as well as bigger and better childhood traumata is wrong in method and perhaps evil in influence. Just because the time has come when man must understand the nature and the danger of what he calls greatness, it is not enough to equate that phenomenon with some kind of extraordinary defect.

Some great men, it is true, do appear to have great neuroses. Their mortal conflicts, however, do not seem containable within a set of symptoms, even if they oblige us by offering flamboyant confessions resembling the kind of data seen in case histories. The varieties of great confessions, and their varying impact on their times, certainly call for a William James. There is always some

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naïve self-revelation in any outpouring of autobiographic data. Yet, each given medium (diary, conversation or autobiography) has its own formal laws and serves tradition and personal style. As to unconscious motivation, we must always remember that the autobiographer has not agreed to a therapeutic contract by which he promises to put into words all his "free associations," so that we may help him to compare them with inner and outer "reality."

Memories, then, are an intrinsic part of the actuality in which they emerge. Our first concern must be with the stage of life in which a given medium was used to retell, relive or reactivate an earlier stage for the purpose of heightening some sense of actuality in the telling. At best, memories connect meaningfully what happened once and what is happening now. If they are painful, they at least recover from the defeats of the past the stragglers of unlived potentials. All confessions want to settle a curse.

First, then, we consider Gandhi's autobiography as an historical event in its own right. I have pointed to the Indian language problem which gives it a certain opaqueness. But biographers also ignore the honest methodological statements with which Gandhi himself introduces his autobiography. "I have no spare time. I could only write a chapter week by week. Something has to be written for *Navajivan* every week. Why should it not be the autobiography? . . ."

The autobiography, then, was written as a series of weekly "columns" over several years. Each column concludes with a moral, the full meaning of which could be grasped only by a reader who knows how Indian elders speak to children and youth and how the young are inclined to react.

Gandhi, at the time, was approaching sixty, and thus, maybe somewhat precociously, speaking out of a stage of life that has (or had) a definite connotation within the Hindu life cycle: "What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these . . . years,—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain Moksha." Moksha means final renunciation and withdrawal; and his testamental tone is further explained in the expressed resolve that ". . . only those matters of religion that can be comprehended as much by children as by older people, will be in-

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cluded in this story." Only against this background can we search these confessions for revelations of hidden motivation. And never assume without good reason that a man like Gandhi is revealing "unconsciously" what is welcome evidence to the spying modern eye. It is, for example, futile to think that one can "expose" feminine conflicts in a man who says with an utterly relaxed smile that he aspires to being "half a woman"—and who remains a leader of men and women. At any rate, autobiographies are written at certain late stages of life for the purpose of re-creating oneself in the image of one's own method; and they are written so as to make that image convincing.

Susanne Rudolph has enlarged in this journal on the astonishing fact that such "confessions" could be politically effective because an Indian audience "felt further reassured that the conditions of his political potency had been long preparing and had been severely tested." One could point here to Western examples of the singular impact of famous confessions of diverse kinds, from St. Augustine's to Rousseau's, and to the *Interpretation of Dreams,* each a work that advanced man's awareness radically by the way in which a man became the originator of a new "honest method" by asking himself "why not me?" and "why not now?" Such decisions and such deeds share a peculiar greatness certainly akin to what Gandhi called "truth-force." If Gandhi, then, "lived his private life in public and if his private restraint became a matter of public concern, it was because both he and those who observed him believed that a man's claims to be just, to command others, and to attain the wisdom of a statesman, were proportional to the capacity for self-restraint," and this particularly in a civilization permeated with ancient concepts concerning the "sublimation" of life-creating semen into the power of thought—and into political potency.

But autobiographies are also written at specific periods of public life. In 1925 Gandhi was "politically silent." His career was then at best a plateau reached after a steep ascent and now stretching toward a nebulous horizon: whether there would be another ascent was then hard to know. Let us look back. Gandhi had spent two decades in South Africa where he had developed the

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method of *Satyagraha* or Truth Force. First negatively translated as nonviolence, *Satyagraha* constitutes the faith that he who can face his own propensities for hate and violence "in truth" can count on a remnant of truth in the most vicious opponent, if he approaches him actively with the simple logic of incorruptible love. He had been in his middle forties when he returned to India and, after a period of "probation," had applied his method first locally (in support of peasants in the Himalayan foothills and of the workers in Ahmedabad) and then nationally in the form of widespread civil disobedience. This latter undertaking he had called off himself because he had felt that the Indian masses were not ready for it. As he had proudly demanded, he had been sentenced to six years in jail but had been released after two. He had found the political climate changed, and what unity he had been able to create between Hindus and Moslems had already been decisively weakened. His leaderless followers in nonviolence and noncooperation had acquired the nickname "Non-Changers." He now withdrew from politics and devoted himself to the purification of himself and of India, both to be achieved by spinning, praying and self-control according to the faith that never left him, namely, that purity is (and brings) freedom, even as truth is (and results in) nonviolence. He had witnessed the danger of redoubled violence in the wake of ill-applied nonviolence and wanted to work his way into the people's hearts "silently so far as possible, even as I did between 1915-1919." He was often depressed. He fasted to unite his followers. Concluding a twenty-one-day fast he said a prayer in which he asked God to make him his instrument if he should again "enter the world of strife," reminding Him of Napoleon "who planned much and found himself a prisoner in St. Helena" and of the "mighty Kaiser, who aimed at the crown of Europe and is reduced to the status of a private gentleman."

The relationship of each installment to the detailed course of events will undoubtedly be clarified when the monumental publication in chronological order of "Gandhi's Collected Works" includes that stage of his life. In the meantime, the general mood of that period should caution us against accepting at face value the

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memories concerning the child who became that man. But the peculiarities of the autobiography must also be underscored because the occasionally priggish tone and the monotonous references to "lust" create a barrier between the originator of *Satyagraha* and today's and tomorrow's fighters for peace. For what is at stake is the future of what he called "truth-force" in a technological world predictably more affluent and less ascetic, and the relationship of a more sovereign sensuality (including its more sovereign sacrifice) to creative peacefulness.

As I have discussed elsewhere (*The American Journal of Psychiatry,* September, 1965) Konrad Lorenz and others have even given us reason to believe that the propensities for peace that Gandhi sought in man's strenuously purified nature and developed into a technique of nonviolence, may, in fact, be part of our "instinctive" animal equipment. The confessions, then, almost audibly dictated to St. Augustine, Rousseau, or Kierkegaard by precocious and overweening conscience (and do these admirable men not all, at times, sound near-untruthful when they are unable to rise above the bog of self-accusation?), are no longer the most representative evidence for the nature of evil in man. One man has seen to that: Freud. In his *Interpretation of Dreams* he has found a way of listening in to the conflict of "inner institutions," and of exposing by systematic self-analysis the unconscious deals that moralistic conscience can make with human cruelty and licentiousness. Before we can make full use of that insight, however, we must understand how these inner deals have also been built into cultural institutions. If Gandhi's ascetic self-revelations seem sometimes characterized by a florid obsessiveness, so are the opposite extremes of his culture, for example, the exhaustive inventory of erotic variations depicted on voluptuous temple facades or listed in pedantic handbooks.

To sum up: at the time when Gandhi wrote the autobiography he had behind him a probationary period during which he had been a mahatma followed by a meteoric rise to *the* Mahatmaship —a position entirely reformulated by him as one uniting politics and religion. Having then withdrawn from politics he was in some danger of continuing as nothing-but-the-Mahatma. In his utter-

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ances of these years he consolidated the Mahatmaship exactly midway between the creation of a new secular religiosity, and a fresh political beginning, this time on the more solid basis of a wide appeal to the masses. And while at the conclusion of the autobiography he had reached the end of the plateau and saw that a new ascent was ahead of him, he ended with words reminiscent of the beginning: "I must reduce myself to zero." Zero, however, as Joan Bondurant has recently reemphasized, is a number powerful, indeed, in Indian thinking. To those who would take out of such a context any scene either as "factual" or as a distortion of memory inviting interpretation, one is inclined to recommend a psychohistorical criterion. An item in an autobiography should be judged first for its meaning in the *stage of the recorder's life,* and secondly, for its meaning in the *course of his whole life history.* But this means that at the same time it must be seen also in the immediate *context of contemporary history,* and in the *historical process* of which it is but a stage. Only then can one turn to the remembered item itself, and see what set of criteria would give it a certain convincing probability.

We will now turn to at least one of the idiosyncratic trends that are recognizable in the autobiography and throughout the course of Gandhi's life. He calls his autobiography, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth.* And his most readable biographer, B. R. Nanda, can say: "What was extraordinary was the way his adventures ended. In every case he posed for himself a problem for which he sought a solution by framing a proposition in moral algebra." Such judgment is obviously in line with Gandhi's dominant "line," but, one must ask, is it compatible with a man's, any man's, development? In projecting this experimental spirit backward, does the aging man make his childhood conform to the needs of his old age? Or do the traumata of his childhood now, indeed, exact an irreversible forfeit? Or do the old man and the child now meet each other in a mutual recognition that may be an intrinsic potential of the human life cycle—and possibly a kind of psychological euthanasia? If Gandhi was an existential experimentalist all his life, this propensity must have had precursors suited to the capacities of a little boy and of a young man. For

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surely (and this is our second set of critieria for a valid psychohistorical item) an early event should be *compatible with the developmental stage* at which it is said to have occurred. And there should be a plausible *developmental continuity* between the pervasive experimentalism of little Moniya, and of young Mohandas, that of Mr. M. K. Gandhi and of the aging Mahatma.

Here, as pointed out, we are not only interested in the traumata that drive a man into particular avenues of greatness, but in some of the very ingredients of that future greatness, that is, in the kind of active tension that he maintained at each stage even where and when he seemed diffident, and by which he cultivated in himself a secret propensity for leadership even when and perhaps just when he seemed to be failing. He was once a child with limitations set by the limits of development, and yet, the saying "the child is father of the man" makes particular sense for special men: they, indeed, strive to become their own fathers and, in a way, their parents' fathers while not yet adult.

Just because any childhood scene, however, nowadays fits into a stereotyped scenery of infantile complexes, it is doubly important to take the time to visualize the actual setting of childhood events. Here the world owes a lasting debt to Pyarelal (Nayar) who was Gandhi's secretary for nearly three decades, and who has undertaken to write a comprehensive biography. *The Last Phase* appeared in 1956 while *The Early Phase* has just been published (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1965). It contains some vivid descriptions which have the ring of plausibility.

The earliest available photograph suggests that Moniya, indeed, was a small child with "a cheerful, sweet face, and lovely eyes." Pyarelal omits mention, however, of the improbably big ears that were to distract from Gandhi's countenance. "Unlike other children he was not given to crying. He had a hearty ringing laughter, and everybody liked to fondle him." The youngest and last son of a young mother (twenty-five) and a much older father (forty-seven), he was born into the typical large family crammed into a house in the port city of Porbandar on the Arabian Sea coast of the peninsula of Kathiawar, a shining "white city" with narrow lanes and crowded bazaars. Thus, like many

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great leaders, he was born on the periphery of his future "domain," and in a setting that would provide a strong regional identity to build on. Kathiawar is a fisherman's and a sea trader's world, renowned for its toughness and shrewdness, for from here, as from the larger port of Cambay, the ships went back and forth between India and Arabia and the East Coast of Africa—down to South Africa. He grew up in a three-storied ancestral house which his father shared with his five brothers and their families. The suite allotted to his father (head of the family and prime minister of a small princely state) was on the ground floor and had two rooms, one twenty by thirteen feet, one thirteen by twelve feet, a tiny kitchen and a veranda. All of this must underscore for us the literal inescapability in the "joint family" system, and the special arrangements any sensitive and self-willed creature must make for some privacy and for some right to move around idiosyncratically.

One of the most instructive passages in Pyarelal's book characterizes the life of a joint family "where so many people with diverse tastes, habits and temperaments are cooped up day and night in a narrow space, from week to week, month to month and year to year." Along with the virtues of such a family life, which are easily overlooked by Western devotees and victims of small families, he points to sources of bitter ambivalence: "Little things assume big proportions; the slightest suggestion of unfairness or partiality gives rise to petty rivalries, jealousies, and intrigues. To smooth them requires infinite patience, resourcefulness and knowledge of human nature."

The mother, Putali Ba, was an ideal mother of a joint family: "She never made any distinction between her own children and other children in the family . . ." Likewise, the prime minister, as the head of the family, looked after the well-being of every member of his clan well into their adult lives. I would think that the ideal that both mother and father treat everybody's children with equal consideration may be one of the deepest sources of discontent. In giving to all, the parents, and particularly the mother, may give too little to each, and this may well constitute a style of parenthood responsible for an occasional Indian trait often remarked on by Westerners, namely, a sulking and deeply angry in-

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sistence on being granted, sometime by somebody, an exclusive relationship of preference or of mutual fusion. As Indian fiction also attests, this need may attach itself to an aunt or an uncle who are capable of identifying with lonely children. It adds, I believe, a strong element to the Indian's search for a guru, and to an almost desperate need to be alone with a loved or revered person, or, in the case of special desperation or special meditative gifts, with oneself. A Westerner rarely visualizes the Eastern wish to be isolated (in lonely spots or in the middle of a crowd) against the background of the unavoidable (if often joyful) total immersion in "folks." Life, then, can become a very special arrangement of parallel isolation and of detached fusion.

Nanda (outdoing Gandhi) ascribes to young Mohandas excessive passivity, passing into a morbid "diffidence." But Pyarelal's account permits us to see how the little boy and youth survived both an early scrupulosity and a large family with the integrity and the energy we know him to have possessed later. Moniya had a quality of tenacious and clever attachment which, so it seems, made his parents feel that their relationship to him was a special one, and made him, in turn, feel that his was the fate of an elect being. For the nature of his early relationships one word suggests itself which expresses the infantile and playful side of what the aging advocate of Moksha calls "experiments with truth." The word is "testing." For the little boy was driven to test people around him by a resourcefully varied number of methods, and his parents seem to have had enough humor to agree to being teased rather than to punish him for the naughty stubbornness and the occasional cruelty that are common ingredients of all provocation. Outstanding, also, throughout his life, was Gandhi's locomotor restlessness, a not uncommon characteristic of great men. Paired with insatiable curiosity, this provides energy for testing the unknown. But it also "tested" those who were supposed to keep an eye on him while his mother was busy; and an older sister describes him as a mercurial teaser. He would try to make friends with animals, sometimes overdoing it by "twisting dogs' ears." This childlike perverseness persisted into Gandhi's old age: at least one proud young man told me that he could not forgive Gandhi for having twisted his ears

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rather painfully when *he* was a child. The older sister, at any rate, did not have it easy. It was good to get Moniya out of the house for when his father was not there he would usurp sacrosanct rights, for example, by removing the image of the ruling Prince from a stool and seating himself in its place. He also used to scatter the utensils of worship and to "write" on the floor. When his mother tried to forbid this, he (in Pyarelal's words) "stoutly dissented." (Was this the ontogenetic origin of the sit-down?) On the other hand, he strongly dissented also from any necessity of being watched out-of-doors. So his sister was told to keep out of sight when watching him, a consideration at variance with the suggestion that the father wanted to squelch his adventuresomeness—at least in childhood. But while he was playful and without fear when playing by himself, he proved uninterested in all boyish games. For this he blamed his "shyness." Yet he later took on the role of peacemaker when the playmates quarreled among themselves. This, Pyarelal says, was the "passion of his life," from the school in Rajkot to the councils of the British Raj. One could also say that he would never "play" unless he was in a position of such moral dominance that he could represent his power to himself and to others as maintained "for their own good." And often (not unimportantly) it was just that.

If this teasing, testing and experimenting is a trait that meets our developmental criteria since it does find a "higher" form on each level, it must also be seen as a personalized form of a relevant cultural pattern. And, indeed, mutual teasing holds a prominent place among those more or less spontaneous ritualizations that make life in the joint family bearable and, on occasion, enjoyable. We must then add a further criterion to a psychohistorical item that we have accepted as developmentally probable. It must have a high probability *within the contemporary culture* of the community, and (again) *within the history of that culture.* If, then, the teasing of people and of animals in childhood was one of the outstanding ways in which Mohandas tested his family and the world of Porbandar we will recognize many somberly reported stories of his later life as, in fact, animated by a gay teasing obvious to all those present at the time. And, to reach far ahead in his life's history, we may recognize a personal inner triumph as well as a peace-

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making gesture in the story of how the Mahatma teased the Viceroy in his own palace.

It was after the great Salt March in 1930 when Gandhi had led his Satyagrahis from Ahmedabad to the sea in order to dramatize the symbolic as well as the practical implications of the Salt Tax. He had been arrested, and while he was in jail his Satyagrahis attempted to raid the government's salt works and were brutally attacked by the police. After some compromises all around, Gandhi was invited to talks with the Viceroy. Churchill scoffed at the "seditious fakir, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceroy's palace, to negotiate with the representative of the King-Emperor." But the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, has described the meeting as "the most dramatic personal encounter between a Viceroy and an Indian leader." When Gandhi was handed a cup of tea, he poured a bit of salt (tax-free) into it out of a small paper bag hidden in his shawl and remarked smilingly, "to remind us of the famous Boston Tea Party."

Such a teasing attitude, however, to be historically relevant, must also be shown to be more than a gratuitous quirk, and, indeed, an indispensable quality of a man's influence on the very people with whom he shares the *actuality of an historical situation*. As one can learn from patients and from everyday failures, teasing is one of those spontaneous ritualizations that wilt when the teaser becomes sadistic or the teasee masochistic. Seasoned playfulness is long in developing, and I think that in Gandhi's life it can be shown to have alleviated his moral precocity and to have added a significant dimension to his evolving personal and political style. It even seems to be an essential ingredient in nonviolence. If one watches a moving picture of Gandhi's Satyagrahis marching to the sea, it is, as it were, physiognomically obvious that they express a certain mature and vigorous "teasing" attitude toward the British authorities, implying that, surely, they could not make a bloody issue out of a people's determination to scoop up the salt out of their own sea, tax-free. That the British (and the Indian constabulary) eventually did react with a brutality multiplied by a sense of being taunted and of "not being able to take it" cost them much of their inner authority in Indian eyes as well as in their own. So

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even though the march did not lead to immediate and complete formal success (as, indeed, many of Gandhi's campaigns did not) his playful gesture marked a declaration of equality such as is expressed in all successful teasing.

Teasing and testing, finally, are also two of the ingredients (but I emphasize, only two) of those early encounters with mother and father, child wife and boyhood friend that Gandhi makes so much of in his autobiography. Pyarelal says that Gandhi's mother gave him the ideal of "living not only for mankind but in mankind" and that his father provided the "meticulous regard" for the "littlest of the little things" and "perfection in performance." He emerged from his relationship with his mother as one given to one intense relationship at a time, and this a relationship of ceaseless testing as well as of service to, and even salvation of the other. When he ran to his mother, it was to serve her, and when he confessed a theft to his father, the father became better for his son's confession. In each case, however, the confrontation avidly sought by the young experimenter showed him the limits of his power, and yet confirmed the moral direction of his genius. That, as Susanne Rudolph concludes, "Gandhi in his inner being was quite the reverse of the filial model he defends in the autobiography" is a "diagnosis" pertaining to something Gandhi all his life was himself aware of, to a fault. But it is true that like all great self-confessors, Gandhi reveals in his childhood memories those basic "complexes" for which only Freud's new confessional discipline has found adequate concepts, if not always felicitous terms. When, at the end, young Gandhi despaired of the possibility of combining the business of salvation with the intense intimacy demanded by the basic cast of characters in human life, he concluded that "He who would be friends with God must remain alone or make the whole world his friend." Thus, bettering the mother of a joint family, he adopted all of humanity, and better than a prime minister in Kathiawar, he made himself meticulously responsible for India and the whole Empire. But all this is not a mere matter of projecting the conflicts of his childhood on a widening world of concerns—a crank, a fanatic and a psychotic could manage that—but one of a minute and concrete interplay,

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of a craftsmanlike series of "experiments" with historical actuality in its political and economic aspects.

I have enumerated some criteria for recognizing the workings of the historical process in such a relatively transparent material as a freely offered autobiography. That these criteria, taken together, are all relative to each other, and that such relativity is the stuff history is made of—this could only barely be indicated. But how about the interpreter's place in it all? I have not attempted to objectify unduly either the method or the mood with which I approach my task. A final criterion for a certain degree of probability in this kind of reconstruction is the interpreter's inclusion in it of the inescapable fact that his interpretation is subject to the *mood of his own life* and heir to a given *lineage of conceptualization.*

Since the days of my youth Gandhi's "presence" has appeared to me to have been of a quality rarest among men. But my testamental attitude has now become bound to a field and a method. The psychoanalytic method itself demands that the record proceed from the case history to the life history, from the symptoms of human conflict to the signs of human strength, from man's adaptive and defensive maneuvers to his generative potentials. Historical reinterpretation has always been thus bound to mood and method, but a certain discipline of self-awareness may yet make a difference.

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The North and the South of It

C. VANN WOODWARD

IT WAS BEGINNING TO APPEAR to me that the old differences between North and South were fading into history, and that before long they would be gone with the wind. There were many signs of this. What with the South getting a little better in some respects and the North getting a little worse, the old peaks of contrast seemed to be leveling out. The great American homogenizer appeared to be grinding away effectively on some of the last and most recalcitrant of the traditional obstacles to uniformity.

Perhaps a residence of fifteen years in the state of Maryland contributed a good deal to the impression. Maryland is more than a border state. It is a buffer state and a state of mind as well, with a historic role of softening contrasts and blunting sensibilities of difference—religious, regional, and to a limited extent even racial. Maryland stretches a left arm far to the South and drapes a long right arm protectively over the District of Columbia as if to spare the seat of government the shock of simultaneous contact with both North and South. It was no more prepared for the clash at Cambridge, Maryland, than it was for the one a century before along the Potomac. But Cambridge was to come later.

In the meantime a move to New England in the fall of 1962 immediately altered the perspective. On October 1 the insurrection at Ole Miss came to a head, federal troops rushed in, and the Battle of Oxford raged. Peace broke out only occasionally between the Feds and the Confeds in the South during the long cold winters and long hot summers that followed. If Mississippi subsided, Alabama was in eruption, and if Alabama suspended hostilities temporarily, Georgia, or Louisiana, or North Carolina would take over, and even noncombatant Maryland violated the peace. One

✪ C. VANN WOODWARD, a member of the Editorial Board of the SCHOLAR, is Sterling Professor of History at Yale University. Mr. Woodward is author of *Origins of the New South, The Strange Career of Jim Crow* and *The Burden of Southern History.*

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scanned the headlines and haunted the television for news from the current front, and one's office became a meeting place for exiled Southerners in anxious consultation. Students and colleagues departed on missions, campaigns and demonstrations and returned with reports and occasional casualties. The beguiling impression of diminishing sectional contrast faded rapidly.

It would appear that we have been somewhat hasty in sweeping under the rug of liberal consensus this ancient question. The assumption was that if we were liberal enough, or enlightened enough, or radical enough our Southern identity would become irrelevant or inconspicuous—if not invisible. Instead of that the Negro revolt and the civil rights movement have heightened sectional consciousness and conflict to a point unapproached in the present century and for some years before that. Since we are destined to live with this curious American phenomenon for some time to come, it would seem wise to try to understand the way it complicates our lives.

One of the wisest analysts of American character is the psychiatrist Erik Erikson. "It is a commonplace," he writes, "to state that whatever one may come to consider a truly American trait can be shown to have its equally characteristic opposite." He goes on to speculate that "a nation's identity is derived from the ways in which history has, as it were, counterpointed certain opposite potentialities; the ways in which it lifts this counterpoint to a unique style of civilization, or lets it disintegrate into mere contradiction."

History and circumstance have endowed Americans with a heritage rich in themes of counterpoint and polarity. They began to appear quite early in our history—as soon as paleface confronted redskin. We had an East-West (or Home-and-Frontier) polarity before the North-South counterpoint appeared, just as there was a White-Red before there was a White-Black polarity. The old-settler–immigrant counterpoint turned up almost as soon as the second wave of immigrants landed. The Protestant-Catholic and the Gentile-Jewish polarities were not long in following.

What America lacked in the way of class tensions she made up in indigenous tensions of her peculiar heritage. Americans have characteristically thought in terms of regional, religious and racial or ethnic rather than class conflict. Their politics, their com-

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promises and their institutions have reflected these preoccupations in much of their history.

More recently many of the historic polarities have lost their sharpness and the old tensions they embodied have relaxed. The East-West contrast faded in drama and vigor after the West no longer represented a frontier and ceased to signify a pull away from home. The West had become only an extension of the East. Old religious tensions have subsided with the secularization of society and the homogenization of sects. All denominations in America—Protestant, Catholic or Jewish—now resemble each other, we are told, more than they resemble their European mother churches. A half century of the quota system and other restraints on immigration have greatly reduced the visibility of European ethnic minorities made up of first- or second-generation immigrants—what used to be called "hyphenate" Americans, Irish-Americans, German-Americans, Polish-Americans. Indeed, as Daniel Aaron has pointed out in discussing Jewish-American writers in contemporary literature, the adjective "hyphenate" is an Americanism that has dropped out of up-to-date dictionaries—just as the ethnic minorities it once designated have been losing their old distinctiveness by the process of assimilation. The homogenization of immigrant minorities has been part of the process of nationalization that has been reducing the distinctiveness of religious and regional groups.

Two huge American minorities, however, have so far largely eluded the great assimilation. They are, ironically, the oldest and (barring the redskins only) the most indigenously American minorities of all. Both of them were established here before the Pilgrims hit Plymouth Rock. They are both the oldest and the most durable of the "hyphenates"—the Southern-Americans and their ancient contemporaries, the Negro-Americans. "A certain kind of stigma is attached to being a white Southerner," says a Negro writer, "just as there is a stigma attached to being a Negro."

These two hyphenates differ markedly, of course, in the origins and character of their alienation. For the Negro-American, alienation has been from the start involuntary, unavoidable, compulsory. As Daniel Boorstin put it, the Negro was the "indelible immigrant," unassimilable by definition. In fact he was not even ac-

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corded the status of immigrant either by the official census or by the historiography of American immigration. For to do so would have been to acknowledge him as a candidate for graduation from that status, a potential assimilable. And that he has been denied. He was, so to speak, a permanent hyphenate.

The white Southerner, on the other hand, has been at least in part a hyphenate by choice. Granted the involuntary character of birth and heritage, they were not insuperable obstacles or ineradicable traits. On the one hand, the Southerner can, with sufficient determination, minimize, suppress or wholly deny the distinguishing marks of regional identity. And on the other hand, the national threshold of assimilation for Southerners has been distinctly lower in some periods and places than in other periods and places. There have, in fact, been times when Southernism, even in its rankest manifestations, was scarcely a barrier to acceptance at all. But those times are gone and the threshold is up again. The other avenue of assimilation, deliberate divestment of identity, has never been the choice of many Southerners, and is still the choice of few.

The ironic thing about these two great hyphenate minorities, Southern-Americans and Negro-Americans, confronting each other on their native soil for three and a half centuries, is the degree to which they have shaped each other's destiny, determined each other's isolation, shared and molded a common culture. It is, in fact, impossible to imagine the one without the other and quite futile to try. What the Negro-American would have been without his Southern experience it is impossible to say, but it is obvious that he would have not been the same. Not quite so obvious is the extent to which the Negro has determined the character and culture of the white Southerner. One reason for that is the common fallacy of identifying everything Southern as white, while forgetting that there is no one more quintessentially Southern than the Southern Negro. In spite of all this, it has been the relations between these two Southern minorities that more than anything else have determined and prolonged the distinctiveness of both in American life.

Putting aside for the moment these Southern complexities, I return to the theme of North-South polarity. North and South have used each other, or various images and stereotypes of each other, throughout our history and for many purposes. They have

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used each other in somewhat the way Americans have used Europe —to define their identity, to say what they are *not,* to escape from what they *are,* to bolster their self-esteem, to shore up regional defenses, to unburden their guilt. North and South, to their mutual gratification, have served each other as objects of invidious comparison. *Our* faults are as nothing, they say to each other, as compared with *theirs.* Compare our candor with their hypocrisy, our forthrightness with their evasiveness, our success with their failures. Where would we be, had we followed their example? Look at this picture, then on that, at these statistics and then on those, at that testimony and now listen to this.

And so it has gone over the generations, sometimes at a high pitch and sometimes in low key, depending on the temper of the dialogue and the moods of the participants. The moods and needs have varied from self-pity to self-righteousness, from guilt and penitence to indignation and aggression. The dialogue has touched on many historic subjects of controversy, but mainly it has been the tortured response of the national conscience to what Gunnar Myrdal called "the American dilemma," the central and persistent moral problem of American society. It has been essentially a white man's dialogue, with the central subject a silent, often indifferent, and sometimes cynical spectator. It has been *about* the Negro, but never addressed *to* him.

This North-South dialogue between whites continues unabated and on a shriller pitch than ever. The invidious comparisons fly back and forth. The newspapers and television play up to audience demand with cheap gamesmanship, slanting the news, giving the headlines to embarrassments of the "other side," and minimizing the setbacks of the home team. Back and forth fly charge and countercharge. A revival of Ku Kluxery in the South is countered by evidence of a new white backlash in the North, evidence of segregation *de jure* with evidence of the same *de facto,* a long hot summer in Mississippi with long hot nights of riot in Harlem, the horror of a Birmingham with the agony of a Watts. And so the war of words continues endlessly, with each side obligingly furnishing more and more ammunition to the other.

It would now seem to be time for the subject and silent spectator of this dialogue to break into the discourse with some pointed

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observations of his own: the black, so to speak, calling both the pot and the kettle white—and their dialogue largely irrelevant. The Negro might have some pungent observations to make about this spectacle. One can imagine his pointing out that there is a great deal of sham in the whole thing—indeed, that there is a great deal of sham in the civil rights movement.

It would be preposterous to dismiss the whole civil rights movement as a sham. Real gains have been scored for racial justice in both North and South as a result of this movement. As slow, as painful, and as grudging as it has been, and as limited and unsatisfactory and incomplete as it is, nevertheless progress of a sort, concrete and demonstrable, has been made in many parts of the country and in some areas of society. Putting aside the embarrassingly token character of school integration, one can embellish the record with figures on high appointive offices, ambassadorships and judgeships, awards and prizes (including at least one bathing beauty prize), with statistics on savings accounts, insurance policies and college degrees, and on through home runs, heavyweight championships, Olympic awards and Nobel prizes.

But those lists of names and statistical triumphs are familiar enough. They have become a sort of ritual at gatherings of the like-minded, a convention of self-praise and mutual congratulations. Their purpose is to prove to ourselves that we are not whistling in the dark, that we are not entirely ineffectual. They are not only weapons against our detractors, but defenses against the assaults of self-doubt.

This is all very well, for we all need our defenses and our protection against self-doubt. But once our defenses are laid aside and we face up to the facts and the future and muster some candor with ourselves, we know how hollow the slogan of "Freedom Now" really is. We know how few of the twenty million Negro Americans this movement has really touched very deeply or tangibly helped. We know that even if the present gains in civil rights were magically doubled or tripled they would still not strike at the root of the trouble.

For what we have really been witnessing and describing by our statistics of progress and achievement is the rather rapid rise of the Negro middle class. On the whole this small class has been doing

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very well. Job opportunities often exceed the supply. The number of corporation personnel representatives visiting one Negro college in Pennsylvania outnumbered their potential recruits in the graduating class four to one. For the few who are prepared, there are unprecedented opportunities, and as a consequence there is a steadily rising level of Negro aspirations. This is important, to be sure, but numbers affected are relatively small. According to a recent estimate, only about forty-five thousand nonwhite males in the United States earned over ten thousand dollars a year, and that would be considerably less than one percent. On the other hand, more than fifty percent of the nonwhite males earned less than three thousand dollars, and therefore are placed below the poverty line. As Daniel Moynihan has put it, "in terms of employment and income and occupational status it is quite possible the Negro community is moving in two directions, or rather that two Negro communities are moving in opposite directions." While the small, mobile, trained middle class has been moving up, the great mass of Negro workers has been stagnating or, relative to white workers, losing ground. It is this great mass that we overlook in our boasts of progress.

The main trouble with the great majority of troubled Negro-Americans is essentially that they are not wanted, not needed. They feel that they are an embarrassment to the society in which they live, that they are useless, and that they are being pushed out, blocked off, put out of sight and if possible out of mind. Their first response is flight. But they find that they flee from one unwanted plight to a more complicated one. About fifteen percent of the Negro population of the South, some one and a half million people, left the South between 1940 and 1950, and as many again in the next decade. A Labor Department study calls this "the most extensive movement of a single group in American history." A million and a half went to other parts of the South, mainly to large cities. They fled the mechanizing cotton culture of the rural South only to land in a rapidly automating industrial culture of the city, North and South, and found themselves in the same plight of uselessness and unwantedness.

It is misleading to equate the present situation of the new Negro urbanite with that of the European immigrants and expect

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him to rise by his bootstraps as they did. There is no place now as there once was for unskilled, cheap labor, unprepared for metropolitan life. Nor can the Negro shed his past and its marks like the earlier immigrants, for he is the "indelible immigrant." He has a very different problem to confront.

The most pressing manifestation of unwantedness is unemployment or underemployment. And in this area the gap between Negro and white workers has been widening rather than closing during the last two decades, with the percentage of unemployed among nonwhites around twice that of whites, without taking into account the lower status and pay of the nonwhites. The prospect is for further widening of the racial gap in unemployment. Within the decade from 1960 to 1970 the labor force will be enormously swelled by the postwar boom in babies now coming of age and seeking jobs, twenty-six million of them within that decade, or a net addition of fifteen million. The Negro work force will increase at twice the rate of the white. Given the present rate of job increase and hoping for a sharp increase in that rate, there are still not nearly enough jobs in prospect. Under these circumstances it would take an optimist to predict that the Negro will be able to hold his present low rate of employment, much less close the gap between the races in unemployment. For on top of other handicaps, Negro workers hold a disproportionate percentage of the unskilled and semiskilled jobs, and it is these kinds of jobs that automation and technological improvement are wiping out most rapidly.

In spite of the crusade for equality and the gains in new federal laws for civil rights, the gap between the races continues to widen instead of narrow in several important respects. One of these is the gap in the median income between Negro and white workers, which has been widening since 1951. Another is the related gap between Negro and white family income that has been increasing since the mid-fifties. This slow deterioration has gone on side by side with the more widely publicized gains for civil rights. It begins to look as if the harder the Negro runs the farther he falls behind in the race and the farther his goal recedes into the distance.

Another race the Negro is losing is the old one against the

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ghetto. Residential segregation in the cities, North and South, has continued to increase right on through the years of the civil rights movement. The index of residential segregation in Atlanta in 1940 was 87.4, in 1950 it was 91.5, and ten years later it stood at 93.6. In Charleston the indices for the same years were 60.1, 68.4 and 79.5; in Dallas they ran 80.2, 88.4 and 94.6; in Memphis they were 79.9, 86.4 and 92; and in Montgomery 86.8, 90.5 and 94.7. In all but five of the forty-five largest Southern cities there was a net gain in residential segregation in those two decades. In two-thirds of the cities the index was above ninety by 1960 and the trend was toward the Johannesburg ideal of one hundred percent. Northern cities by now are essentially the same as Southern in degree of residential segregation. Residential segregation in Philadelphia was recently reported greater than ever before. Northern cities differ somewhat in geographical pattern. But even the difference in pattern can be exaggerated, for the Richmond ghetto pattern is interchangeable with that of Seattle or Chicago.

It is not necessary to explain the connection between residential segregation and other types of Jim Crowism, and particularly segregated schools. The spread of *de facto* segregation has made a mockery of *de jure* desegregation. *De facto* segregation is another Yankee invention the South is importing, just as it once imported the now outmoded Yankee invention of Jim Crow laws. Southerners have quickly caught on to the new ways. The way to avoid desegregation is to convert to *de facto* segregation and show clean hands to the law. The proof is pragmatic: it works the country over. The up-to-date South can join in righteously repudiating the outmoded Jim Crow laws and plump for the American Way.

The cozy liberal superstition about urbanization, the fatalistic optimism that the more citified we get the more civilized we become, the hypothesis that integration is a sort of hidden dividend of urbanization would not seem to be sustained by recent experience. The liberal urban middle class that was supposed to have such a leavening and liberating effect on racial prejudices has picked up and moved out to the suburbs—white middle class to all-white suburbs, and black middle class to all-Negro suburbs. They motor in from their respective segregated retreats occasionally to attend interracial meetings and hear speakers deplore problems of

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urban decay, but their personal response to those problems is withdrawal. The city itself is more and more left to the mass of Negroes and lower-class whites, whose record of interracial harmony has been somewhat less than spectacular.

In the meantime, for fifteen years under federal government sponsorship and aid, programs of urban renewal have been underway, and we have been promised salvation by the urban planners—the bulldozer as benevolent integrator. But the bulldozer turns out to have strong racial biases in its preference for fields of operation and in the old neighborhoods it razes into wastelands. For about three-fourths of the families that have to be "relocated," as the phrase goes, are Negro families—hence the cynical slogan of the slums, "Urban renewal is Negro removal." Furthermore, of the land cleared by urban renewal approximately one-half is dedicated to the automobile in the form of throughways, connectors and parking lots, and scarcely a fourth of the land is actually used for housing. A handful of racially integrated neighborhoods has been thus created, but too often the black ghetto has simply been shunted to new locations.

The experience of the great mass of Negroes with migration from farm to city, from South to North, and from ghetto to ghetto has been flight from one kind of unwantedness to another. Their crisis has been described as "a change from an economics of exploitation to an economics of uselessness." They are still exploited, to be sure, but they increasingly lack the dubious opportunity of being exploited. Their anxiety is not so much that they are exploited as that they are irrelevant. Their problem to an increasing extent is not so much civil rights as human rights. Their plight has been compared to that of another historic minority for whom the white man found he had no use—the Indian. The red man wound up in Indian reservations and the black man in Negro ghettos, both to subsist on handouts and lead a marginal existence on the periphery of a society that had rejected them.

There are rough times ahead in both North and South. Which will be rougher and uglier would be difficult to say. After one of several murderous outbursts of white racism at Chicago in August, 1966, Martin Luther King remarked, "I've never seen such hostility in a demonstration before and I've been all over the South."

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He added, "I think the people of Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to learn how to hate." No Southerner can for a moment forget the shame with which his people have been covered by the brutalities of a white minority on the life-and-limb level of the struggle that still rages in the rural South, or the series of jury trials that continue to make a mockery of justice and Southern courts in the eyes of the world.

While rural life is a diminishing and minor aspect of the problem, the South will probably be coping with its peculiar and personal brand of violence and oppression for years to come. Here preeminently is the level at which civil rights as generally conceived are a life-and-death matter—elemental rights to a fair trial, to the ballot box, to an education, to life and liberty. That struggle must go on relentlessly. But having coped with that, whether it is ever "solved" or not, the South will still have to face up to the larger Northern-style problems that have been emphasized here, the big-city ghetto problems of uprootedness, unwantedness, and what Martin King once called the "degenerating sense of 'nobodiness.' " A majority of Negroes now live outside the South and three-fourths of all of them in cities.

I do not want to be accused of the very thing I have deplored, the futile game of invidious comparison between North and South. Obviously both have their problems, similar ones and different ones. But I do believe that the Southern heritage the Negro bears has a special importance for the future. I am supported in this by the testimony of a Northern psychiatrist, Robert Coles, and a Negro novelist, Ralph Ellison. Robert Coles has worked long and closely among the most oppressed Negroes of the Deep South. He is impressed and puzzled by the spirit and courage, by what he calls the "extreme resilience, inspiration, improvisation, and an originality," and, above all, "an incredible capacity for survival" that he finds among these children of oppression. "I don't know where else in the world, when else in history," he writes, "two groups of people have had quite so wide a range of relationships—spread over time" as here in the South. It has made him skeptical of the "Mark of Oppression" and its stereotyped effects. He misses some of the qualities of the Southern "subculture" among Negroes in the North and wistfully hopes they will not disappear.

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Ralph Ellison believes that the foundation of Negro identity is the racial experience of tragedy and suffering through generations of Southern history. "Negro American consciousness," he writes, "is not a product (as so often seems true of so many American groups) of a will to historical forgetfulness. . . . Being a Negro American has to do with the memory of slavery and the hope of emancipation and the betrayal by allies and the revenge and contempt inflicted by our former masters after Reconstruction." It was thus, says Ellison, that the Negro "has developed those techniques of survival to which Faulkner refers as 'endurance,' and an ease of movement within explosive situations which makes Hemingway's definition of courage, 'grace under pressure,' appear mere swagger." Ellison would not have the modern Negro forfeit that dearly bought sense of identity and the support it gives his personality. He thinks it can be strengthened by the Negro's establishing identity as a Southerner.

Two-thirds of the Negroes now living in the North and West were born and raised in the South. They constitute a tremendous Southern impact upon the North. Within a few years many of our largest non-Southern cities will be predominantly Negro in population. The North in fact is confronted with a Southern invasion vaster by far than the one General Lee threatened. Under the skin the new invaders are Southern too, even the second and third generation of them. Living in the North, one hears Southern accents and sees Southern mannerisms all around. These new immigrants will be the most powerful influence in shaping the direction and future of the Negro movement where the majority of Negroes now live. If they can preserve their Southern heritage of endurance and courage and "grace under pressure," their country will be the better for it and their own identity the more secure.

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For Keith Jackson

HAZARD ADAMS

Thirty years ago one fall
standing as usual for lunch
we heard of Wilbur's death.
It had been as if
with all called in
someone stayed hidden,
lingered in the woods
and we were merely
less by one.

It had been as if
in the pale brown hall
after grace and shuffling chairs
in the abstract callousness
of brown betty, bells, and announcements
Wilbur had faded through
forests of hide-and-seek
to a vague anticipation
of rustling hidden birds.

Or was it grief that hushed
the hall that day?
All of him was taken—
all we might know of him—
away.
Yet when spring birds appeared
and the sun and deciduous ones
regained their poise, little remained,
except in birds, of him.

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The goings recently
are not the same,
and yours, O little one,
a strange forsaking:
There is the sandbox,
there the thirty trees
where in spring afternoons
you swung the trunks
in balance with my son.

Innocent time
dries twigs of memory.
The trees of age are green.
I see you still,
no shyly hidden bird,
forgotten of my youth,
but now, dear child,
questioning me
across my summer lawn.

✪ HAZARD ADAMS' poems have appeared in *Quicksilver, Poetry Northwest, Michigan's Voices,* and in THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR. He is chairman of the department of English at the University of California at Irvine, and the author of two recent critical books, *The Contexts of Poetry* and *William Blake: A Reading of the Shorter Poems.*

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The Message of the Hungarian Revolution

MICHAEL POLANYI

TEN YEARS AGO last February Khrushchev denounced the insane regime of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress. Four months later, in June 1956, the repercussions of this act led to an open rebellion of the Hungarian writers at the meetings of the Petöfi Circle in Budapest. This was the actual beginning of the Hungarian Revolution which broke out violently in October of the same year.

It has often been mentioned, but never realized in its full importance, that the rebellion of the Petöfi Circle was an uprising of Communist party members. There were many among them who had won high honors and great financial benefits from the government. They had been, until shortly before, its genuine and passionate supporters.

The Petöfi Circle, where this first rebellion broke out, was an official organ of the party, presided over by trusted representatives of the ruling clique. But in June 1956 other party members, forming the bulk of the audience, overcame the platform. They demanded a reversal of the position assigned to human thought in the Marxist-Leninist scheme. Marxism-Leninism taught that public consciousness is a superstructure of the underlying relations of production; public thought under socialism, therefore, must be an instrument of the party controlling socialist production.

The meetings rejected this doctrine. They affirmed that truth must be recognized as an independent power in public life. The

✪ MICHAEL POLANYI is a scientist and philosopher. His books include *Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy,* in which his theory of knowledge was first fully stated; *Science, Faith and Society; The Study of Man;* and *The Logic of Liberty.* This article is an expansion of an essay by Mr. Polanyi which will appear in the book, *Ten Years After; The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History,* to be published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

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press must be set free to tell the truth. The murderous trials based on faked charges were to be publicly condemned and their perpetrators punished; the rule of law must be restored. And, above all, the arts corrupted by subservience to the party must be set free to arouse the imagination and to tell the truth. It was this outbreak that created the center of opposition that later overthrew the Communist government of Hungary.

Has the response of the West to these events been adequate? I am not asking whether we ought to have aided the Hungarian Revolution by money or the force of arms. I am asking about our intellectual and moral responses.

What did we think, what do we think today, of this change of mind among many of the most devoted Hungarian Stalinists? Do we realize that this was a wholesale return to the ideals of nineteenth-century liberalism? In the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 its fighters were clearly going back to the ideals of 1848, to Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. After the French Revolution the ideas of liberty had filtered through the whole of Europe, and in 1848 these ideas aroused a chain of insurgences. Starting from Paris, rebellions swept through the German states and through Austria into Hungary. The Hungarian revolutionaries of 1956 revived these same ideas; they believed that the ideals of truth, justice and liberty were valid, and they were resolved to fight and conquer in their name.

I ask you again: What do we say to this? It has been a long time since history was written in the English language as the inevitable progress of truth, justice and liberty. I think J. B. Bury was the last to do so, fifty years ago. Our current interpretations of social change and the rise of new ideas are nearer to the theories of Marx than to the views of Bury, or those of J. S. Mill, or Jefferson, or Condorcet and Gibbon. Our interpretations are couched in terms of a value-free sociology, of a historicist historiography, or of depth psychology. We can then hardly be expected to acknowledge the aims that the Hungarian rebels professed to be fighting for. Our most popular explanation of unrest in the Soviet countries is sociological. It says that the methods of Stalin had fulfilled their

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purpose of carrying out the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union, but that these methods were no longer suited to a more complex society and hence the need has arisen for new ideals, more appropriate to the new situation. This is said to have caused the renewal of thought in the Soviet countries since Stalin's death.

Such theories are put forward without any supporting evidence, and nobody asks for evidence. It is ignored that two of the most highly industrialized regions of Europe, namely East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have produced the hardest Stalinist governments and resisted reform the longest. Any mechanical explanation of human affairs, however absurd, is accepted today unquestioningly.

Listen to the story told two years ago in *Encounter* (January, 1964) by a distinguished expert on Soviet countries, Professor Richard Pipes, then Associate Director of Harvard University's Russian Research Center. Professor Pipes wrote:

> Four years ago, when writing an essay on the Russian intelligentsia for the journal *Dædalus,* I wanted to conclude it with a brief statement to the effect that the modern Russian intellectual had a very special mission to fulfill: "to fight for truth." On the advice of friends I omitted this passage since it sounded naïve and unscientific. Now I regret having done so . . .

Thus at the most influential academic center studying Soviet affairs, it took three years after the rebellion of writers at the Petöfi Circle for it to be mooted for the first time that this kind of unrest was due to a craving for truth. Even then this suggestion was suppressed in deference to expert opinion, because to speak of intellectuals fighting for truth was held to be "naïve and unscientific."

Professor Pipes continues this passage by explaining why he thinks now (four years later) that in the case of Russian intellectuals it is not unscientific to attribute to them a craving for truth. The reasons apply equally to the conditions under which Hungarian intellectuals rebelled, and thus the argument applies to them too. Professor Pipes writes:

> The reason the word "truth" is in disrepute among us is because we attach to it generally moral connotations; that is, we understand it as a concept which implies the existence of a single criterion of right and

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wrong—something we are not willing to concede. We react thus because in the environment in which we live our right to perceive is not usually questioned; what can be questioned is our interpretation of the perceived reality. But in an environment where the very right to perception of reality is inhibited by claims of the State, the word "truth" acquires a very different meaning. It signifies not true value but true experience: the right to surrender to one's impressions without being compelled for some extraneous reason to interpret and distort them.

We are told here that it is unscientific to speak among us of "truth," and that the word merits its current discredit because we attach moral values to it. It is legitimate to recognize that the Soviet intellectuals fight for truth, because they are demanding the right merely to perceive reality, not to convey any interpretation of it in terms of values believed to be true. The writers who rebelled in the Petöfi Circle ten years ago, however, were not demanding the right to have certain "perceptions of reality." They were demanding that the execution of László Rajk on faked charges be publicly admitted and that they be free to denounce the tyranny forcing its false values on the people; they were demanding the right to write the truth in novels, in poetry, and in the newspapers.

I think that to understand this rebellion we must see it as part of a major historical progression, composed of three stages to be seen jointly. The first was the defection of leading intellectuals of the West, abandoning "the God that failed." Some turned away during the trials of 1937-38, others after the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939, others still later. But by the end of the Second World War there was an ardent band of former Communists desperately warning against the Soviets, whose philosophy made them impervious to our values.

The next decisive change occurred in Soviet Russia itself on the day Stalin died. The first act of his successors was to release the thirteen doctors of the Kremlin, who had recently been sentenced to death on their own false "confession" of murderous attempts against Stalin and other members of the government. This action had a shattering effect on the party. If party-truth was to be refuted by mere bourgeois objectivism, then Stalin's whole fictitious universe would presently dissolve.

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The alarm was justified. After the further revelations of the Twentieth Party Congress, it became clear that the new masters of the Kremlin had acted as they did because they felt that their position would be safer if they had more truth on their side and less against them. They sacrificed for this end the most powerful weapon of terror, the weapon of faked trials; no such trials were held in the Soviet empire after the Jewish doctors were set free. A radical change of the foundations had begun.

The third major step in the growth of the power to vindicate the truth—and the human values resting on the right to tell the truth—was the rebellion of Hungarian writers. We can see this now as part of the historical process that had started with the numerous defections from Communism among Western intellectuals about fifteen years earlier.

The rebellion of the Petöfi Circle was a change of mind by dedicated Communists forming an intellectual *avant-garde.* Although undertaken against the still ruling Stalinism, it spread under the very eyes of the secret police, until one day it brought the workers out into the streets and won over the army to its support. The government was overthrown. And although a few days later the Russians moved in with new tanks, they did not restore the Stalinists to power. Since the twenty-third of October, 1956, ideas have never ceased to circulate freely in Hungary. You cannot fully print them, but you can effectively spread them by word of mouth.

When seen in this context, these events might appear self-explanatory. They would indeed be so, if the truths of the Enlightenment were self-evident today. But although these truths still dominate our public statements and also largely dominate the day-to-day judgments of men, they are, for the most part, ignored by social scientists. Most academic experts refuse to recognize that the mere thirst for truth and justice has caused the revolts now transforming the Soviet countries. They are not Marxists, but their views are akin to Marxism in claiming that the scientific explanation of history must be based on something more tangible than the fact that people change their minds.

Such a split between the laity and the learned is not unusual in

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the history of thought, and has at times been beneficent. But I think that the major responsibilities of our time require a clarification of these inconsistencies. I have quoted the hesitations of Professor Pipes of Harvard and have criticized the advisers mentioned by him, for their reluctance to acknowledge the fight for truth among Soviet intellectuals. I will now take a look at the principles governing this attitude. I shall use as my source a distinguished textbook, entitled *Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior,* edited by Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul S. Smith, and published in 1963. This textbook, composed of seventy contributions by well-known academic scholars, and covering eight hundred and thirty large pages, claims to teach the "Science of Social Behavior," both its principles and its application to several subjects. The introduction, by Robert A. Dahl of Yale University, declares that the proper subjects of science are "events which may be observed with the senses and their extension." This excludes from science any statements of value. Values admittedly enter into the *life* of a social scientist, but in the pursuit of science the scientist makes only statements of fact that can be observed by our senses. To state, for example, that the Supreme Court of the United States has nine members is to state a fact, while to say that its decisions are impartial is not to state a fact, and this kind of statement is to be excluded from the science of political behavior.

Professor Dahl follows up these principles by an attack on traditional political science. He says—and in this he is right—that the traditional inquiry is concerned with such questions as "What is a good society?" He derides such a pursuit by calling it mere "political theology."

To see how these scientific principles work in our case, I shall now quote some detailed evidence of the mental transformation among Hungarian Communists and other Soviet intellectuals. Here is a passage written at the beginning of October 1956—that is, a few weeks before the outbreak of the revolution—by Nicholas Gimes, until lately a firm Stalinist:

> Slowly we had come to believe, at least with the greater, the dominant part of our consciousness . . . that there are two kinds of truth,

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that the truth of the Party and the people can be different and can be more important than the objective truth and that truth and political expediency are in fact identical. This is a terrible thought . . . if the criterion of truth is political expediency, then even a lie can be "true" . . . even a trumped up political trial can be "true" . . . And so we arrived at the outlook which infected not only those who thought up the faked political trials but often affected even the victims; the outlook which poisoned our whole public life, penetrated the remotest corners of our thinking, obscured our vision, paralysed our critical faculties and finally rendered many of us incapable of simply sensing or apprehending truth. This is how it was, it is no use denying it.

Speaking of faked trials, Gimes must have had foremost in mind the trial and hanging of László Rajk. The grave of Rajk was visited at about this time by a procession of many thousands, led by Communists. The pilgrimage took place on the sixth of October, the day that commemorates in Hungary the hanging—at the orders of the Austrian Emperor—of thirteen revolutionary generals in 1849.

Let me add here some extracts from a later and non-Hungarian document. It is a long poem by a leading Bulgarian Communist, Dimitar Metodiev, published in the official party organ of Bulgaria in January 1962.* It describes in passionate terms the great change that by this time was universally imposed by the party. The poem entitled "Song of Our Faith," starts with the verse:

> If one had told me yesterday:
> —Friend take off your glasses!—
> I would have laughed
> in a black rage
> at the mortal insult.

and it continues later:

> On the ground now
> The glasses lie smashed
> And I look at them stunned.
>
> . . .
>
> Friends!
> the great hour of the twentieth congress
> has struck our earth.
> Oh let its holy justice
> solemnly, inexorably go forth today.

* Quoted from *East Europe*, April, 1962.

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Returning once more to Hungary, look at a case in which "the smashing of the glasses" happened, long before official enforcement by the party and even before any public manifestations by the Hungarian intellectuals. It happened to the Hungarian Communist writer György Paloczi-Horvath, while imprisoned at the orders of Rakosi, as described in his book *The Undefeated* (Boston, 1959). Since his arrest in September 1949, Paloczi-Horvath had suffered incessant cruelties, inflicted on him in order to make him confess to false charges; yet he had never wavered in his Communist faith. Then suddenly, after two years in prison, in a matter of a few days, he changed his mind and rejected the party. His sufferings in prison continued unchanged, but from this moment he felt free, even happy—a new person.

Let me now confront the science of political behavior with these pieces of evidence and see what such a science can make of them. Let us take a generous view of the range included among "events which may be observed by the senses and their extension." Thus we may accept it as a scientifically observed fact that two very different ways of seeing political affairs have been current in the Soviet countries: one, until Stalin's death in March 1963; another from about two years later, after the Twentieth Party Congress. A pair of hitherto indubitable spectacles were smashed and everything looked different from then on. Science can record this fact.

But does it account for *the act of smashing the spectacles?* Does it explain this act, which in Hungary amounted to a revolution? Our science could acknowledge this fundamental change of outlook as a fact—and perhaps even class it as an intellectual achievement—if the change could be regarded as the correction of a hitherto current theory by the discovery of new factual evidence. But this is not what happened. Paloczi-Horvath acknowledges with amazement that all the facts he was seeing in a new light after his defection from Communism, had already been known to him as facts before his change of mind. Arthur Koestler has described this phenomenon in looking back on his time as a Communist. "My party education had equipped my mind [he wrote] with such elaborate shock absorbing buffers and elastic defences that everything seen and heard became automatically transformed to fit a preconceived pattern" (*The God that Failed,* London, 1950).

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Stalinism was a closed system, a system of the kind I have described in *Personal Knowledge* as capable of accommodating any conceivable new piece of evidence. Such a system, which can interpret in its own terms any possible fact, can be shaken only by preference for a total change of outlook. The Bulgarian Dimitar Metodiev was right in describing it as the smashing of one's spectacles.

Remember that the whole person is involved in trusting a particular comprehensive outlook. Any criticism of it is angrily rejected. Its questioning is felt to be an attack on an existential assurance, hardened by the dread of mental disintegration. We have many testimonies by Communists, that their minds clung to Marxism-Leninism for fear of being cast into the darkness of a meaningless, purposeless universe. Paloczi-Horvath himself describes how, after his abandonment of the Communist faith, he at first felt lost, incapable of coherent thought. It was only after a few days that he began to experience a new way of making sense, which he felt to be a more honest, more decent way of thinking, bringing him a happiness that transcended his sufferings in prison.

Nicholas Gimes confirms this emotional value of a comprehensive framework. Looking back on his time as a devoted member of the party, when he believed that to benefit the revolution was the criterion of truth and of all other human values, he feels horrified by the mental corruption caused by this doctrine. The scornful rejection of objectivity as a bourgeois delusion and fraud, which he had previously accepted as an intellectual triumph, now appears to him as an abysmal loss, the loss of the capacity to see any truth at all.

We have many descriptions also of conversions in the opposite direction. Thousands of leading intellectuals have joined the Communist party because they found in Marxism an interpretation of history and a guide to action far superior to the outlook predominant since the French Revolution among progressive circles in the West. In 1917, when President Wilson was confronted by Lenin on the world scene, these people laughed Wilson's language to scorn and dedicated themselves instead to Lenin's doctrine, which they felt to be intellectually and morally superior.

We may take it, then, as an established fact that during the past half-century radical changes of mind have taken place, which were

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motivated each time by passionate affirmations of value. And we can return again, with these facts before us, to the science of political behavior and ask how this science deals with such conversions from one basic conviction to another.

I shall admit once more the widest possible interpretation of this scientific method, and shall concentrate on the question of how the method treats the moral motives of men when they smash their old spectacles and put on new ones instead.

The behavioral scientist acknowledges that moral values motivate him in private life. He may meaningfully observe that moral motives are claimed by people for their actions. Such reference to alleged values was sanctioned by Heinrich Rickert in 1902, in his book *Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*. When he taught here that value judgments are beyond the competence of science, he excluded *Werturteile* (value judgments) from science, but allowed that *Wertbezogenheit* (references to value judgments) is observable by science. Through the mediation of Max Weber, this doctrine has since been used to reconcile moral neutralism in science with the experience of observing moral motivation in persons studied by the scientist. According to this theory, the scientific method can establish, for example, that the rebellious Hungarian intellectuals attributed moral value to the freedom of truth and felt that the doctrine of party-truth caused a moral corruption of public life; but it cannot state whether this moral judgment was right or not, since this observation would constitute a moral judgment, which science is not competent to make.

This doctrine, however, can be proved to be inconsistent by two complementary arguments, one starting from the existence of the scientist as a moral agent (outside the range, as he alleges, of his scientific activity) and examining the implications of his (extrascientific) moral judgments for the statements he makes as a scientist; the other moving from his allegedly value-free scientific pronouncements to his (extrascientific) moral judgments.

The first argument is as follows. I. All men, whatever their professions, make moral judgments. II. When we claim that an action of ours is prompted by moral motives, or when we make

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moral judgments of others—as in recognizing the impartiality of a court of law—we invariably refer to moral standards *that we hold to be valid.* Our submission to a standard has universal intent. We do not prefer courts of law to be unbiased in the same sense in which we prefer a steak to be rare rather than well done; our appeal to moral standards necessarily claims to be *right,* that is, binding on all men.* III. Such a claim entails a distinction between *moral truth* and *moral illusion.* IV. This distinction in turn entails a distinction between two types of motivation. The awareness of moral truth is founded on the recognition of a valid claim, which can be reasonably argued for and supported by evidence; moral illusion, in contrast, is compulsive, like a sensory illusion. V. Thus once we admit, as we do when we acknowledge the existence anywhere of valid moral judgments, that true human values exist and that people can be motivated by their knowledge of them, *we have implicitly denied the claim that all human actions can be explained without any reference to the exercise of moral judgment.* For to observe—in our present case—that the Hungarian writers rebelled against the practice of faked trials because they *believed* this practice to be wrong, leaves open the question of *why* they believed this. If true human values exist, the Hungarians may not have been driven by economic necessity, propaganda or any other compulsion; they may have been rebelling against a *real evil,* and may have done so *because they knew it to be evil.* But this cannot be decided without establishing first whether faked trials are, in fact, evil or not. Therefore: VI. *This value judgment proves indispensable* to the political scientist's explanation of the Hungarians' behavior.

The inconsistency of a science professing that it can explain all human action without making value judgments, while the scientist's private actions are said to be often motivated by moral values, can be more simply demonstrated the other way around. If the

* This claim is not impaired by the fact that the application of true values may be subject to exceptions. Arsenic is rightly known as a poison and aspirin as a harmless drug, although some people are immune to arsenic and every year a few people die from taking a tablet of aspirin.

And let me note that contrary to Kant, the universality of moral standards applies only to the judgments of men and not to their behavior, for men's situations are often incommensurable.

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social scientist can explain all human actions by value-free observations, then he cannot claim any of his own actions to be motivated by moral values. Either he exempts himself from his own theory of human motivation, or he must conclude that all reference to moral values—or any other values—are meaningless, are empty sounds. Such a conclusion, although repulsive, would at least appear consistent.* But there exists another consistent position that makes better sense, namely, the kind of position affirmed by the Hungarian revolutionaries. They expressed their horror of a philosophy that taught that truth, justice and morality must be subservient to the party, and they demanded that these values be recognized as free powers of the mind. Their moral motives were confirmed by the claim that the standards of truth, justice and morality must be recognized as independent powers in public affairs. A passion for freedom confirms thus the existence of the freedom it fights for.

This analysis shows that a science that claims to explain all human action without making a value judgment discredits not merely the moral motives of those fighting for freedom, but also their aims. This is why the Hungarian revolutionary movement, which revived the ideals of 1848, and which claimed that truth and justice should be granted power over public affairs, has met with such a cold reception by the science of political behavior. Modern academic theories of politics, on the contrary, give support to the doctrine that denies that human ideals can be an independent power in public affairs.

It goes without saying that these implications of their science were contrary to the sympathies of the scholars wedded to this science. It is true that Professor Pipes hesitated for three years before he first tried to state the obvious fact that Soviet intellectuals were fighting for truth. But when he was stopped from doing so by his more fastidious colleagues, he did not give up; after another four years he produced a labyrinthine theory that allowed him to state

* Once it is acknowledged, however, that *any* claim to truth entails a recognition of standards, even the scientist's "value-free" statements of fact are seen to be unable to claim their own truth in the light of his own theory. For the purpose of the present argument, however, it is not necessary to follow through the epistemological implications of the doctrine to this ultimate self-contradiction.

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this fact. Such scholarly prevarications may appear harmless, but they are not, for they obscure great events which dominate our history. No vision of these events can then arise to guide us. We are bogged down in meaningless details.

Think of the great figures of the Enlightenment. Think of Condorcet hiding in Paris from the Jacobins and completing before his death his triumphant forecast of universal progress. And then look at the article in the volume on the science of political behavior that deals with "Soviet Domestic Politics since the Twentieth Party Congress," an article originally published in 1958. Its author expects to see a growing influence of indoctrination in Russia on the grounds that extreme measures to secure ideological conformity, like those of the Zhdanov period, have been given renewed prominence since mid-1957. This is the kind of hand-to-mouth foresight that the science of social behavior has produced, for the lack of a vision of what is actually going on.

Remember now the contemptuous rejection by the science of social behavior of such questions as "What is a good society?" Such inquiries, belonging to traditional political science, were derided as "social theology." But what the revolution in Hungary—and the whole movement of thought of which it formed part—declared was a doctrine of political science in the traditional sense of the term. The movement condemned a society in which thought—the thought of science, morality, art, justice, religion—is not recognized as an autonomous power. It rejected life in such a society as corrupt, suffocating and stupid. This was clearly to raise, and to answer up to a point, the question "What is a good society?" It was to establish a doctrine of political science.

Actually, the current transformation of thought in the Soviet countries has added to political science new and remarkable insights. We have seen that this social transformation was achieved by a smashing of spectacles. Its typical utterances, such as those I have quoted, manifest the deep emotional upheaval caused by recognizing once more that truth, justice and morality have an intrinsic reality; and this is the decisive fact. Paloczi-Horvath remained in prison, but his conversion made him free; and that sym-

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bolizes the character of this whole immense political movement. It was not started by demands for institutional reform, and it went on without materially changing the institutional framework of the countries it transformed.

I know how very peculiar was this transformation of the Soviet countries, for I have often been challenged about it during the past years. When I spoke of the radical changes going on in the Soviet countries, I was faced sharply with the objection that these movements had brought no constitutional changes and could therefore be reversed at any moment. But this argument misconceives the foundations of power in this age ruled by rival philosophies. I myself yielded in a way to this error when, at the beginning of this essay, I called Stalin's regime "insane." His regime was actually well founded on the strange assumption that neither truth nor justice, nor art, nor human feeling, exists except in the service of the party and subject to its rule. This conviction went so deep, was so fully accepted even by its victims, that when faithful Communists were executed on trumped-up charges, they went to their deaths shouting "Long live Stalin!" And this logic works also in reverse: Stalin's system virtually ceased to exist once its basic conceptions of intellectual and moral reality lost their hold on thought.

But we may yet ask, Why trust this change of basic conceptions? Could people not go back to their previous outlook, which supported Stalin so long? There is indeed nothing to prevent them from doing so, except the fact that their present conception of mental reality is far nearer to the truth, and they feel this and enjoy it. In this sense, and in this sense alone, can we say that what has happened has been not merely a *changing* of spectacles, but a *smashing* of spectacles? And this is a change more radical and more lasting than any constitutional reforms could be.

We have seen that the vagaries of philosophy, which have hardly ever before been followed literally among men, often control our fate today. The Soviet people have gone through a philosophical experiment which revealed to them the nature of mental reality in a way not recognized in our universities. They are turn-

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ing away from the site of their calamities and seeking support in the West. This we fail to give them. Our scientific methods search for truth by turning a blind eye on the values that the rebellious Communists have recognized, and our traditional schools of political science fail to take the chance that history has given them to vindicate these values. They are disabled by the antimetaphysical pressure surrounding them.

Meanwhile, in the Soviet countries, the ideas of mental independence are not only renewing the grounds of thought, but are daily revealing new sights previously blocked by official fictions. Hungarian newspapers have recently published complaints by party members that scant respect is paid to them. They say that the government itself prefers nonparty members. We can understand what is happening here. Those who still hotly profess the Marxist interpretation of history, who proclaim the surpassing achievements of revolutionary socialism and predict the proximate coming of Communism—these people are increasingly looked upon as ignorant fools. The young are immune against their teachings. The Old Believers' authority is drained away by the superior intelligence surrounding them. Everywhere outside China this change is clearly in progress.

The change is bound to be accelerated by the gradual acceptance, since 1963, of Yevsei Liberman's critique of detailed planning as inferior to market operations controlled by profit. It is becoming clear that there is in fact no viable socialist alternative to the market. Thus the Russian Revolution, which had conquered power in order to achieve a radically distinct form of economic organization, one that would be far more productive and also morally superior to commercial management, has now demonstrated the fact that there exists no such possibility. By the time its fiftieth anniversary is celebrated, the Revolution may be widely recognized by its very successors as having been virtually pointless. It may live on henceforth in its emblems, as the Mexican Revolution has lived on without making much difference in substance.

On the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, close on nine years ago, I published an article in *Encounter* under the

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title "The Foolishness of History." I complained that our scientific approach to history debars us from envisaging the part of folly in shaping history. I wrote:

> . . . Volume upon volume of excellent scholarship is rapidly accumulating on the history of the Russian Revolution, but as I read these books I find my own recollection of the event dissolving bit by bit. . . . The Revolution is about to be quietly enshrined under a pyramid of monographs.
>
> Yet I know that it was something quite different. Not only when it actually happened; but all along, up to this day—for it still lives in our own blood. It was boundless; it was infinitely potent; it was an act of madness. A great number of men—led by one man possessing genius—set themselves limitless aims that had no bearing at all on reality. They detested everything in existence and were convinced therefore that the total destruction of existing society and the establishment of their own absolute power on its ruins would bring total happiness to humanity. That was—unbelievable as it may seem—*literally* the whole substance of their projects for a new economic, political, and social system of mankind.

I think that this is now dawning on the minds of people all over the planet. The realization of the fact that we have wasted half a century of European history, and in the process well-nigh destroyed our civilization, may lead to shattering thoughts beyond my horizon. On the other hand, the final dissolution of the bogus salvation promised by our revolutions may exorcise at last the bogey of its hellish powers. Once the disasters of the past fifty years are clearly seen to have been pointless, Europeans may turn once more to cultivating their own garden. Such a new flowering of Europe may yet save this planet from the familiar mortal danger threatening us all today and for times to come.

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"The American Scholar" and Philosophy

PHILIP P. HALLIE

THE HISTORY OF IDEAS is the history of redemptive questioning. Parzival at first failed to ask the redemptive question, "for courtesy's sake," as Wolfram von Eschenbach puts it. When Anfortas, the wounded fisher king, had the Bleeding Lance and the Holy Grail brought into the room, Parzival did not ask the king what ailed him, or what all this meant. His teacher had told him that a courteous man does not ask too many questions, and he obeyed. But because of his silence the wasteland remained sterile, and the wound of Anfortas was not healed. Eventually Parzival, that brave man slowly wise, came back to the castle and asked Anfortas the redemptive question, *"Oeheim, waz wirret dir?"* "Uncle, what is wrong with you?" Only then was Anfortas healed, and only then did his land turn fertile.

Every modern thinker with any vigor recapitulates the history of Parzival: early in his studies he is too busy learning to come up with the fresh and fructifying question; but later he learns that silence is not only apathetic but vicious, when breaking it could help heal the wound in the groin of his age. Eventually he boldly asks the question, breaking what he feels to be a long silence. He trusts himself enough and has enough verve to do this, and (at least from his own point of view) his act frees men from sterility.

This kind of boldness was what Emerson was praising in his address, "The American Scholar," when he said, "The one thing in the world, of value, is the active soul." In fact, all through that address—as in so many of his other writings—he shows disdain

✪ PHILIP P. HALLIE, William Griffin Professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan University, is the author of a recently published book, *The Scar of Montaigne: an Essay in Personal Philosophy;* he has also published extensively on skepticism, Wittgenstein, and French philosophy.

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(like the hermit in Book IX of *Parzival*) for the meek young men too courteous to speak up; he thinks of them as the bookworms

> . . . who value books, as such; not as related to nature and the human constitution, but as making a sort of Third Estate with the world and the soul. . . . the bibliomaniacs of all degrees.

For him, if a man is not "free and brave," heroic, disdainful of the dry harvest that the past has left us with, then that man is not a scholar, not a Man Thinking. For Emerson a man who is meek before convention is as derelict of his duty as a scholar as the man who tries to act as if there is *no* past.

But there is another point in this address, at least as important as the plea for self-reliance, and very closely involved with that plea. The scholar's words must be "loaded with life." Perhaps the passage that best summarizes it is the following:

> . . . Character is higher than intellect. Thinking is the function. Living is the functionary. The stream retreats to its source. . . . Not out of those on whom systems of education have exhausted their culture, comes the helpful giant to destroy the old or to build the new, but out of unhandselled savage nature; out of terrible Druids and Berserkers come at last Alfred and Shakespeare.

Wordless, thoughtless, powerful nature, action as the bee acts or as the marauding Indian slays, sheer living is also part of "the active soul." Words must not form a "Third Estate with the world and the soul"; they must be alive with the silent vigor of both.

This is no place to give an exegesis of the polarities, the "undulations" that Emerson so loved. It would be alien to the spirit of his address to treat it with the meek patience of a bookworm. Instead, let me use those polarities and the story of Parzival as a preface, a preface to a plea for fresh, redemptive questions in the philosophy being written now.

When I was a graduate student in philosophy, I used to read to the blind, brilliant widow of a very great philosopher. She would make me a little meal, and then we would read and talk together. One night, after a delicious chicken dinner, I found myself so troubled that I could not or would not pick up the book. I begged

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her to help me answer a question that had troubled me all during the meal, as it had been troubling me almost all of my conscious life. The question could be put this way: how can we *justify* drawing a sharp line between killing and eating a juicy chicken and killing and eating a juicy child? For years I had seen Thanksgiving advertisements for turkey or cranberry sauce that pictured a plump, blond child at the table in front of a baked turkey with its legs slanting up in the air; her blond head was usually bowed in thanksgiving to God for this flesh. And for years I had thought about Jonathan Swift's "Modest Proposal" for eating infants.

Now I was not tempted by vegetarianism—my question had to do with killing and eating anything: why this and not that? I had read as much as I could find on the subject, and I had found words like "hierarchies" and "differences of kind" and "ensouled" as against "merely bodily" creatures. I had found words like "practicality" and "will to power," and none of these words helped justify or even elucidate the horror I felt at the idea of eating a plump, blond child, or the often pain-streaked pleasure I felt at eating a juicy capon. And so I asked this deep-thinking woman, the wife of one of the profoundest philosophers of the twentieth century, the question I had been asking myself for years.

She answered: "Dear Philip, you are sentimental, and you must get over it. You have not asked a proper philosophic question; you have expressed an emotional disorder. One simply does things this way or dies, and one does them gleefully if one is truly healthy."

I responded by telling her that almost every philosophic problem could be dismissed this way, as an emotional disorder, or a linguistic anomaly; and besides, I wished she would stop using question-begging epithets like "sentimental." I needed help toward justifying something I had been party to every day of my life, something that needed justification for me, or else human morality was accidental, arbitrary, provincial, even absurd. But she persisted in her name-calling. She could tell in a moment that there was no neat answer to my question, and so, with great philosophical caution, she was dismissing it, and hoping it would go away.

In surprise and anger I began to ask my fellow graduate stu-

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dents this little set of questions, and they reminded me how our teachers had been equipping us to get *rid* of such questions, to "exclude them from circulation," as Wittgenstein had put it. And this was true: I couldn't raise such questions with my teachers—neophyte that I was—without getting a string of speculations on the emotional or linguistic causes of my disorder.

As timid as Parzival, and very slowly wise, I became one of those meek young men who live in libraries and help engineer Emerson's "sort of Third Estate with the world and the soul." Sets of questions (no basic question could be stated in one neat form) accumulated in my diary, but could never appear in an article or a lecture, because they were not the sort of thing a clever philosopher tries to do, and I wanted to be clever. Lust, envy, ambition swept me like storms from time to time, and I left little bits of the wreckage on those diary pages. With the driftwood I would sometimes form questions like: "Why am I bored and even sometimes enraged by the smug remarks of biblical, pagan, and scientific wise men on such subjects as sexual passion, jealousy, and 'getting somewhere'?" And I briefly essayed answers to such questions. But for the learned public, as well as for my students, and therefore almost all of my working time, I explored the grounds and limits of human knowledge, and cautiously posed and answered fashionable and mangeable questions like: "What did So-and-So really say about such and such, and why was he obviously overlooking a very important point in saying this?" My life as a philosopher went one way; my intimate, inner life went, with my diary, another. And I let this happen not only out of courtesy or timidity, but out of hope: after all, these things I could deal with in public *were* "fundamental," and therefore eventually they would surely help me to answer the questions that hummed in my brain so often, so long, and so insistently.

But the years and the diary questions accumulated. I noticed that my essays at answers got skimpier, and that I seldom saw a connection between my work and my life. The acceptable questions, which had stayed acceptable for more than two thousand years of philosophy (like the body-mind problem, freedom as against determinism, and the nature of meaning), somehow failed

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to help me articulate the humming. Had I lived in another age, I might have thought that I was losing my soul, sinning against the light. What I did think was that I was losing my integrity, that I was spending my life doing something *actually different and separate* from the things *I knew* were worth doing.

We need not pursue at length this autobiographical narrative. Its upshot is more important than the pain my self-deception caused. And its upshot was this: I resolved to be a little less courteous to and patient with my contemporaries and predecessors in philosophy; I resolved this for many reasons, because I knew that what I lost in courtesy and patience I might well gain in force, but above all because I needed, in the words of Thoreau, to

> . . . drive life into a corner, and . . . if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole and genuine meanness of it, and publish its meanness to the world; or if it were sublime, to know it by experience, and be able to give a true account of it. . .

I wanted to use everything I had learned and everything I was, in order to do this.

We have noticed that the history of ideas is the history of redemptive questioning. It seems plain that there are at least two sorts of questions that have quickened men's minds: questions concerning knowledge of the way things are, and questions concerning the way the questioner himself ought to feel and act. For instance, René Descartes redeemed himself and his age, at least in his own opinion, by asking, "What can we know for sure, and by what method can we know it?" He wanted to discover how all our claims to knowledge could be made as "clear and distinct," as lucid and testable as $2 + 2 = 4$. As to his own conduct, he discussed it only in personal letters, and in a section of his *Discourse on Method* where he made it clear that he would not philosophize about his everyday conduct, would use his method only on matters of theory—although some day, *"quand il serait temps,"* he would bring knowledge and conduct, his method and his life, together. Unfortunately, Descartes never lived to see that day, just as I had failed to see it thus far in my spiritual history. On the other hand, some thinkers have been more concerned with living happily, with

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eudaimonia, than with laying the cognitive foundations of all conduct. Montaigne, for instance (one could as readily mention Solomon, Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius), was rather impatient with "supercelestial thoughts and subterranean conduct"; his essays were a *"membre de ma vie,"* a part of his everyday living, a way of moderating and elucidating his imagination, his passions and his everyday actions. On the one hand, there have been those who have devoted most of their time and genius to impersonal knowing; on the other, there have been those who have devoted themselves mainly to understanding their everyday lives. For some redemption lay primarily in impersonal knowledge; for others it lay primarily in personal wisdom.

Of course, none of these men dreamed of *permanently* neglecting one sort of question in favor of the other. As Emerson put it in the best brief essay ever written in English on Montaigne:

> Every fact is related on one side to sensation, and on the other, to morals. The game of thought is, on the appearance of one of these two sides, to find the other. . . . Nothing so thin, but has these two faces. . .

Living intelligently and living well are not separate enterprises. The main concerns of the scientistic philosophers and the main concerns of the wisdom philosophers are two sides of a thin coin; but still some men are quite content to spend most of their lives looking on the side of objective knowledge, and others are content to spend most of the time of their lives putting into words the business of living well. Every thinker worthy of the name has seen the thinness of Emerson's coin, the need to play what he calls the "game of thought," but some, and in my experience with my contemporaries and teachers many, have been more concerned with asking, "What is there?" than with asking, "How do I live here?"

Seeing this, and looking at the entries in my diary, I found that I was a wisdom philosopher stranded in a community of scientistic philosophers. I found that I was impatient with "foundations" of method and fact that were never quite solid and square enough to have my conduct built upon them. I found that my years of training as a scientistic philosopher, and my previous work in physics, had not been wasted on me: I cherished method, facts and distinctions that made a difference as much as the next man, but I

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did not cherish these so much that I could continue to postpone thinking sustainedly about my own feelings and conduct. Of course, I was fully aware that other men felt otherwise, and I gladly gave them my blessings: whatever they could find out I wanted to know, and with more curiosity than most. But I was ready to start asking my own sort of redemptive questions. I was ready to start finding my way about amidst the feelings of envy, lust, ambition, joy, and horror that I found in myself and in my fellow men.

And gradually literature opened up for me in a new way. For instance, one of the Father's speeches in Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author* offered a vision I needed:

> . . . The animals suffer without reasoning about their sufferings. But take the case of a man who suffers and begins to reason about it. Oh no! It can't be allowed! Let him suffer like an animal, and then—ah yet, he is "human"!

In many places in literature I found the conviction that to neglect to think or to put into words what we often and strongly feel is to fail to live in full humanity. But philosophy also changed for me. I came to see that Socrates may have had something like this in mind when he said that the unexamined life is not worth living, and various Greeks, divine and human, may have had this in mind when they urged men to get acquainted with themselves. It seemed to me that Confucius in his *Analects* may have been thinking this way when he praised "the great learning" as the process of

> . . . clarifying the way wherein the intelligence increases through the process of looking straight into one's heart . . . it is rooted in watching truth affecting the way people grow.

Above all, Montaigne's *Essays,* and to a lesser extent Thoreau's *Walden* (toward the beginning of which he writes, ". . . I, on my side, require of every writer . . . a simple and sincere account of his own life, and not merely what he has heard of other men's lives . . ."), encouraged me to engage in what Confucius called "adult study, grinding the corn in the head's mortar to fit it for use." These words encouraged me to pose the problems that were pressing for me, that cried in my skull for light.

Formulating the truth in a language as clear and distinct as

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arithmetic while living like a mute animal amidst my own disgusts and yearnings became very difficult now. Eager for other sorts of men to ask and answer their own redemptive questions—Emerson's coin *is* thin—I became even more eager to ask the questions that would help redeem my own most powerful feelings from a totally irrational silence.

But questions without answers are not redemptive, at least not in philosophy; the interrogative mood is only one note in the diapason of the human spirit. The same boldness, even discourtesy, that prompts the productive questions must prompt their products, the answers. Without such answers the wound of silence (at least it is a wound for philosophers, who are supposed to believe that the unexamined life is not worth living) is not healed.

It is useful to notice that the redemptive answers that "active" men give fall into two sorts, parallel to the "scientistic" and "wisdom" rubrics we have been using. Let us say that there are "Cartesians" and "Montaignians." Actually, there are many sorts of thinkers in between, but the distinction will be helpful anyway, just as the distinction between two colors can be useful even though there are shades in between—or even *because* there are in-between shades. The Cartesians want a universal, permanent and precise science as the answer to their question, "What can we know for sure?" Like Laplace, they want a theory that (as he puts it in his *Treatise on Probability*)

> . . . would embrace in the same formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom: nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the past, would be present to its eyes. . .

And Descartes had much the same sort of system in mind; his answer, or his system of answers, had to be as cognitively clean as arithmetic, although far more comprehensive.

But the Montaignians are not universalists; they want not definitive systems, but partitive claims, claims suitable for *some* times, *some* places, *some* circumstances, *some* people. This sort of wisdom philosopher is often content with rules of thumb for living

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that apply only in some cases. For instance, Proverbs 14:30 reads:

> A tranquil mind gives life to the flesh,
> but passion makes the bones rot.

Of course, only some tranquillities give life to the flesh, and only some passions make the bones rot, and the whole sentence is patently imprecise. There are other kinds of partitive statements, ones like Montaigne's *"Et les Roys et les philosophes fientent, et les dames aussi."* To say that "Both kings and philosophers defecate, and women do too," is to make a claim with no exceptions. Here the statement itself is not partitive or imprecise—its *use* is. It is always true, but only sometimes useful. It may, for instance, be useful only when we are trying to make somebody less arrogant, but if it is indiscriminately invoked, it can be misleading, disgusting, or troublemaking.

Another way of putting the partitive nature of Montaignian answering is this: change is crucial to this sort of philosophy. Consistency is not the highest virtue (as it is for scientistic philosophies like Descartes's), and sometimes consistency does more harm than good for a Montaigne. Emerson's aphorism on consistency, hobgoblins and little minds is quite apt here. Different circumstances, different moods, dictate different courses of passion and action. Montaignians hate straitjackets, and love change; they are more interested in what Confucius called "watching truth affecting the way people grow" than they are in rigid methods or systems.

The partitive quality in some wisdom philosophies is put plainly in Proverbs 26:9:

> Like a thorn that goes up into the hand of a drunkard
> is a proverb in the mouth of fools.

Common sense, judgment, always changing and hopefully growing, these make the individual remarks of a Montaigne useful as a guide for living; it takes some sense to know when and where and how the partitives in fact apply. And Montaigne, who wrote more about common sense than any other wisdom philosopher of my acquaintance, never even bothered to formulate a precise definition of *"sens."* He simply tried to show us how he used his own

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common sense. Such philosophers are content with the rich contributions of the individual's judgment.

But still, not seeking a complete and consistent system, they do require constancy. Their integrity, however, does not reside in formulas—it resides in *style*—the way the partitives jell to make a way of looking at things, a fundamental way of life, a personality that grows or at least changes but does not disintegrate. Style for Montaigne is not a method with recipe-like rules, nor is it mannerisms that are as rigid and superficial as recipes can be; it is deeply personal, that is, difficult to detach from the person who has it (while we often learn methods from others by rote, and it is a parlor game to pick up each other's mannerisms). All of this is what Montaigne meant when he urged the reader to note his *façon* or *stile* rather than his conclusions, and when he said that his essays were strokes in a self-portrait, an image of a personal vision that changes but never loses its basic contours.

As a result of this emphasis on partitives and style, Montaignian philosophizing has been called by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "an inquiry without discovery, a hunt without a kill." Unlike the Cartesian's, the Montaignian's philosophizing fits his life: it is individual and alive, not a supercelestial, superpersonal castle.

The kind of answers I learned to want were Montaignian answers, which are not answers at all, but essays, efforts at Confucius' "adult study," the best and most lucid efforts I could manage at the time. I wanted not a kill, not an impersonal method and system, but a language loaded with life.

Ultimately my reasons for using a Montaignian approach to philosophy amount to what was said in the first part of this paper: I simply needed to face certain questions in order to "live with myself," as we colloquially and accurately put it. But I should add another reason: skepticism. The Cartesian, scientistically redemptive questions men have posed and answered have not, as a matter of fact, done what they set out and claimed to do. They have not produced a system acceptable to all men in all times and all circumstances. A person who is skeptical about philosophic recipes sees that Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Berkeley, Hegel and others

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have not silenced their oppositions (each other), and every new ecumenical effort to find a universal system and method soon dwindles into another defensive and offensive sect. A theory is not universal in fact if it is not universally accepted—there is *no other workable criterion* for judging universality. Each great answer looks delightfully plausible if you lavish enough time and ingenuity on it, but it becomes definitive only when it is indeed universally accepted. If it continues to be offensive and defensive, it is in fact a sect, one among many, unless you are willing to ignore the opposition, or dismiss it with arrogant, question-begging epithets like "spiritually blind," *et cetera.* And if you do this, you are fudging on the term "universal": history will walk around you.

The skeptical person looks at each of the great scientistic philosophic systems with aesthetic admiration, but he believes that if they cannot domesticate history, they should not claim to be doing so. They should not mistake their intentions for their deeds, the fish story for the fish. In waging the battles of the books and at the same time claiming victory, they call the whole philosophic enterprise into question, at least in the eyes of plain men.

But skepticism must be kept sternly in check; it tends to nourish not an active mind, but a passive, indifferent suspension of judgment, a kind of spiritual death. Radical skepticism wants us to keep quiet about *all* matters that are arguable. Once I heard a scholar, who quite rightly described himself as a skeptic, say that the Nazis may or may not have been wrong on genocide: after all, as his neofascist acquaintances had told him, there were many good reasons for Hitler's doing what he did. And so, since he could not convince everybody, he suspended judgment, doubted, and had no way of facing his own deepest convictions. (He was himself Jewish, and felt an immense terror and disgust over what Hitler had done.) His skepticism created a spiritual wound; it did not help heal one. No, one must be skeptical of only those claims that contradict their deeds; one must be prepared to believe some things that are arguable, provided that those arguable things do not claim to be unarguable, universally "valid." When skepticism turns its logical weapons on personal, ethical or other such beliefs, it can do noth-

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ing but paralyze the mind. Here one must be skeptical of skepticism or one cuts oneself off from life.

Emerson, in a journal entry of January, 1842, wrote:

> I see that a man ought to renounce writing for his townsmen or his countrymen and express his spiritual history and motions in such images as have a private significance for him.

A man must be bold enough to do what he should, although he may well fail to convince all of his "townsmen." And if someone should say that this approach makes argumentative discourse between men impossible, let me tell the following story about Winston Churchill. A fellow legislator was pleading his case before the House of Commons, and seeing an adverse reaction from Churchill, he stopped the course of his argument to say, "I should like to remind my colleague that I am giving only *my* opinion on this matter." To which Churchill replied, "I should like to remind my colleague that I am shaking only *my* head on this matter." Moderate skepticism deflates arrogance; it does not stop the shaking of heads.

I can hear my philosopher-townsmen saying "relativism," and "subjectivism" in their summaries of what has been written here. Well, these terms have a tendency to bite the hand that uses them. Great universalistic schemes, as I have mentioned, turn into provincial sects, and the barrel of pitch into which they draw their proponents and opponents is as dark as any subjectivism (Descartes's "Objections and Replies" are a classic example of a "universal" science reduced to interminable, provincial bickering). Moreover, men like Montaigne and Thoreau ("relativist" as they themselves often admitted they were—if the word means anything plain) have communicated abundantly and persuasively the "private significance" Emerson talked about, and have done so to many generations of grateful men. Often there is great lucidity in ordinary language used with candor and modesty. And a jargon that mimics the exact sciences without possessing their great persuasive power can be as unclear as it is unpersuasive.

We human beings are different enough from each other and similar enough to each other to profit from each other's several

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efforts to understand our lives. Scientistic accusations of subjectivity, *et cetera,* cannot conclusively "refute" wisdom philosophies like Montaigne's, nor can a Montaignian approach conclusively rule out of court the great insights that scientistic philosophies have produced. In such deep, or, if you will, ultimate matters, words like "refutation" express only foolish wishes, never real possibilities. On such matters, one looks at the evidence as best one can, and finds oneself choosing a way of thought, not necessarily for all men, but necessarily for this one.

After having looked for a while, I found myself making certain basic choices. I found that there are two visions of the politics of ideas: one is, if I may use loaded words, totalitarian—it proposes a universal form with much firmness and detail, and insists that this is *the* form of reality and of man's knowledge of it; the other is a democracy which disappoints men hungry for a "kill," but which stimulates men who are eager to assume the burdens of a life of self-trust. In political theory men have long ago become accustomed to a democracy of basic points of view; in technical philosophy we have not yet learned enough about the inextinguishable variety of the human spirit.

Keats expressed a vision that could be an emblem for this way of thinking about philosophy:

> . . . man should . . . whisper results to his neighbor, and thus, by every germ of spirit sucking the sap from our old ethereal, every human being might become great, and Humanity instead of being a wide heath of Furze and Briars with here and there a remote Pine or Oak, would become a grand democracy of Forest Trees!

I do not propose to cut the "remote Pine" down, but only to let the other trees grow.

Ultimately each active mind must find its own redemptive questions and answers. A wound in the spirit is intimate or it is no wound at all; a redemptive question and a redemptive answer are intimate or they do not redeem.

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Out of the Whirlwind

HARLOW SHAPLEY

THOSE WHO ARE THOUGHTFUL of the history of science should read Job—I mean, of course, that you should reread the biblical Book of Job. You would learn thereby how poetic the sciences can be, and how science-touched is some poetry.

I suppose that the greatest scientific poem ever composed is the *De Rerum Natura* of Titus Lucretius Carus, written about two thousand years ago. Some idle day I want to explore again his powerful and generally tuneful discussion of the nature of things. I first took a try at Lucretius as a college junior—my second scientific writing of any kind. I entitled the effort, "Curious Lunar Theories of an Ancient Scientist." It was juvenile all right, adolescent in truth, but publishable. (By "curious," I meant "peculiar.")

In the poetry of science what rivals has Lucretius? Dante? No, for the *Divine Comedy* is short on science and even on pseudoscience. Chaucer, Spenser, Milton, Tennyson? No, none of them; and Shakespeare was so indifferent to scientific matters that he does not even mention the Western Hemisphere (possibly he does a little in *The Tempest*), although America had been discovered and exploited romantically for a hundred years before Shakespeare stopped writing. Strange, it seems to me. I wonder what was the tavern small talk around the 1600's?

How about the Psalms as poetry and science? Not bad, but when we turn to the Book of Job, we are in big-time science, and literature as well.

✪ HARLOW SHAPLEY has served on the SCHOLAR's Editorial Board since 1940. He is professor emeritus of astronomy at Harvard University and author of *The Inner Metagalaxy*, *Of Stars and Men* and *The View from a Distant Star*. This essay* is part of his forthcoming book, tentatively titled *The Scientist Outside His Laboratory*, to be published by Charles Scribner's Sons.

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As I turn again to this book of the Holy Writ, and what is written about the Writ, its origin and dating, I am reminded that there never was such a character as Job. He came from the land of Uz, the Book says—but there is no land of Uz, unless we settle for Uzbek in the U.S.S.R. where there is probably very little Bible reading.

There are scattered biblical mentions of the word Uz; but where the writer of Job located his myth is not important. It is more to the point that this writing about the troubles of a nonexistent character in a probably nonexistent land is full of poetry and drama and imagination.

(I pause here to read the whole Book again, and to check my persistent impressions that it is a powerful drama with high flights of poesy and low sinks of misery.)

My favorite Chapter is 38. It contains, in the midst of fine imagery, a revealing survey of the knowledge and manners of Job by no less a surveyor than the Lord himself. It is not an elementary quiz. I would call it a swift-moving doctoral oral.

Witness the grand opening of the examination:

Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said: "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?"

No answer. One is tempted to blame the darkness on the professors who have an abundance of wordage and only preliminary knowledge.

We continue the questioning, that is, the Lord does, but with a warning to Job to hitch up his what-you-call-ums. (That is, by the way, the Shapley translation; the King James Version employs unusual words like "gird" and "loins.")

And prepare thyself, for here comes the most profound question known to doctoral examination committees. The answer is really rather easy and simple, but no one knows it fully—certainly not Job, confused with his boils. Here is the way the Lord put it:

"Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding."

Again no answer. When that question is put to our current graduate students, they, too, are silent. Silent at best; and on the

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average, stupid, for they cannot successfully reply, with or without a whirlwind. Some might venture:

"I wast not anywhere." But that is clearly wrong, for practically every atom of Job's body, mostly oxygen, carbon, hydrogen and nitrogen, was in or on the surface of the earth when the foundations were laid.

It is the same now. With the exception of some high-flying hydrogen and helium atoms, which have speeds fast enough for them to escape the earth's gravitational field, the atoms and molecules of the students' bodies were all here in Job's time, and also in the time when the foundations were laid some five or six billion years ago.

"Who laid the corner stone thereof; When the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy."

What a lovely audition for the morning stars. Throughout this story of fortitude and suffering are many equally smooth phrases. But the most revealing phrasing, it seems to me, deals with the survey of the sciences as they were known at the time the Job story was told.

When was the Book written? I have consulted biblical experts; their answers range from 200 B.C. to 800 B.C. There is internal evidence that the fourth century B.C. is the most consistent date. But whatever the date, we can fairly assume that the sciences in Job's time were well known to the author.

The questions cover many of the natural sciences; and the frequent invasion of dramatic poetry does not conceal the wide knowledge and deep curiosity of the writer. The examination was essentially a searching in the fields of cosmography, supplemented by questions on piety and respect. That powerful cosmogonic question at the beginning of Chapter 38 is followed by inquiries on geology, oceanography and meteorology. Listen to this:

"Hast thou entered into the treasures of the snow? or hast thou seen the treasures of the hail, Which I have reserved against the time of trouble, against the day of battle and war?. . . . Hath the rain a father? or who hath begotten the drops of dew?"; and more about rains and droughts.

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And, of course, the familiar astronomical quotation appears: "Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades, or loose the bands of Orion?"

There is great depth to the question:

"Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts? or who hath given understanding to the heart?" Well, Dr. Walter Cannon wrote a classic volume on *The Wisdom of the Body,* and promoted the concepts of Serendipity and Homeostasis.

If we look over the dozens of direct questions we shall find that perhaps thirty percent are now answerable—not fully, it may be, because there has not been enough progress in the past two thousand years. The questions on animal husbandry, zoology, ornithology, are now not very difficult; and concerning many of these matters there are in the Book of Job succinct statements rather than questions put to the unresponsive examinee. The background is neatly laid. The Lord comments on the stupidity of the ostrich, and in these closing chapters of the Book he remarks on hawks, goats, eagles, and especially on the war-horse, which is so impressive that several fine verses are devoted to the eulogy. Here it is:

"Hast thou given the horse strength? hast thou clothed his neck with thunder? Canst thou make him afraid as a grasshopper? [ridiculous!] the glory of his nostrils is terrible [he snorteth]. He paweth in the valley, and rejoiceth in his strength: he goeth on to meet the armed men. He mocketh at fear, and is not affrighted; neither turneth he back from the sword. The quiver rattleth against him, the glittering spear and the shield. He swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage; neither believeth he that it is the sound of the trumpet. He saith among the trumpets, Ha, ha; and he smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains, and the shouting." Beautiful, isn't it?

Yes, that phrase "among the trumpets, Ha, ha" is quoted correctly: Verse 25 of Chapter 39. It would be irreverent to ask if this were the original horse laugh.

Finally Job gets in his humble reply:

"Behold, I am vile; what shall I answer thee? I will lay mine hand upon my mouth. Once have I spoken; but I will not answer; yea, twice; but I will proceed no further."

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Had Job by his silence failed the examination? By no means. His humility, his admission of ignorance, was *the correct answer!* He passed with flying colors. For then answered the Lord:

"Deck thyself now with majesty and excellency; and array thyself with glory and beauty. Cast abroad the rage of thy wrath; and behold every one that is proud, and abase him."

The payoff was indeed most pleasant to this much punished man, for "the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than his beginning: for he had fourteen thousand sheep, and six thousand camels, and a thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand she asses." (That last item seems somewhat one-sided.)

And "he had also seven sons and three daughters. . . . And in all the land were no women found so fair as the daughters of Job: and their father gave them inheritance among their brethren."

What better could you expect?

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Our Sargasso

JEAN VALENTINE

The fox went under the garden
thinking. The watersnake
never moved, or the sun.
—Night, and everyone's straight out

longing; the cat's in the woods,
the children lie loose in stories
tall as this world could—
Could we run for it Lord

Fox. Foxfire will, we thought, out,
you and I, blue glass at the fire-
side side by side,
word for word,
wood for wood,
desire for desire,
nicer than God.

✪ JEAN VALENTINE is living in the Berkshires, where she is at work on a second book of poems.

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the scholar cornered

Sociodicy: A Guide to Modern Usage

DANIEL BELL

In every culture, Claude Lévi-Strauss tells us, there are sets of transformational rules which make it possible to include in the same group myths held to be markedly different. This idea of transformational rules allows us not only to find structural homologies where none were thought to exist (for example, the legends of the Pueblo Indians and the Oedipus myth), but it may also permit us to explain the phenomenon of sociological metonymies, wherein words held to be markedly the same are not. It is the purpose of this essay to illustrate these rules in the transformation of *verba sociologica* from the Academy to the marketplace.

The idea of transformational rules derives, of course, from the pathbreaking work (the clearing of the linguistic bramble bush, so to speak) of Ferdinand De Saussure, particularly in his impressive findings on syntagmatic solidarities, and from the generative grammar developed by Noam Chomsky in his remarkable work *Syntactical Structures*. Chomsky's discoveries proceed from a simple axiom: sentences must be uttered one word at a time. Does that fact imply that they form a simple chain? Is the next word in the sentence chosen exclusively on the basis of preceding words (that is, a left-to-right system)? Not necessarily. They can be chosen as well on the basis of the words that may follow. How does one know? We can follow formal rules, or we can accept the claims of an intuitive or transfer theory of learning. Where does that leave us? Let us see.

Suppose that we would like to learn how to generate and recognize all grammatical sentences up to some fixed length—say, twenty words. Information theorists tell us that English sentences on the average carry about five bits per word so that there would be 2^{100} different strings, twenty words long, to cope with, if we sought to learn the language from formal grammatical rules. If one accepted conditioning theory in psychology—which denies the possibility of a genuine generative grammar—there would be no alternative but to insist that a child must have heard 2^{100} sentences before he could speak and understand English.*

But the simple point is that we do not acquire grammatical knowledge from the formal rules drilled into us by teachers of traditional grammar, but rather from the implicit generative knowledge that we in-

✪ DANIEL BELL is a sociologist, and a second-born child.

* "In order to appreciate how ridiculous this condition is," write George Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl Pribram in their book, *Plans and the Structure of Behavior*, "recall the fact that there are only about 3.15×10^9 seconds per century. In short, the child would have to hear about 3×10^{30} sentences per second in order to be exposed to all the information necessary for the planner to produce sentences according to these left-to-right rules of grammar, and that is on the assumption of a childhood 100 years long with no interruptions for sleeping, eating, etc., and perfect retention of every string of twenty words after one presentation! Just a little calculation will convince anyone that the number of internal states needed in a left-to-right system explodes before the system is capable of dealing with anything as complicated as a natural language, and that some other kind of sentence generator must be used."

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tuit when we use a language appropriately.* A natural language, distilled over time, so to speak, allows us heuristically, rather than by algorithm, to generate many combinations whose syntax will be formally correct.

It is at this point that transformational rules make their entrance. For syntax and semantic are not always the same. Following George Miller, we can take two sentences: *Healthy babies sleep soundly. Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.* They are syntactically similar, but the second is harder to perceive and remember correctly because it cannot be interpreted by the usual semantic rules for combining the sense of adjacent English words which move from left to right.† The transformational rules relate surface structures to deep structures, for "the deep structures alone express significant relationships and it is upon them that the semantic rules operate to yield meaning."

Thus, no matter how many syntactical sentences we can correctly generate, if we want to maintain the semantic purity of the grammatical coin, we must remember that the interpretation of a word is affected by the company it keeps.

The second rule, from economics as derived from culture, relates the elasticity of yield (or output) not to input, but to social use. Here Lévi-Strauss, characteristically, gives us a brilliant example. "One of the keys to the understanding of the social and religious importance of yams, which is so striking throughout Melanesia," he writes, "can probably be found in the remarkable elasticity of yield. The farmer who is exposed to harvesting far less than he actually needs must plant far more in order to be reasonably certain of having enough. Conversely, if the harvest is plentiful it can so widely exceed expectations that to consume it all becomes impossible; this leaves no other use for it than competitive display and social food presentation. In cases such as the above, as in many others, we must learn to translate in terms of several different codes phenomena that we have been apprehending so far in terms of one or two codes only and thus render the observed phenomena a great deal more significant." This principle, as is quickly apparent, can also be applied to linguistic yams, such as academic harvests, or literary symposia.

To complete our triskelion, we turn to modern information theory for a rule on the transformation of entropy. In his paper, "On a Universal Tendency in Nature to the Dissipation of Mechanical Energy," William Thompson, Lord Kelvin, pointed out that in the conversion of heat to work there is a loss of efficiency and a dissipation of intensity, the consequences of which are an increase in entropy, or the tendency among molecules to an increase in disorder. In his valedictory, *A Letter to American Historians,* Henry Adams sought to apply this concept to history and discerned as a law that the greater the recourse to force, the larger the increase in social disorder. Few historians today would accept Adams' application of the Second Law of Thermodynamics to history, perhaps not even as a metaphor. But the concept of entropy has become central to communication theory and to linguistics.

The entropy concept in communication theory, it should be emphasized, is quite different from the idea of entropy in physics, itself an interesting illustration of a "transformational rule." For while the measure of entropy in physics is a measure of "disorder," the measure of entropy in the mathematical theory of communications is a measure of "uncertainty."

To understand the communication theory meaning of entropy, however, one crucial distinction must be kept in mind. In ordinary discourse, we associate *information* with *knowledge;* to the communication theorist, however, information is simply a *signal* of any kind, most usefully conceptualized as *bits* (short for binary digits), or any form of 1-0 communication. Entropy

* One should underscore the implication of this argument for learning by "leaps," namely that it is a new proof for a mentalistic (even purposive) rather than behaviorist (or conditioning) theory of mind.

† There are, of course, inversions, or sentence palindromes, wherein the predicate precedes the subject, yet the semantic sense can be grasped quickly: for example, "Where it all will end, knows God!"

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is the measure of bits per second (or per message, per word, or even per letter) transmitted. Thus entropy increases as the number of messages or signals in a single channel increases. To sift out meaning from noise depends upon the degree to which bits are crowded in a channel—the more signals there are in the channel, the more one is uncertain of one's ability to receive the message (unless one assumes, not caring for meaning, that the medium is the message)—and upon the clarity of the code one is using. (It is not that children can't speak, said Piaget; they try many languages until they find one their parents can understand.) With the number of messages increasing exponentially, along with the output of science (as Derek Price tells us) we are experiencing an increase in entropy, or uncertainty.

"The entropy of this communication theory," John R. Pierce has written, "is a measure of this uncertainty, and the uncertainty or entropy is taken as the measure of the amount of information conveyed by a message from a source. [But] the more we know about what message the source will produce, the less uncertainty, the less the entropy, and the less the information."

In short, the transformational rule here is to ignore the flurry of "noise"—that is, not to listen too closely to the words, but to know the source well. Thus, uncertainty will be reduced. (In that case, too, while ignoring the message, we can ignore the medium as well.)

With these three transformational rules now explicated,* we can proceed (*à rebours*, so to speak) with the task at hand—to examine those socio-linguistic phenomena in which (to wreak a transformation) tropes become metopes, and where, while syntax remains constant, semantics becomes a degenerative grammar.† This is not, however, a Tottel's Miscellany, a gloss on Max Nordau, or a *Dictionnaire des Idées Reçues*. It is, in the language of the turf, by Lévi-Strauss out of Leibnitz (with Fowler as midwife)—an exercise in sociodicy.

Alienation

For a period of about a hundred years (circa 1840 to 1940) the term *alienation* was used in one of two different senses: as the transfer of ownership or title of a piece of property; or to denote a quality of mental derangement or insanity. The second edition of *Webster's New International Dictionary*, in fact, provides only these two definitions of the word, while the sole occurrence of the word *alienation* in the fifteen-volume *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1934) is in connection with "alienation of property."

The term alienation, of course, has older, and different, meanings in philosophy, political and otherwise. The idea of alienation as the possibility of selling oneself, but not one's children or a nation, into slavery is the theme of Chapter 4 in Rousseau's *The Social Contract*, while the "total alienation to the whole community" of each person, with all his rights, giving himself up entirely for all, is the foundation, as Rousseau defines it, of "the social pact" (Chapter 6). The Greek idea of *ekstasis* (in Latin *superstitio*), the leaving of one's body in the mystery rites, or ecstasy, was regarded by the Romans as mental alienation *(abaliēnātio mentis)* and as socially reprehensible. To the early Christians, alienation meant the separation of man from God; and to Hegel, in his *Phenomenology*, the *"unglückliches Bewusstsein,"* the Unhappy Consciousness (or the Christian spirit) which follows the Skeptical (Greek)

* We could, at this point, add a fourth rule derived from the compelling work of Stanley Schachter on birth-order. The evidence which Professor Schachter has assembled proves convincingly that the first-born in any family is brighter, more verbal, and more likely to succeed than the later-born. One can see this same rule at work in the family of sciences. But to invoke a fourth rule at this point would only be to square the circle.

† Since I am concerned primarily with formal changes in cognitive content, I shall not deal here with the "diffusion rates" of these terms, although an adequate sociology of culture would have to chart such changes as well. For a discussion of "diffusion rates" as indicators of social change, see my Working Paper #2, Commission on the Year 2000, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Brookline, Massachusetts.

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and Stoic (Roman) consciousness, is "the Alienated Soul which is the consciousness of self as a divided nature, a doubled and merely contradictory being."*

The currently fashionable vogue of the word *alienation* to mean a rumbling dissatisfaction with society (see, for example, "The Alienation Bag: The Songs of the Byrds and Bob Dylan," by Lawrence Dietz, *Herald Tribune,* October 10, 1965, p. 55) derives, in the last analysis, from Karl Marx, even though—actually—in posthumous fashion. Oddly enough, the first generation of Marxian exegetes—Karl Kautsky, the literary executor of Marx; Eduard Bernstein, the literary executor of Engels; and V. I. Lenin, the political executor of Marx and Engels—knew nothing of the word *alienation,* and never used it. The foremost American scholar of Marx's ideas, Sidney Hook, does not even refer to the term in his magisterial work on the philosophical sources of Marx's work, *From Hegel to Marx* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1936). The concept of alienation appears principally in one of Marx's works, written when he was twenty-six, but not published in his lifetime and, in fact, not published until 1932, the *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844), although a passing mention of the idea occurs also in *The German Ideology* (1845-46), a posthumous work left literally to the gnawing of the mice, for whole sections of it had been nibbled away when it was discovered.

In the *Manuscripts,* Marx uses the concept of alienation ambiguously and sloppily, in three different senses (although all three are translated by the single word *alienation*). These are *Vergegenständlichung* or objectification, whose English equivalent now, in its philosophical sense, is reification; *Entfremdung,* which is best translated as estrangement; and *Entäusserung,* or being sold, as a commodity. The important point is that none of the usages are sociopsychological. They are not concerned with loss of meaning or lack of fulfillment of the self, or other subjective states of mind that now parade under the term alienation, but they are philosophical processes that presumably reflect objective social situations in society. (As Marx said, a slave is no less a slave, even though he is happy in his bondage.)

The reason why the word *alienation* disappeared from Marx's later writings is a simple one. It was part of a cloudy Hegelian phase that Marx (for good reason or bad) had dissipated by 1848. The idea of alienation (which for him meant primarily religious alienation, exemplified in the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach) was associated with the idea of essences, or the nature of Man in the abstract; whereas what began to count for him was not abstract man but concrete social organization, the role of private property, and historical variations (particularly class differences) among men. Since economics, for Marx, was the material embodiment of philosophy, and private property the source of power, the term *exploitation* replaced *alienation* in his vocabulary; and so narrowed, thus it remained. In his writings after the Hegelian phase, particularly in the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx in fact attacked those who discussed "human nature, of Man in general," particularly the German literati who refused to deal with economics (as French socialist thinkers did), but preferred to talk about philosophy. "For instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic functions of money, they wrote 'alienation of humanity.'" Mocking his erstwhile comrades, Marx spoke scornfully of "this transcendental robe in which the German Socialists wrapped their sorry 'eternal truths' . . . the robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with the flowers of rhetoric,

*Less apocalyptically, the term alienation is used by Hegel as one of the stages of negation, in which every subject becomes transformed, or "other," in the process of *Aufheben,* or spiraling states of consciousness. It might not be amiss to point out in passing that while Hegel uses alienation as the negation of negation, wherein consciousness becomes *implicit, explicit* and then *implicit* and *explicit—an sich, für sich* and *an sich und für sich*—he *never,* despite the fact that the idea is popularly attributed to him, used the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. See Gustav E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas,* Vol. XIX, No. 3, June 1958.

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steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment."

The rediscovery of alienation—the "dew of sickly sentiment"—began in the 1930's, when the tattered manuscripts were published for the first time in the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,* known familiarly to Marxologues as MEGA. (Despite its title, this was never a complete edition since the editor, D. Riazanov, was shot by Stalin before he could complete his work.) There was at first only the slightest interest in these works, for as Engels had remarked (Letter to Florence Kelley Wischnewetzky, February 25, 1886) apropos of *his* youthful efforts, "the semi-Hegelian language of a good many passages of my old book is not only untranslatable but has lost the greater part of its meaning even in German."

What greater boon for hermeneutics than works not only almost *bedeutungslos* but with pages missing or indecipherable? The task of intellectual reconstruction was begun by the Frankfurt school, especially when it went into exile and began to communicate in an Aesopian language wherein "Young Hegelians" denoted Marx and "technological rationality" denoted capitalism.* Although the ontology was greeted with respect, especially by young radicals in New York who were flattered to think they spoke with philosophical accents, the literary resonance of the idea of alienation came about with the popularity of Kierkegaard and Kafka in the late forties and early fifties, and the sense of despair they epitomized. Existentialism—that version of what Arthur Koestler called the French Flu —added its bit (not binary digit) and if intellectuals could not be *engagés,* they could at least be alienated.†

From sophisticated Marxism to vulgar sociology is a short step.‡ And what the literati put together, the sociologists soon sunder. If alienation has a meaning, it can also be measured. But what is its meaning, and what does it measure? Fortunately, an intrepid young sociologist, Dwight G. Dean, undertook the double task in an article in the *American Sociological Review* of October, 1961 (Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 753-8). It can serve as the paradigm of all the sociological efforts.

Writes Professor Dean:

The concept of Alienation, rooted deeply in sociological tradition, has recently enjoyed a new popularity. Theorists have suggested numerous possible correlates of Alienation, such as Apathy,[1] Authoritarianism,[2] Conformity,[3] Cynicism,[4] Hoboism,[5] Political Apathy,[6] Political Hyperactivity,[7] or Personalization in Politics,[8] Prejudice,[9] Privatization,[10] Psychosis,[11] Regression[12] and Suicide.[13] Only recently have scientists attempted to develop scales to measure this phenomenon.[14] Numerous references to Alienation (or to similar concepts variously labeled) are, frequently, implicit rather than explicit. Sometimes the same writer includes several nuances of meaning. Seeman[15] has brought order out of this chaos with his fivefold classification: Powerlessness, Meaninglessness, Normlessness, Isolation and Self-Estrangement.

1 Kenneth Keniston, "Alienation and the Decline of Utopia," *The American Scholar,* 29 (Spring, 1960), p. 164; Eric Kahler, *The Tower and the Abyss,* New York: Braziller, 1957.

2 Theodor W. Adorno, *et al., The Authoritarian Personality,* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, p. 618.

3 Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom,* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958, p. 185; Keniston, *op. cit.,* p. 169.

4 Robert Merton, *Mass Persuasion,* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 143.

5 Morton Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

6 Morris Rosenberg, "The Meaning of Politics in Mass Society," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 15 (Spring, 1951), pp. 5-15.

7 David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy," in *Studies in Leadership,*

*For a short history of the intellectual rediscovery and transmutation of the concept, see Daniel Bell, "The Debate on Alienation," in Leopold Labedz (ed.), *Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962).

† In the 1950's, interestingly, French Catholic priests and German Protestant writers began proclaiming alienation as the central concept in Marx's thought, for in this fashion they hoped to assimilate him into an existentialist version of a tradition. Religion, for Marx, "is the moan of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world . . . the spirit of spiritless conditions . . . the opium of the people."

‡ One has to sidestep at this point Bertolt Brecht's use of the *Entfremdungseffekt* as a theory of the epic theater. Alienation, as used by Brecht, has the positive connotation of "distancing" the spectator from an experience, to reduce the naturalistic mirage that what is on the stage is reality. The *Entfremdungseffekt,* however, is operative only in those plays that are purely *Lehrstücke.*

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edited by Alvin Ward Gouldner, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, pp. 505-559.

[8] Adorno, *op. cit.*, p. 618.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda," in *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication,* edited by Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950, p. 283.

[11] E. Gartly Jaco, "The Social Isolation Hypothesis and Schizophrenia," *American Sociological Review,* 19 (October, 1954), pp. 567-577.

[12] Sebastian DeGrazia, *The Political Community: A Study of Anomie,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, esp. pp. 8-20 and 115-122.

[13] See, for example, E. H. Powell, "Occupation, Status, and Suicide: Toward a Redefinition of Anomie," *American Sociological Review,* 23 (April, 1958), pp. 131-139.

[14] See, for example, Allan H. Roberts and Milton Rokeach, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice: A Replication," *American Journal of Sociology,* 61 (January, 1956), pp. 355-358; Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure of Alienation," *American Sociological Review,* 22 (December, 1957), pp. 670-677; and Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," *American Sociological Review,* 21 (December, 1956), pp. 709-716.

[15] Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review,* 24 (December, 1959), pp. 783-791.

Following Melvin Seeman, Professor Dean selects three major components of the concept of Alienation: Powerlessness, Normlessness and Social Isolation, to make up a scale to test on the American population. Curiously, both Meaninglessness and Self-Estrangement are omitted from the mensuration, although it may be imputed that the dimensions of these terms are subsumed under the two distinct subtypes of Normlessness that Professor Dean has differentiated: (1) Purposelessness, which he feels is akin to *anomie,* and (2) Conflict of Norms.

The three subscales were combined to make up the Alienation scale, and they intercorrelated from .41 to .67, which, while suggesting "that it is quite feasible to consider the subscales as belonging to the same general concept . . . there appears to be enough independence among the subscales to warrant treating them as independent variables."

Independent or not, Professor Dean proceeded to administer his combined Alienation scale to 1,108 individuals in Columbus, Ohio. Of these, 433 or 38.8 percent responded. Whether the others were so alienated as to refuse participation in a scientific experiment we shall, of course, never know. Of the 433 replies, only 384, however, were usable in the analysis.

What does Professor Dean find? Surprisingly (to him, at any rate) there is a statistically significant *negative* correlation between the three components of Alienation, and, occupation, education, income and rural background. There is a small but *positive* correlation between alienation and advancing age. As Professor Dean writes: "It is of interest to note that, in general, with increased status in society, there is less of a feeling of *Alienation.* If we assume that older people in our culture have decreased status, the positive correlation that we found between age and *Alienation* would be expected. In this, our findings parallel Bell's work."*

So, after numerous suggested possible correlates of alienation with apathy, authoritarianism, conformity, cynicism, hoboism, political apathy, political hyperactivity or personalization in Politics, Prejudice, Privatization, Psychosis, Regression and Suicide, the only statistically positive correlation of alienation (with three subtypes of normlessness, powerlessness and social isolation) is with Advancing Age!

But one need not falter—yet.

Professor Dean concludes: "It may very well be that *Alienation* is not a unitary phenomenon, but a syndrome. In this respect, Davids' conceptualization of eight components seems challenging.† In any case, certainly much more research is required before the *Alienation* concept can be empirically validated."

* Dean's footnote reads: Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation and the Class Structure," *Sociometry,* 20 (June 1957), pp. 105-116; Dorothy L. Meier and Wendell Bell, "Anomia and the Achievement of Life's Goals," *American Sociological Review,* 24 (April 1959), pp. 189-202.

† Dean's footnote: Anthony Davids, "Alienation, Social Apperception and Ego Structure," *Journal of Consulting Psychology,* 19 (February 1955), pp. 21-27 and "Generality and Consistency of Relations Between the Alienation Syndrome and Cognitive Processes," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 51 (July 1955), pp. 61-67.

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Certainly.

From the sociological to the psychological level is, of course, but the shortest segue. The transformational rules are quite self-evident. Who is not alienated today? Who dares not be alienated? Inevitably, a word returns to its *Wesen*. Even the alienist becomes alienated. For Herbert Holt, M.D., of the New York Institute of Existential Analysis, Inc., "the term 'alienation' is one of the portmanteau words of contemporary discussion. It suggests a whole range of problems of identity and adjustment to the social realities of our times, but it is not really capable of much more precise definition. As a phenomenological category, however, [alienation] might well be said to be neither more nor less than what the psychiatrist has to deal with in his daily work."

The psychiatrist, in fact, according to the title of Dr. Holt's paper, is "An Alienated Being in Our Time." "It is not too much to say," he writes, "that in the current milieu of his training the medical scientist conceives of his patients, and indeed of himself, as potential cadavers whom he must endeavor somehow to keep . . . alive. In other words, [he continues] if I may be permitted to draw upon the vocabulary of existentialism, thought-forms of his educational environment, the scientific *Umwelt*, carry over into the *Eigenwelt* of his internal imagery."

Dr. Holt concludes: "We can speak of remedies for both aspects of his alienation under the same heading, it seems to me. Both [*Mitwelt* and *Eigenwelt*] call for a style of communication which is genuine communication—that is, an attainment of common ground for the expression of the reality which each sees in the therapeutic situation."

What we can applaud is the call for "a style of communication which is genuine communication"—one more definition, one might say, of Sociodicy.

Charisma

The term is derived from the Greek of the New Testament (*charisma*, gift of grace, from *charis*, of the three Graces), although the phenomenon is known all over the world. Polynesians speak of *mana*, the Iroquois of *orenda*, the Iranians of *Maga* (from which our word *magic* is derived) to bespeak a sense of extraordinary power. The Persian *hvarnah*, or *glory*, already attaches the power to religious and political leadership.

The term *charisma* itself, however, has a theological origin and usage, from the early Christian church. Although the term is Greek it is not found in classical Greek, and, except for Philo, only in early Christian literature. In the New Testament, it occurs six times in Romans, seven in I Corinthians (five times in Chapter 12), once each in II Corinthians, I and II Timothy and I Peter. But the term does not occur in the Gospels or in the Acts of the Apostles. It is a term used, clearly, by Paul for the purposes of Paul. It relates to the problem of the personal invocation of religious authority called "speaking with tongues."

The problem is set in I Corinthians 12. "Now ye are the body of Christ and members in particular. And God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues. Are all apostles? are all prophets? are all teachers? are all workers of miracles? Have all the gifts of healing? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret? But covet earnestly the best gifts; and yet shew I unto you a more excellent way."

In short, how is one to know the true word? Who represents authority, and what are its signs? To whom does God speak, and what are the *charismata*?

In I Corinthians 13, Paul sets the stage with that most magnificent of all rhetorical statements:

> Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels and have not charity, I am become as a sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. . . . For we know in part, and we

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prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known. And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.

In I Corinthians 14, Paul gives the subtle answer:

Follow after charity, and desire spiritual gifts, but rather that ye may prophesy. For he that speaketh in an unknown tongue speaketh not unto man, but unto God: for no man understandeth him; howbeit in the spirit he speaketh mysteries. But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men to edification, and exhortation, and comfort. . . . greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues, except he interpret, that the church may receive edifying. Now, brethren, if I come unto you speaking with tongues, what shall I profit you, except I shall speak to you either by revelation, or by knowledge, or by prophesying, or by doctrine? And even things without life giving sound, whether pipe or harp, except they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be known what is piped or harped? For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? So likewise ye, except ye utter by the tongue words easy to understand, how shall it be known what is spoken? for ye shall speak into the air . . . forasmuch as ye are zealous of spiritual gifts, seek that ye may excel to the edifying of the church.

In effect, Paul is saying that the use of charisma must be regulated and orderly. He condemns the indiscriminate use of "speaking with tongues" or ecstatic, personal revelation, and while he does not forbid tongue-speech, he regards it as inferior to the teaching and preaching he calls prophecy. In current parlance, Paul is striking down the "left wing" of early Christianity, which seems to have had its stronghold in the Corinthian church. The phenomenon of tongue-speech seems not to have been known in Rome or in any of the other centers to which Paul wrote, and it may have been connected with the Greek belief in mantic ecstasy.* In any event, Paul is instituting a reaction against ecstatic forms of worship, a phenomenon that has been recurrent in the Christian church, and that Father Ronald Knox has analyzed most recently in his book *Enthusiasm* (Oxford University Press, 1950).

It was Max Weber, of course, who introduced "the happy term 'charisma' " (as one writer put it) into the language of sociology. In his great unfinished corpus published posthumously by his wife Marianne, entitled *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (known familiarly to sociologists as *WuG*, pronounced *Voo und Goo*), Weber discussed charisma in Volume II, Chapters 9 and 10, entitled "Charisma" and "Transformation of Charisma" respectively.

Weber used the term *charisma* to denote an "extraordinary quality" possessed by persons or objects, which is thought to give these persons or objects a unique, magical quality. Weber distinguished different types of charisma and charismatics, but the religious type was fundamental, since it was the source, for Weber, of the initial exercise of authority. Weber, moreover, distinguished between *individual* charisma, which arises out of the personal qualities of the individual, and the charisma of *office*, which derives from the sacred nature of the position. It is a distinction akin to one between "leadership" and "authority." The power exercised by the first depends upon personal qualities, that of the second on the legitimacy of the office, independently of who occupies the position—a distinction important in the history of religious groups, particularly in understanding the difference, say, between prophet and priest.

While Weber had made religious charisma primary, he had carried the concept over into a general theory of authority, in which he distinguished between three types of legitimacy—traditional, charismatic and legal-rational—and into a rudimentary theory of social change. For Weber, charismatic authority, resting basically on mag-

*Schmiedel connects Paul's awareness of the dangers of such "gifts" with his own malady, epilepsy, and it is possible, notes A. J. Grieve, that at Corinth there were others similarly affected.

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ical powers, is outside the realm of the everyday routine and the profane, and is thus sharply opposed on the one hand to rational, and particularly bureaucratic, authority, and on the other to traditional authority, whether in its patriarchal, patrimonial or any other form. Both traditional and rational authority are, specifically, forms of everyday routine control of action: traditional authority is bound to precedents handed down from the past; bureaucratic authority is bound to formal, intellectually analyzable rules. Charismatic authority is irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules.

Where religions, or societies, are hidebound, or ruled, by customs sanctified by the past, the only way such authority can usually be challenged is by some charismatic leader whose legitimacy resides in his personal qualities. Charisma breaks everyday boundaries. To that extent, charisma is a great revolutionary force, and the charismatic leader is akin to Hegel's World-Historical individuals, who embody the cunning of reason. But once the charismatic leader has achieved his aim, he has to set about creating rational, administrative rules: secondary individuals have to be endowed with the authority of the leader, symbols replace the person, and there ensues what Weber called "the routinization of charisma." The sacred is transferred from the person to the office, gradually becoming thinned out, routinized, and a new kind of tradition.

Although Weber initially used the idea of charisma to explain changes in religions, as initiated by prophets, the concept, as it became known to English-speaking sociologists, was seen primarily in political terms. This was due largely to the hazards of translation, whereby Weber's work was presented only in bits and pieces. Translations mined from Weber's systematic work, *WuG,* began to appear only after World War II.* Some of the sociological essays on power and class appeared in *From Max Weber,* edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills in 1946. The first two chapters of *WuG* and parts of several others dealing primarily with concepts, economic categories and authority were translated by Parsons and Henderson in 1947 as *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.* The chapters from *WuG* on law appeared only in 1954, in a translation by Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein, as *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society,* while the *Religionssoziologie* from *WuG* appeared only in 1963, in a translation by Ephraim Fischoff, as *The Sociology of Religion.* To the extent that some American sociologists and political scientists have used the idea of *charisma* as central to Weber's thought, it has been an inverted use.

The word *charisma* was introduced into American journalism for the first time, so far as can be learned, in *Fortune* magazine in 1949, when a writer used it to describe the qualities of John L. Lewis. The managing editor, scanning the first draft of the article, questioned the use of a clumsy foreign term that would be unintelligible to the reader, and struck it out. On the page proof, however, an eleven-character word was needed for the caption under Lewis' picture to justify the line, and over the loud objections of the editor, the word *charismatic* was inserted, because no comparable word with the same number of letters could be found.

Since then, the word *charisma* has been a staple food on the groaning board of American journalism. In *Life,* Theodore H. White, writing about the New York City elections, states that "Lindsay has something which politicians call 'clout' and intellectuals style as 'charisma.' Roughly translated, both clout and charisma add up to the same thing—voter response." Six months later, a writer in the New York *Times* Sunday magazine writes that "Lindsay lacks the personal charisma that ostensibly goes with greatness." And, remarking

**The Protestant Ethic* had been translated by Talcott Parsons in 1930 and the *General Economic History* by Frank Knight in 1927, but the former was an independent essay, first published in 1904, while the latter was reconstructed from student notes taken at Weber's last series of lectures in 1919-1920.

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on the fact that Lindsay rides the subway during the rush hours without being noticed by anyone, the writer continues, "Of course, at that hour of the day, most New Yorkers probably wouldn't even have noticed such allegedly charismatic types as the Beatles strolling among them."

Charisma is used not only for a person, but for any attribute that seems to denote appeal. A writer in the *Village Voice* says of Bobby Kennedy (who, maybe, is also existential) that "even his harshest critics now acknowledge that there is something more—and suspect it is the charisma which seems to seize the young and those who would like to be young." And in the *National Review,* Morrie Ryskind writes, apropos of Ronald Reagan's start in politics, that a speech that Reagan gave on TV in support of Goldwater had set him off: "Vox Populi, still enchanted by the charisma of 'The Speech,' called clearly for the man who had made it and turned to the untested Reagan."

Since new words are like newly minted coins, writers, like collectors, are eager to grab them, and heavy use soon brings tarnish. An advertising copywriter describes an "irresponsible moppet" who is the hero of a novel called *Morning's at Seven* as possessing a "Peter Pannish charisma," while Craig Claiborne, in his often elegant gastronomic column in the New York *Times,* writes of a new Manhattan restaurant: "In a physical sense La Côte Basque is charismatic. The kitchen soars neatly, but it should be celestial."

Perhaps the final accolade (since, as Gerth and Mills write, "Weber's conception of the charismatic leader is in continuity with the concept of 'genius' as it was applied since the Renaissance to artistic and intellectual leaders") is the one bestowed by the North American Mensa (Latin for table), a club for people of superior intelligence whose members must prove, through tests, that they have higher I.Q.'s than at least ninety-eight percent of the rest of humanity. The club's magazine is *Charisma: The New York Mensa Literary Review.* Thus Greek and Latin became rejoined in a new Alexandrian philosophy.

DASEIN-ANALYSE

Dasein-analyse is a fusion of philosophy and psychoanalysis, out of Martin Heidegger by Ludwig Binswanger. (The American version, courtesy of Rollo May, is called Existential Analysis.)

We can begin with Heidegger, since it was he who raised the *Grundfragen* about Being. In his Basic Question of Metaphysics he asked: "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?"* Because, he replied, to himself if to no one else, the ground itself has a shifty ontological foundation. There is not one Being, but three, the *Ur-grund,* the *Un-grund* and the *Abgrund*—the original ground, the negation and the abyss. Like Hegel before him, he is providing a metaphysical rather than a mythological underpinning for religion, but where the process, for Hegel, is an *Aufheben,* for Heidegger it is an *Einfallen.* (Is this the *Böse der List?*)

Having thus settled the theistic side of Being, Heidegger then turns to the atheistic side of non-being. The problem, as he puts it in his *Letter On Humanism,* is to liberate language from grammar, "freeing it for a more original structure of essences (*ein ursprünglicheres Wesenbefüge*)." At issue, he claims, neither more nor less, are the laws of logic. If one thinks of truth as propositional truth, "nothing is simply nothing," and to talk of "nothing" is to turn it into a "something," which is a contradiction. But it is a contradiction only if one is bound *(zeitgebunden)* by Occidental concepts of "subject" and "object."

The fault lies in the genitive, which does not allow us to express "by oneself" and "for oneself" in a single phrase.† To overcome this duality, Heidegger says, one has to understand the nature of *Seinvergessenheit,* or the "oblivion of Being." As Profes-

*Theologians will recognize that this is a more radical question than the challenge of Aristotle to religion; namely, the question of *creāto ex nihilo.* To that classic question, how can something come out of nothing, religion has given the traditional answer—miracle. Heidegger, however, does not ask *how* but *why?*

† We have already encountered this difficulty in the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic of *an sich* and *für sich.* See ALIENATION.

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sor Walter Kaufmann—no friend of Heidegger he—coolly explains: "The oblivion of Being means not only that mankind has forgotten Being, but also that Being has somehow withdrawn from man . . ."*

It is in that last sentence, perhaps, that one can see the long step from the philosophy of *Dasein* to the therapy of existential analysis. Being and Non-Being form a dyad, the completeness of which is the Whole Man, the self and the looking-glass self, locked in the corridors of time. To recover Being, one must wrestle with one's Non-Being, not in the past, as the Freudians claim, but in the existential present, in the *hic et nunc* where there is the I and Thou, the *Dasein,* the "be," rather than the "was."

The sociologist Socinus Grelot has taken the argument one step farther.† It is clear from Heidegger, his afflatus, that if one breathes in, one must breathe out, lest one be, as the Latinist says, *in vacuum ventus.* In other words—the nucule of the problem—*Dasein-analyse* by itself is only half the answer: a circle without a center, a rim without a core, an endocarp without an epicarp. So, following nongrammatical logic, Grelot has proposed the complement to *Dasein-analyse* of *nichts-synthese,* for if *Dasein-analyse* takes Being and breaks it down, *nichts-synthese* takes Non-Being and puts it together. Thus the two form a unity which, in spiritual nuptiality, become one; the trinity is negated and becomes *Ichud.*

Light with the wine of discovery, one reels, in the nichts-air so to speak, at this daring dissolution and reassembling of reality, and in a Gestalt and a Gewalt one intuits the inherent unity of Knowledge and Non-Knowledge. And yet, as Socinus Grelot points out, in the unconscious insinuation of associative logic, just as Jove did not spring (or *Ur-sprung*) from Minerva's head, *nichts-synthese,* too, is only one further link in the Great Chain of Non-Being. And in the *tableau philosophique,* the gnostic pantheon of *nichts-synthese,* so to speak, one finds such luminaries as Heinrich Null and Gerald Void, Italo Zero and A. P. Cipher, Immanuel Noumena, Rabindranath Abyss (a great Indian poet, full of depth) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Bagel (who was full of wholes) and in the crowning synthesis of the *nuova sciènza,* the Meister of the Almanac de Goethe, who gave us his last, heartrending cry, *"Nichts, nichts, mehr nichts!"*

* It is that "somehow," that *auf irgendeine Weise,* which obviously is the escape hatch of oblivion. How casual can *Dasein* philosophy be with fate?

† In an unpublished paper made available to the author.

Establishment

The term *Establishment* was resurrected by the English journalist Henry Fairlie, after the Suez fiasco, to mock at the puny moral authority of the English ruling class. One has to say "resurrected," for, as a hundred and forty-two letters to the *Times Literary Supplement* attest, about two hundred and sixty-three English authors could be assigned prior coinage, although the final evidence seems to settle upon Alexander Pope as the perpetrator of the word.

Heady English words, unlike French white wines, travel well and swiftly, and soon the term had become Established in the United States. The only difficulty is that everyone so dubbed denies being a member of the Establishment. Jason Epstein, reputed to be on the presidium of the New York Intellectual Establishment, mocks its existence, remarking, "There is no such thing as a New York intellectual establishment. It just looks that way from the outside."

The *locus classicus* of Establishment studies here is that of Richard Rovere, "Notes on the Establishment in America," *The American Scholar,* Vol. 30, No. 4, Autumn 1961, pp. 489-495, reprinted in *The American Establishment and Other Reports, Opinions and Speculations* (New York: Harvest Books, 1962, pp. 3-21). In this authoritative report, Rovere stated: "It is now, of course, conceded by most fair-minded and objective authorities that there is an Establishment in America—a more or less closed and self-sustaining institution that holds a preponderance of power in our more or less open society."

Rovere's conclusions in 1961 were given

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dramatic confirmation less than five years later when, at the first Conference on Returned Peace Corps Volunteers (a group that many persons feel is the nucleus of the future Establishment), held on March 5-7, 1965, in Washington, Elmo Roper (a member of the Establishment in good standing), told the thousand conferees: "Of all the groups I've seen recently there is none I'd rather see batter down the walls of that Establishment." And Abram Chayes, then the legal counselor of the State Department, and a professor, before and after, at the Harvard Law School, told the group: "No 'Establishment' ever welcomes the agents of change. If you want to live on the commanding heights you must seize them."

Every Establishment breeds smaller imagoes, and the most refractory is the New York Intellectual Establishment, reported on by Victor Navasky in the New York *Times* magazine of March 27, 1966. As Mr. Navasky pointed out, to be eligible, one had to have attended C.C.N.Y., circa 1935-1939, or Columbia University, circa 1948-1952, although, contrary to rumor, one did not have to be Jewish. "The simplest way to join the establishment," Mr. Navasky writes, "is to edit the right magazine. Thus, charter members include Irving Howe and Lewis Coser (editors of Dissent), William Phillips, Richard Poirier, Philip Rahv and Steven Marcus (editors of Partisan Review), Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol (editors of The Public Interest), Barbara Epstein—Jason's wife—and Robert Silvers (editors of The New York Review of Books), and Norman Podhoretz, Theodore Solotaroff and Marion Magid (editors of Commentary)."*

In the nature of an "Open Conspiracy," to use H. G. Wells's phrase about an earlier Establishment, there are always subtle links between different circles. As Rovere reports in his earlier study: "The Establishment has in its top councils some people who appear to the unsophisticated to be oppositionists. For example, Norman Thomas, the Socialist leader; Norman Mailer, the self-styled 'hipster' novelist; and Norman Podhoretz, the firebrand [circa 1961] editor of *Commentary,* all enjoy close relations with leading figures on the Executive Committee."

What is most extraordinary, however, about *Establishment* is the quick fading of the term. To some extent it is due to the rise of the more embracing rival term, *Power Structure,* which is a reflection of the shift of usage from the literary culture to vulgar sociology. What may be equally true is that most members of the Establishment, on learning of their public nomination, decided, in the immortal phrase of Groucho Marx: "Any club that wants me as a member is not worth joining."

EXISTENTIAL

"The next addition to the collection of intellectually fashionable words will doubtless be 'existential.' I can see it springing up on all sides. Before long it will have landed with the public at large. When, in order to convince one's audience of profundity, one has said 'dynamic' long enough, it will be 'existential.'"

So wrote the eminent Dutch historian Johan Huizinga in 1935 in his book, *In the Shadow of Tomorrow.* Professor Huizinga's prophecy has been more than amply fulfilled. From the first entry in the library catalogue—*L'Existence; essais* par Albert Camus, Benjamin Fondane, M. de Gandillac, *et al.* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945)—there follow hundreds of books and thousands of articles with the title *Existentialism.* There is *Existence and Being,*
and Faith,
and Freedom,
and Inquiry,
and Therapy.
There is *Existence and the Existent,* by Jacques Maritain, and *Existence in Search of Essence,* by Fred G. Sturm, unpublished Columbia Ph.D. dissertation, 1962. There is, simply, *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology,* edited by Rollo May, and even a pseudonym, G. Existence, author of *Village;* grand nouvelle inédite (Les Oeuvres Libres, 1939).

*Since then, Solotaroff has left *Commentary* to strike out for himself as the editor of *Book Week,* the Sunday supplement of the quondam New York *Herald Tribune,* the Washington *Post,* and the Chicago *Sun-Times.*

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Of course all this becomes multiplied exponentially when we consider all the possible grammatical forms of *existence.* As an adjective, we have *The Existential Background of Human Dignity; The Existential Import and the Aristotelian Syllogistic;* and, of course,

Existential Metaphysics,
Phenomenology,
Psychiatry,
Psychoanalysis (by Sartre).

There is, necessarily, a *Journal of Existentialism,* and a *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry.* When one considers the possibility of the conjunction, one readily finds

Existentialism and Alienation,
and Education,
and Human Emotions (by Sartre),
and Literature.

As one would expect, there is *Existentialism as—Humanism, Philosophy, et cetera,* and even *Existentialism from Within,* although not, curiously, from without. And in the *Ur*-adjectival form, there is the

Existentialist Aesthetic,
God,
Theology,
Thinkers and Thought,
Revolution.

The final listing in the library catalogue is *Der Existenzkampf der Frau in Modernen Leben:* Seine Ziele und Aussichten Herausgegeben von Gustav Dahms (Berlin: R. Taendler, 1895-1896), followed by a new entry, *Exit,* by Harold Bell Wright (New York: Appleton, 1930).

This mode of research does not include, of course, the hundreds of books in which Existentialism or Existence follows some other noun, such as *Marxism and Existentialism,* or *The Philosophy of Existence,* or titles in which our fashionable word occurs only in the subtitle, such as *The Owl and the Nightingale: From Shakespeare to Existentialism* or *Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy,* let alone titles in which the word does not appear at all, but one *knows* that it is there, such as *Encounter with Nothingness.*

One shudders to think of all the philosophers who are labeled existentialist, actually or *malgré eux,* not to mention all the forerunners. Perhaps the only figure in the history of philosophy who can indisputably not be claimed as an existentialist, or a forerunner, is William of Occam, who in his *Quodlibets* formulated the principle that "entities are not to be multiplied without necessity."

Despite all the books and articles, one still finds it difficult to know exactly what *existential* means. This may be why it is easy to seem profound when using the word. *Existentialism* was used recently in the New York *Times* (June 26, 1966) to explain the nature of delinquent youngsters. " 'Gang members were deprived youngsters trying to achieve some kind of status, looking for identity, prestige,' says Professor [Lewis] Yablonsky. 'Their violence was a kind of existential validation—an attempt to prove to themselves that they were alive. . . .' " On the other hand *Time* magazine, in describing Malraux's early novel *The Royal Way,* writes: "There, his hero Claude takes it all with existential calm." And, of course, Senator Robert Kennedy is eligible, maybe, for the accolade. In the *Village Voice* for July 7, 1966, "ebullient Arthur Waskow, author of four books, former aide to maverick Congressman Robert Kastenmeir and resident fellow at the influential Institute for Policy Studies" employed, the interviewer said, " 'the symbolic syllogism' [*sic!*] of 'Kennedy, Watts and SDS' to sketch his envisaged [political] alliance of the future. Kennedy, said [Waskow] is a new kind of liberal . . . more interested in peace than collective security, not so viciously anti-communist, more concerned with the non-working poor than the labor unions. Also he is intuitive, gutsy, maybe existential."

Maybe.

GENERATION

1. A logical class term denoting a separation of age groups: once thought to be thirty years, then twenty, then ten, more recently five, and most recently six months. In the "Old Left," anyone over fifty could not be a revolutionist and would be

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knocked off; among the "New Left," no one older than thirty can understand the new generation—except Paul Goodman, who has "Peter Pannish charisma." (See CHARISMA.)

2. Sociologically, there have been two approaches to the problem of generations: the *positivist* and the *romantic-historical.*

The positivists sought to find a general rule to express the rhythm of historical development, based on the biological law of the limited life-span of men and the overlapping of new and old generations. Comte tried to assess the nature and tempo of progress by questioning what would happen if man's life-span were lengthened or shortened. To lengthen the life-span of an individual, he said, would slow up the tempo of progress; to shorten the life-span (by killing off the older generation quickly) would accelerate the tempo but result in shallowness, since the potentialities of the older generation would not be realized. Comte thought that a generational span of thirty years was just right—* an organic limitation on the tempo of social change (in the first thirty years people still learn; individual creativeness begins at that age; men retire from active life at sixty).

The romantic-historical view was initiated by Sainte-Beuve, who first used the term "romantic generation" to characterize the poets and writers who were in vogue in France after 1830. But the idea of self-contained generations was taken up most imaginatively by Wilhelm Dilthey, who made a distinction between *chronological time* of history, months, years, decades, *et cetera,* and *experienced time.* The emphasis on contemporaneity, of shared, experienced time is what constituted a generation for Dilthey.

*The method is reminiscent of Talmudic *pilpul.* Applied by the new criticism to literary analysis, the result would be something like this: "Into the Valley of Death rode six hundred." Why six hundred? Why not five hundred? Why not seven hundred? Fool! If into the Valley of Death rode five hundred, it would be a hundred too few. If into the Valley of Death rode seven hundred, it would be a hundred too many. So, into the Valley of Death rode six hundred.

Dilthey had a strong influence on cultural historians, particularly those art historians who sought to relate different styles to different generational groups. Wilhelm Pinder went so far, in fact, as to argue that new artistic styles are developed regularly, every thirteen to twenty-two years, by artists born at roughly the same time. (If one computes the successive dates of the introduction of abstract expressionism, pop, op, kinetic, inter-media and media-mix art, the time between can be seen as growing shorter, exponentially, by a factor of two, since 1947.)

Little of any substance has come out of the sociological efforts to define the nature of generations, other than the wonderful phrase of Pinder, "the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous," the effect of which is to destroy effectively the counterproductive idea of the *Zeitgeist,* for if each generation builds up an entelechy of its own, the "same" times necessarily are different for the different generations, as each seeks to impose its own *Geist* as the spirit of the age at the same time.

3. Generational Conflict. The *locus classicus* on the problem is Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons.* Published in the spring of 1862 in Katkov's paper, *The Russian Messenger* (Vestnik), the organ of the "Younger Generation," the book was a description of the Nihilists, the new generation that boldly announced that their trust and hope lay only in themselves. To read the novel today is to be struck, conversely to Pinder, with the contemporaneity of the noncontemporary.

"You don't know my father well enough," said Arkady.

"Your father's a nice chap," said Bazarov, "but he's behind the times; his day is done."

* * *

"What? Do you adopt Proudhon's ideas, then?"

Bazarov drew himself up haughtily. "I don't adopt anyone's ideas; I have my own."

* * *

Pavel Petrovitch raised his hands in horror. . . . "I don't understand how it's possible not to acknowledge principles, rules! By virtue of what do you accept then?"

"I've told you already, uncle, that we don't accept any authorities," put in Arkady.

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"We act by virtue of what we recognize as beneficial," observed Bazarov. "At the present time, negation is the most beneficial of all—and we deny——"

"Everything?"

"Everything!"

"What? not only art and poetry . . . but even . . . horrible to say. . . ."

"Everything," repeated Bazarov, with indescribable composure.

New? Left, did some one say?

4. Sociological Truism (which doesn't make it less true!): He who lives by the generational sword dies by the generational sword. (An immortal line spoken by a quondam student of Lionel Trilling as he was smitten, almost fatally, on reaching the age of thirty.)

IDENTITY CRISIS

Last year's word for *anomie*.

The concept was introduced by the psychoanalyst (and Harvard professor) Erik H. Erikson, initially, to denote that period at the end of adolescence when there is a convergence of all the discordant identity elements assembled through childhood, and when the individual must resolve (and gain a "real" perspective on) the valuations he has made of himself and others.

("The final identity, then, as fixed at the end of adolescence is superordinated to any single identification with individuals of the past: it includes all significant identifications, but it also alters them in order to make a unique and reasonably coherent whole of them." "The Problem of Ego Identity," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association,* IV, No. 1, 1956, pp. 58-121, reprinted in *Identity and Anxiety: Survival of The Person in Mass Society,* edited by Maurice R. Stein, Arthur J. Vidich and David Manning White, New York: The Free Press, 1960.)

The term received national attention in the report by William Wertenbaker, "The Problem of Identity," in the *New Yorker* (December 1, 1962), of the alarming dropout rate of Harvard freshmen. When asked to explain their problems, each of the students reported the onset of, the failure to resolve, an "identity crisis."

"You taught me language;" said Caliban, "and my profit on't/Is, I know how to curse: The red plague rid you/ For learning me your language!"

What is Harvard's is, sooner or later, America's. So, it was no surprise that the adolescent difficulties of the new City University of New York were discussed by the New York *Times* Education Editor in the following fashion: "The City University was created only four years ago and its current crisis might be diagnosed as growing pains. Actually it would be more accurate to talk of the pains that come with an 'identity crisis,'—an attempt to change one's personality."

And what may be true of an institution might be true of a state as well. Thus in his inaugural speech in January, 1966, as Governor of New Jersey, Richard Hughes reported that "New Jersey was suffering from an identity crisis." "Caught as we are," he said, "between New York and Pennsylvania, New Jersey does not have a coherent self-image of its own."

A state of "acute identity diffusion," writes Professor Erikson, "usually becomes manifest at a time when the young individual finds himself exposed to a combination of experiences which demand his simultaneous committment to *physical intimacy* (not by any means overtly sexual), to decisive *occupational choice,* to energetic *competition,* and to *psychosocial self-definition.*" (Italics in the original.)

Governor Hughes, however, did not specify which of these possible pathographic elements had precipitated New Jersey's "identity crisis."

IDEOLOGY

The word *ideology*—it has many ambiguous meanings and emotional colorations. Everything is sooner or later dubbed an ideology—ideas, ideals, beliefs, passions, values, *Weltanschauungen,* religions, political philosophies, moral justifications and so on and so forth. One hears about "communism and capitalism as competing ideologies," about the "ideology of the small businessman," about the "failure of the United States to develop an ideology,"

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and, *pace,* "the end of ideology." A sociology colleague sends me an essay entitled "Change, Ferment and Ideology in the Social Services." In an essay in *Partisan Review* on pornography, ideology is defined as "fantasy cast in the form of opinion or assertion," a loose and associative form of thought "sharing qualities in common with pornography itself." A front-page essay in the *Times Literary Supplement* on pre-Christian religious tracts discusses the effects on Christian apologists of trafficking in "hostile ideologies" (for example, early Epicureanism). And Senator Fulbright writes, apropos of a conversation with the Johns Hopkins psychiatrist Dr. Jerome Frank: "He pointed out, for example, that an ideology gives us an identity beyond our own trivial and transitory lives on earth and also serves the purpose of 'organizing the world' for us, giving us a picture, though not necessarily an accurate picture, of reality."

Surely by now some specific meaning should have developed out of such fragment usage. And yet it has not. The word remains both descriptive and pejorative, both analytical and normative; it does not remain neutral. Neither do people who are influenced by ideology. (In talking about the "end of ideology," one is accused of calling for an end to ideals!) Ideologies, because they somehow catch up one's passions, move people to action. This is the source of their initial power, for in a world committed to change, often quite violent change, ideologies become prime agencies of social movements. But this is also the seed of their decay, for when passions are spent or betrayed, or when harsher realities confound initial promises, ideologies can also wane, or, if used coercively, they can induce cynicism.

Ideology is a French word, coined by the philosopher Destutt de Tracy, at the end of the eighteenth century. De Tracy was trying to define a way of discovering truth other than through faith and authority, and (like Francis Bacon) to eliminate bias, distortions of prejudice, self-interest, and other particularities that prevented men from understanding what they were talking about and therefore agreeing on common terms. De Tracy believed that one could "purify" ideas by reducing them to sense perceptions—a belated French variant of British empiricism—and this new science of ideas, of the discovery of reality, he called *ideology.*

Ideology took on a wholly different set of meanings for Marx. As a materialist he felt that ideology inverted the relation of thought to being, and was therefore a "false consciousness." From the same starting point, Marx claimed that ideologies were simply masks for particular interests. In the essay on *The Jewish Question,* for example, Marx attacks the various Declarations of the Rights of Man in the French and American revolutions for, while proclaiming universal freedom, they unloosed rampant individualism, or the unbridled pursuit by the individual of his own egoistic desires.

The "end of ideology"—a phrase used first by Engels in his essay on Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy—meant the time when men would achieve "true consciousness" or the awareness of the material basis of society and the direction of history.

A second meaning for Marx—and this became in many ways the starting point for the sociological analysis of ideology—was the proposition that all ideas are conditioned—class-conditioned, *zeitgebunden,* language-bound; thus, all ideas are socially determined. Such an argument led, in the work of Max Scheler, Émile Durkheim, Pitirim Sorokin, Karl Mannheim and others, to the sociology of knowledge. When Mannheim, for example, speaks of thought as *ideological* or *utopian,* he is distinguishing two modes of thought in relation to time perspectives, and considers them justifications or attacks on the existing social order. In these instances, however, by invoking science, or contrast perspectives, or history, the sociologists seek to *transcend* the partialities of conditioned ideas.

When ideas are seen as socially determined, or as serving certain interests, or primarily as instrumental, it is a short step to see ideologies as social formulas that

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mobilize people for action. The classic illustration is provided by Lenin in his primer *What Is To Be Done.* Unaware, clearly, of Marx's earlier usages, Lenin used the term "ideology" to mean simply the rival combat of ideas. His language is one of conflicting belief systems in the same temper as the previous wars of religion. He spoke of the Zubatovs, who were dragging the working class "along the line of clerical and gendarme 'ideology'." He described the German working class as "broken up among a number of ideologies." The bourgeois ideology had prevailed, he wrote, "because it possessed *immeasurably* more opportunities for being spread."

But politics, said Lenin, is a question of either/or, *kto/kogo,* who/whom—no compromise. As he put it in his most striking formulation:

> Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being developed by the masses of the workers themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is: either the bourgeois or the socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for humanity has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology *in any way,* to *turn away from it in the slightest degree* means to strengthen bourgeois ideology.

If ideologies are rival belief systems in conflict, involving the mobilization of the masses, the most direct way of rallying people (as Lenin observed in a famous essay "On Slogans" [V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works,* Volume VI, pp. 167-175], an essay that can still be read with profit by Madison Avenue) is by simple formulas, a "line," prefabricated responses that will fit any problem. Ideologies become hermetic languages that provide self-contained explanations of events. (An ideologist has been defined as a man running down the street shouting, "I've got an answer! Who has a question?") Ideology, as Lionel Trilling has put it, "is not the product of thought." It is the refuge of the lazy or frightened mind. In short, ideologies become slot machines of ideas.

The theme of the "end of ideology" as developed by such individuals as Raymond Aron, Edward Shils, S. M. Lipset and the present writer, in its normative aspects, at least, decried the use of ideas as mobilized creeds, as secular religions, and urged the claims of doubt as prior to the claims of faith. In a democracy, moreover, ideological politics, as politics *à outrance,* can only be disruptive of society and lead to violence. A democracy can exist only where there is "civil politics," a politics of respect and toleration. In fine, it is not that political differences and distinctions no longer exist, or that the happy life has been achieved, or that the status quo is to be justified; it is simply that the *way* in which political conflict should be expressed needs to be changed. In effect, the "end of ideology" is not a defense of the status quo, but an emphasis on rational social change.

But sweet reason finds few takers when passions, especially adolescent passions, are aroused in politics. Clark Kissinger of the Students for Democratic Society is quoted (in *Harper's,* June, 1966) as saying: "When they proclaim the end of ideology, it's like an old man proclaiming the end of sex. Because he doesn't feel it anymore, he thinks it's disappeared."

Curious, this new identification of ideology with sex. This may be the mark of the New Left, just as the Old Left had confused ideology with religion. ("We may wait as long for the 'end of ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion," writes anthropologist Clifford Geertz. So who says God is Dead!) If ideology is to be equated with sex, it would be fairer to say, if the metaphor is to hold, that the "end of ideology" is the end of rape.

But every shambles has its *Aufbau,* and now comes herculean Henry David Aiken to provide a new foundation, an *Unterbau,* for the term: "Political ideology," he proclaims, "is nothing but political discourse . . . . on its most general, formative level. It is, this is to say, political discourse insofar as the latter addressed itself . . . . to the guiding principles, practices and aspirations by which politically organized societies, absolutely or else in certain typical situations, ought to be governed . . .

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"If my 'definition' of political ideology turns out to be nothing but a 'stylish' redaction of 'the old-fashioned definition of political philosophy' so be it. For then in refurbishing ideology, I shall have done, as I meant to do, two jobs at once."

Two jobs? *Un pléonasme vicieux!*

KAIROS

A moment of suspended time, the descent of the eternal into the temporal mode, as symbolized by the Cross. The term was introduced into American theological discourse by Paul Tillich in the first of his books to be published in English, *The Interpretation of History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), although the essay, *Kairos und Logos, eine Untersuchung zur Metaphysik des Erkennens, aus: Kairos Zus Geisteslage und Geisteswendung,* herausgegaben von Paul Tillich, had been published in Darmstadt in 1926.

In the essay, Tillich had written:

> We call this fulfilled moment, the moment of time approaching us as fate and decision, *Kairos.* In doing this we take up a word that was, to be sure, created by the Greek linguistic sense, but attained the deeper meaning of fullness of time, of decisive time, only in the thinking of early Christianity and its historical consciousness. The thinking in the Kairos, which is the determinant of the second line explained in our historical consideration, is opposed to the thinking in the timeless Logos, which belongs to the methodical main line. Thus the correctness of our original distinction becomes apparent, and at the same time the question of the essential relationship between Kairos and Logos becomes urgent. For it must become apparent that the consideration of reality in the sense of the timeless Logos is at best an immense abstraction which cannot do justice to the passing fate and decision of immediate existence.

What is puzzling is the failure of this implicit chiliastic term to win an historical afflatus. Was it that its pneumatomachian implications could not find a ready echo in an age that does not want to lay the ghost of the Word? Or was it simply the more functional, linguistic explanation that the term could not be adapted to the necessary adjectival form (as could charisma) in which it could be used with fervor?

Surely the failure of transformational rules to operate in a circumstance in which, from surface indications, a powerful intellectual sweep was at stake, is a question for all sociodicists.

KEYNESIANISM

A doctrine once considered socialist because of its theorem that the state should undertake to stimulate full employment by maintaining a level of aggregate demand such that all the goods offered for sale would be taken off the market. Now that the 1965 tax cut has demonstrated that capitalist fiscal policy can reduce unemployment, the doctrine is being attacked from the Left as "reactionary Keynesianism."

PHENOMENOLOGY

A term just ready to come in over the breakers. In the history of philosophy, of course, phenomenology *preceded* existentialism. Sartre was a phenomenologist—*La Nausée,* his first novel, was a didactic effort to explore the phenomenological nature of objects—before he became an existentialist. But as the existentialist tide recedes, some of the undertow now begins to come in.

Phenomenology fits certain current cultural preferences: for description rather than introspection, of structural analysis of forms rather than content, the emphasis on relation and intentionality rather than analysis, *et cetera.* There are other reasons for its rising popularity. Phenomenology, with its emphasis on logical forms, offers a bridge to continental philosophy for those now seeking a way out of linguistic analysis. In sociology, the emphasis on actual behavior and modes of presentation offers a relief for those seeking escape from such abstractions as "roles," "sets," *et cetera.* In literary criticism, phenomenology can be a carry-over from the minutae of the "new criticism" to a description of "total structures."

More generally, the younger generations of scholars, particularly those in revolt against their elders, always want new lan-

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guages, new forms. Validity combines with quiddity to place this on the agenda of sociodicy.

POWER STRUCTURE

The origin of the term is not altogether clear. To a considerable extent it derives from C. Wright Mills's the "power elite." The difficulty with that term is that it was too specific. The "power elite" referred to those individuals at the head of the major institutions—military, corporate and political *Spitzenverbande*—of the society. But then one could always go and look, as Robert Dahl did in his book *Who Governs?*—and find out that the alleged cohesion is just not there.

And for Negro radicals and nationalists, the term "power elite" was too restricted for adequate usage. It referred to people at the top. But as they see it, all whites hold power over them. There was not just a power elite, but a power structure, with people ranged in it all the way. To this extent, paradoxically, the term *power structure* represents a democratization of the term *power elite.*

In effect, the term "power elite," crude as it was, was not sufficiently crude for use in political sloganeering. The term *power structure* clearly is superior. The "power structure" can be seen as a monolith. And at the same time it is diffuse. Also, it can be reified. It can seem to be alive and to compel obedience. That is the virtue of total ambiguity. The "power structure," like Cobbett's "The Thing," or Jack London's "The Iron Heel," has diabolism. Consider the recent use of the term by Conor Cruise O'Brien, the sometime literary critic and sometime diplomat. Describing the insidious influence of *Encounter* magazine on the English and American intellectuals, he writes: "Writers in Britain and America were encouraged thereby to accommodate themselves and their readers to *the* requirements of *the* power structures in their countries. More important even than that, writers living under the subordinate power structure, Britain, were encouraged to accommodate themselves and their readers to the demands of the superior power structure, that of the United States." (*Book Week,* June 12, 1966, italics added.)

But radical *cognoscenti* recognize that such a term cannot stand for the complete social reality. It is just a necessary means, like slogans and ideological formulas, for educating people to true consciousness. As Peter Lathrop (the pen name, we are told, of an instructor at a Midwestern university) writes in the February, 1966, issue of the *Monthly Review,* in an article entitled "Telling and Teaching":

> The teacher constantly creates an intermediate language to bridge the chasm between social reality and the revolutionary word. A socialist consciousness cannot be hastily superimposed: rather it must grow out of present ways of apprehending reality. Hence we should carefully analyze the student's dominant symbols and images and, where possible, introduce new concepts in familiar metaphors and similes. For instance, "ruling class" is Marxist shorthand: once understood, of course, the term can function as an instrument of thought—when conversing with other Marxists and when reading such journals as *Monthly Review.* But the teacher cannot employ such abbreviations as "ruling class" as initial means of creating understanding: he must first find partial equivalents such as "status quo," "monster," "power structure," and the like. Confronting the same social reality, teacher and student must proceed from sensing to organizing experiences in common forms of language. Though long and often arduous, such a process is necessary to the birth of socialist consciousness.

Clearly, Mr. Lathrop has put forth the "transformational rules" of Marxiodicy.

SOCIODICY: *Some Definitions.*

1. The study of "transformational rules" to uncover the changing meanings of sociological meanings.

2. The vindication of sociological glossolalia as the necessary condition of the greatest linguistic good.

3. The meta-science of sociologomachy.*

* See *Sociologomachy,* by Socinus Grelot (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

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ART AND LETTERS

The Feast of Cybernesia

ROGER DU BEARN

It was a Greek festival, of course, in honor of steersmen—not the identical ones named, or rather, symbolized, by the K in Phi Beta Kappa, but creatures closer to them than to the smooth-tongued bandits who now hold up the serious business of life by touting their supposed art of Cybernetics. These miscreants are confidence men, too, because they usurp the name of steersman, *Kubernetes,* for devices they represent in the same breath as self-steering, as thinking. Well, the Greeks had imagined that possibility also. They were convinced that the ships of Phaeacia had acquired consciousness and needed no *Kubernetai.* But the Greeks had sense enough to see and to say that these cyberneticized vessels had got consciousness along with self-steering. We are silly enough to believe in the one without the other.

The last time THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR took notice of this tedious subject was last spring, when many nice people and some able minds palavered and pondered, like hundreds before them, "Do they think? Will they walk and talk? Am I hearing them mutter—or futter? Isn't their memory remarkable—fifty thousand characters! Why, they remember my name, although my face stays unfamiliar. Yes, that's how they do it: they've translated me into a language they like better. Who am I? It's the problem of identity: I'm DO 75 I = 1, 20. That's my last name; what I was christened is: KAT (I) = 0. All their answers are a *façon de parler,* of course, but as polite as you'll find anywhere. Yes, you have to admit it, anything you can do, they can do; and do better and faster and for longer at a time. A Model 7090 never feels the need to go to bed or to the beach or to the john. It's the ideal fellow we've been waiting for, the wise man who has the fool's questions taped. The only problem left for us dull human beings is not to run out of questions. They get used up fast, and we can't have waste, otherwise—but *you know,* an idle computer is literally unthinkable."

While our docile readers were rocking themselves to sleep over this lullaby, an earnest worker was beating his merely mortal brains out inventing still another language that the computers as an ethnic minority might be placated by when asked to translate. He invented FASE, the thing itself and the beautiful name to go with it. The name, I am assured, does not rhyme with *blasé.* It is an acronym designating Fundamentally Analyzable Simplified English; on learning which, the New York *Times* asked itself whether the language of Shakespeare could not after all be improved upon.

This was quickly put to the test by quoting the self-steering remarks of Richard III about the winter of his discontent. Those lines are fundamentally unanalyzable nonsense (or FUN), and all must agree they are as anti-FASE as anything can be. To the question about Shakespeare's being improvable, the *Times* gave "a definite yes" (meaning yes). The *Times* conceded that "the machine still [*sic*] does not know what the words mean," but "it 'comprehends' their function as indicated by the order in

✪ This is ROGER DU BEARN's second contribution to the ART AND LETTERS department. His "In the Hand or in the Bush?" appeared in the Autumn, 1965, issue.

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which they appear in the sentence." What we need now is a machine to tell us what those quotation marks mean around "comprehends." When we know the answer to that, we can cure quite a few modern diseases. Meanwhile FASE is expected to "serve as the basis for information retrieval by machines in libraries and laboratories that handle vast numbers of written documents."

> Oh, Fase is the basis,
> The sought-for oasis
> For scholars in stasis.
>
> In textual hitches,
> Retrievers like beavers
> Will be turning out learning
> Much faster, much better, much
> longer than we obsolete sons
> of Academia.

Make no mistake. There is nothing the matter with digital computers. I love them. I lust after their svelte outlines and silent conversation. They're unseducible, as I know from overhearing a delinquent programmer whisper to a modest 1410, "You've got to get hotter, Henrietta." The machine did not quiver, either in response or indignation. True to its real name, it continued counting on its fingers and turning out the same wrong answers that he had set the stage for. I repeat, computers are a credit to themselves and to man, on exactly the same footing as a pair of tweezers or a piano. What is objectionable is not computers, but the gossip of the old women who write for the *Times* and THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR (me too) and the jabberers who address the P.E.N. clubs or appear on university panels (three pieces of wood laid side by side, FASE please note).

For my money, which isn't enough to pay for even a minute's conversation with a geisha-type computer, the gossip is equally bad whether it's for or against the revolution in data processing (all done with figs.), the invasion of private life by computers, computers and creativity, scholarship and computers, computers help diplomats, help doctors, help designers, help composers, help, help, help! And the reason I deprecate the pseudo discussion is that it is naïve on both sides.

All brassy promoters make their pitch by scaring you first and then saving you from the dangers they have created. Here they bamboozle you, browbeat you, into believing that machines are minds and minds machines. The inference is that you had better quit. Your mind is a poor thing and not your own. But as soon as you have decided that you might as well let the alarm ring and stay in bed tomorrow morning, the self-same machine is sold you as an indispensable adjunct to your good life, your charmed life, your gracious living. It will find your collar button, teach your children, locate that tumor you're hiding, and work out your income tax, *adversus fiscum*. Ask and ye shall be answered, IBM that I AM.

The wickedness is that these demonstrators rely on fraudulent definitions of *teaching, knowledge, translation, diagnosis, mind, thinking,* and the rest. In all of them, the thing left out is *meaning, intention,* the *working toward a purpose* which a mind has and a machine lacks. Mr. Robert McClintock made this clear in one of the best papers in the Spring issue of the SCHOLAR. But he and his friends are, as I say, of equal naïveté with their opponents —not indeed Mr. Marshall McLuhan, who is a fine Canadian Lord Peter Wimsey, but the multiplying tribe of McLuhanatics. For the fallacy in the proposition that a machine is a mind and v.v. has been shown up over and over again. Doing it once more is being like a patient grandmother who repeats a simple story endlessly to the tots. Let's stop arguing and sober up. We haven't a teaching machine, but a rudimentary drilling device, little better than the chapter of answers at the back of the old algebra book. We haven't a translating machine, but a mechanized glossary, less complete and less finely differentiated than a good bilingual dictionary. We haven't an electronic doctor, but a high-speed sorter-and-riffler for the classification of standardized reports.

And this last characteristic is of course what makes computers a marvel, a true

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lifesaver designed just in time to rescue us from the chaos of overpopulation and the excessive interchange of goods and services. A mass civilization is too many people doing too many things. If we insist on keeping on as we are, we obviously need this colossal and impassive sorter and dealer. Your right to education, travel, false teeth, a pension, and a hysterectomy depends on the vast capacity of a computer to be indifferent to you, unaware of the boredom and drudgery required to keep your needs and records straight. It cares not but counts right—if a mindless click, click, click over a punched card or tape can be called counting. At any rate, as the social order breaks down, the computer reembodies it—with the help of a small army of intelligent men.

If the machine can do this it can of course also make indexes, concordances, and systems of cross-references; this being so, it should become a time- and patience-saver for innumerable scholars, librarians and policemen. But get this into your rubbery noddle, O devotee of FASE, the machine will not make the slightest list or inventory for you if you do not first classify your wretched stuff, that is, if you do not first think about it, O Aphasiac!

Ask, for example, the embattled members of the American Booksellers Association, who last summer in Washington fell on their knees and worshiped the abacus, ask them what they think of the big publishers' computerizing of their "fulfillment" and bookkeeping operations. The booksellers do not feel fulfilled, and they cry out that the invoices they receive are not to be believed. Why not? Because the excellent computer systems lately introduced have not yet been fed the right meanings. The machines do what they are told, like soldiers of olden times: no initiative. If *Hist Jap* is the abbreviation for both *A History of Japan* and *Historic Japan* the computer will treat the two books as one, no matter how many returns and letters of expostulation come to the office; whereas the girl there, assuming she is bright, will suspect something wrong after, say, ten or twelve occurrences of the trouble.

I conclude that when we thoughtlessly attribute thought to machines, when we pathetically pretend that they live and feel and love to help us ("Our Ailing Machine on Moon Shows Where It Hurts"), we are being not only stupid but brutish. I raise my voice against cruelty to computers now, because I sense that the next move of a degraded humanity will be to make them responsible for our sins. The innocent, beneficent computer or surveyor (and dear little Anna Log too) will become our scapegoats, with all that this may entail of discrimination, violence, perhaps technocide.

The ulterior consequence of cruelty we all know—or ought to. Cruelty not only maims and kills the victim, it dehumanizes and maims the doer. In our dubious relation to computers today the paradox must strike everyone that the dehumanizing of ourselves is accomplished by attributing our humanity to the machine. In our passionate desire to say "it's all one," we destroy, for example, the exclusively human flesh and spirit of language. Says FASE: " 'The winter of our discontent has become glorious summer by this sun of York.' Now *that* we can translate. Hooray!" The trouble is that the meaning has escaped with the verse. A winter of discontent by itself means nothing more than a season of unhappiness, which is not at all what royal Gloucester means—any more than he means just one thing by the triple pun in "sun of York," which in FASE is as literal and flat-footed as "sun of the tropics."

Language is not translatable by machine, because language is not a code. It is not a system of which the parts retain a fixed meaning or function. The correct French translation, by human means and for human consumption, of "a horse of another color" is *"une autre paire de manches,"* in which *horse* means the same thing as *sleeves.* That reflection makes one melancholy about the good money spent, yours and mine, on the buoyant boys who have been working for years at machine translation. The official report of the Air Force scientific board concludes: "The state of the art in machine translation has not advanced a

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great deal in the two and a half years since the [previous] report. Some good work has been done; but the production of machine translations of a quality equivalent to good human translations is inherently a very difficult problem."

No doubt. An acquaintance of mine who was on a similar team in another part of the same kindergarten once justified his work to me by saying that in the course of not getting anywhere the team "had learned a great deal about the nature of language." I had not the heart to say that what was learned so expensively by so few was known to the Greeks even before the first Festival of Cybernesia. Ulysses fooled the Cyclops by giving his own name as No-Man. Poor old Cyclops was programmed like a computer and did not catch the fatal pun.

His descendants today miss the same point, by failing to understand (or should one say "comprehend"?) the familiar. This is the besetting fault of our appallingly able men. They will recount with pride in their voice that a computer in Illinois has produced tolerable counterpoint in the third species, and they think it irrelevant when one says that (a) tolerable counterpoint is intolerable and (b) a graduate student would have done it for far less money. The hurt expression of the hopeful mechanist at that point wrings the heart, but he recovers quickly and plays his trump card: the great mind-machine of which he is the male nurse could be programmed to "create" *Paradise Lost* by random effort and without an error—it is only a question of time. And again his muscle-bound mind refuses to work when one tells him that if a machine did produce the poem word for word on paper, it would not be the poem that Milton left us. For one thing, there would be dozens, hundreds of versions that scanned and made sense, but there would be no Milton to point to one and say: "This is it. I wrote it. *That* is what I *mean*."

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CONtroversy

An Electric Grape

ANTHONY BURGESS

Invited to comment on the Spring number of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, I fear that the extravagant praise I want to give may be taken only as the good manners of a guest. But this praise is not appropriate to *gastfreundlich* cosseting: it is many years since I have had so uncomfortable an experience; it was like being welcomed in only to be pummeled, given a cold shower, fed with hard tack, then sent to bed with the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But a very heady wine was, at the same time, cunningly and surreptitiously administered: I was overstimulated into a three-night insomnia.

The issue, in fact, jolted me into as purgative a reassessment of my position as I have known since middle age began to set in. As a professional writer, I have taken a modest pride in my speciality—which is in the employment of a very subtle and highly organized mode of communication. I have used language, but I have also studied language; as far as is consistent with the extramural limitations of a private and amateur scholar, I still try to study it. But articles like Roger W. Wescott's "Introducing Coenetics" remind me that I am still living in the days of Professor Sweet, when linguistics could be studied with a notebook, an ear, and a little intelligence. A lot of people in my position would, if they had not been set upon by the creative bug, have elected for genuine scholarship—which seems to me to offer the most desirable life imaginable. Looking back more than twenty years to the time when scholarship beckoned and was repudiated, we tend to think that it is still robed and hellenic, all browsing and seminars. That Spring issue must have put us all right (those few in Britain who can have read it, I mean. I would seriously recommend that it be published here as a book: it would bang the dust from a few academic gowns). Linguistic scholarship, and the new general studies of communication, sounds like business—white coats and spanners.

Spanners? That shows how out-of-date I am. I cannot come to terms with cybernetics, despite the helpful pamphlets I receive from the British automation company of which I am a shareholder. I do not know how a computer works, although I can roughly explain television and the internal combustion engine. Asked to take cybernetic findings on trust, I feel unhappy and envy Dr. Johnson, who could encompass most eighteenth-century science in a corner of his living room. And I also feel the uneasiness of that great Johnsonian Mr. Krutch, who writes of "our increasing dependence upon increasingly complex machines." I, like him, was brought up on the arithmetical extraction of cube roots; now, as he says, scientists are ignorant of what they can leave to computers. I trust the computers ("By God," some new Carlyle will say, "he'd better"), but I despise myself for trusting them. In the same way I refuse to be dependent on the internal combustion engine (although I understand that): I insist on living where I can walk to grocers and liquor stores. This, I know, is both neurotic and self-deceptive: my retailers would have no groceries and gin if there were no internal combustion engines. I fear, like Mr. Krutch, a total breakdown

✪ ANTHONY BURGESS, a distinguished novelist, "trained as a linguist, musician and teacher of English literature, served six years in the war, lectured in many places, worked as a colonial officer in Malaya and Borneo. . . . He has a house in Sussex and another in London." He writes that he "prospers modestly."

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and a consequent impotence—not having to get used to no machines, but having to get used to no groceries and no gin.

Computers are only a part of the Spring issue. My brain received as powerful a drubbing from Professor McLuhan's address as from any of the cybernetic optimists. So I have, at last, to take pop art seriously, since the Beatles "stare at us with eloquent messages of changed sensory modes"; I have to learn about the mass audience; I have to look forward to "the possibility of a world without words, a wordless, intuitive world, like a technological extension of the action of consciousness." I can in no way dissent from Professor McLuhan's theses and observations (except where he seems to go wrong over *Finnegans Wake*): I join with many here in regarding *Understanding Media* as one of the great seminal books of the age. My uneasiness is that of one who feels himself threatened, along with the "minority subculture" he serves. Charles Snow, speaking of the Two Cultures, mentioned the old-fashioned humanist, ignorant and distrustful of science, trying to warm himself in the tattered rags of his outmoded learning. I feel rather like that—not willfully embracing my inertia, but wondering if it is not perhaps too late to learn the new things, for, if I set out to learn, I shall cease to act. Professor McLuhan quotes the young Harvard architect who said: "My generation does not have goals. We just want to know what is going on." The two-war generation to which I belong still, I think, has goals and it tends to be frightened of what is going on.

There is a lot of talk about media—which, I accept, we must learn to understand—but not so much about values. What are we trying to communicate *about?* I take some comfort from Mel Powell's brief essay on electronic music: below the new modes of sound production (which the ungifted composer may take as ends in themselves) lie the unchanged problems of art. Despite the coruscations of new techniques, essences are perhaps much as they were. We are learning incredible new things about language, but nobody has yet computerized the secret of giving language aesthetic significance. The liquidation of goals may mean the liquidation of culture. I can hear the ready-made reply: "Yes, but only *your* culture." Professor McLuhan's electric grapes can so far only impart some very sour shocks; I await the treading and the vintage.

The Other Vision

HOWARD NEMEROV

The architects, engineers, town planners, and so on, had just designed and built New York City: a beautiful job, there it stood, in sunshine, in rain, that mighty heart. . . . then someone said, "What do you think it'd be like if now we introduced people into this here set-up?"

Something like that, I guess, is my simple and maybe simpleminded thought about Vision 65 and related matters, so simple that I spent a few days trying to make it sound rather scholarly and abstruse, which it did at several times the length of what I have to say. The following is probably unfair, then, because I shall be criticizing the symposium for something not included in its intentions. Nor may I apologize for this bad behavior, because the exclusion is a mighty one, and necessary at least to mention.

First, then, something so obvious it is easy to overlook. The attitude in the word "vision" has changed right around from what it used to be, and this, like many another change we are concerned with in

✪ HOWARD NEMEROV, a former Consultant in Poetry to the Library of Congress, teaches at Brandeis University. *Journal of the Fictive Life* is his most recent book.

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the world—like, in fact, the electronic revolution itself—is not a thing any particular person or persons decided on, although many persons must have cooperated in bringing it to pass; like any large-scale change in the nature of social assumptions, it looks as though it came about on its own. Visions of the Last Judgment, Visions of the World's Vanity, the visions of Ezekiel, Isaiah, John on Patmos writing Revelations, The Vision of William Concerning Piers Plowman—thoughts of the durable sorrow of the world's condition, dire predictions of local doom, lurid paintings of the everliving End . . . these qualities have disappeared, being replaced, in Vision 65, by a shrewd and genial speculative intelligence, basing on fact, orienting to action, optimistic in expectation while scrupulously cautious against claiming too much.

The change is so imposingly there that an opinion as to its being simply good or simply bad could not be more than trivial. What I mean to stress is that it took place, not by decree, not by planning, scarcely by the direction of consciousness at all, so completely that the presence in the SCHOLAR's Spring issue of a contributor with the other vision would rightly have been felt to be an impropriety; William Blake on the assumptions and consequences of an imperially successful technology would not, to my mind, be obsolete at all, but in this company he would appear to be talking unhelpfully far out in left field. For the burden of the technological symphony is not "Shall we do this or not do it?" but "Here it is, let's get on with the job." The predominating optimism begins well past the point of choice. *Ducunt fata volentem, et cetera.*

There are significant exceptions, and I mention a few of them. Joseph Wood Krutch and Gerald W. Johnson recite eloquently a list of perils no less real for being by now familiar. J. Bronowski describes a probably intrinsic limitation upon the mind's power of viewing itself as a machine, and the part of his essay dealing with self-reference in science and in literature is splendidly complemented by Richard Hoggart's discussion of the sort of knowledge of itself a society may hope to gain by the study of its literature. Robert McClintock argues convincingly against certain cybernetic pretensions to philosophy, and Walter A. Rosenblith tells us that the immense usefulness of computers does not proceed from "gross and overall analogizing" with the brain. But in the papers presented at Vision 65, I find a rational and progressive optimism to be the rule, and one looks a long time for the kind of thought to which Lynn White, Jr.'s essay "On Intellectual Gloom" seems designed as the antidote. Here are a few sample conclusions.

"The move toward the center; the recognition that science and technology are integral to mankind's adventure; the building of a democratic culture: these are clearly only three aspects of one thing that is occurring—the achievement of a unity of human knowledge and experience such as no earlier age has imagined." White, p. 226.

"Perhaps the most exciting prospect of change resulting from our new technology of information processing is the likelihood that it will halt and reverse [the] progressive isolation of idea from idea and man from man. Mankind, in its professional as well as its nonprofessional aspects, will again become the proper study of man." Simon, p. 264.

"Perhaps for the first time in man's history, he can afford to think truly long thoughts." Hertz, p. 271.

I think it is not the optimism I am arguing against—we need all of it we can have—but its exclusively professional and engineering and planning and intellectualizing nature. Not that those voices ought not to be heard, but might not the symposium have cast its nets somewhat more widely? The opinions of women, for instance, of union officers, of persons at various levels of work who had been displaced by technology—the inclusion of these, and others, either not "expert" at all or else qualified in some seemingly remoter area (medicine, psychology, government, law), would have given a somewhat less tidy appearance to the general result, while adding, in counterpoint to the theme of What We are going

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to do with It, the theme of What is It likely to do to Us?

What I have said of the change in the word "vision," then, probably applies in the realm of technology more than elsewhere (George Orwell being a fair example of elsewhere). In that realm it seems as if optimism is itself an assumption, a convention of literary style, a piety belonging to some tacitly specified form of public address. That's fair enough in itself; the Old Testament bit is all too easy these days, and very few modern prophets, imprecating their various dooms upon Nineveh, will have Jonah's luck to be altogether wrong. And if you mean to talk about the near and temporal future, rather than the eternal one that is ever-present, it is also fair enough to exclude more than a pious passing mention of nuclear annihilation in favor of getting on to happier alternatives that at least leave more to talk about. And yet, something about the writers' procedures—the generalized plot that emerges when I put together a number of their scenarios for the future—is dissatisfying.

In Proust's novel there is a place at which the Narrator, dawdling and fiddling through today, keeps deciding that he will be a writer tomorrow; in one form or another a familiar experience for most of us, which the intelligence of Proust, however, enables us to understand better. For when the Narrator examines his unthinking belief that tomorrow will be more auspicious for his purpose than today, he comes upon a tragically illuminating answer: the sole relevant factor that makes tomorrow better than today is that he has not yet corrupted it by being in it.

Applying the lesson, I see that what dissatisfies me about some of the papers is the writers' scholarly enthusiasm for the future that leads them to overleap this point. I am sure none of them believes that electronic means alone will make the future better than the past and present, yet when they come to the point of transition—after having discussed the present in a tone of the most grimly realistic awareness—they get past it rather rapidly, so that it is almost invisible.

In H. F. William Perk's scenario, "The Great Transformation," written by a historian in 1985, it happens this way, in the years 1968-69: "For reasons that are still a subject of dispute among historians, the established order in almost every region of the world was replaced—by one means or another—with a new leadership dedicated to the proposition that peace and abundance shall become the common condition of all mankind." (p. 360) The project of the new leadership bears for its title a familiar but still sinister metaphor: "World War on Want."

In Buckminster Fuller's essay the same transition is accomplished conditionally rather than declaratively. After surveying, with great brilliance and brevity, the evidences of a real improvement of the human condition during his own lifetime, and linking this improvement to the history of energy and its transforming use of materials, he sets up his program for the near future extension of the benefits of technology to all humanity—and then declares in effect that the only thing holding us out of the Garden is the combined dishonesty and incompetence of "the politician." Utopia will come, he says, through "a design science revolution of spontaneously coordinate university-aged youth. This revolution is trying to articulate itself everywhere. It gets bogged down by political exploiters of all varieties."

I sympathize with his impatience, but as to the truth of that diagnosis—that politics is an arbitrary, capricious and unnecessary injection of dishonest stupidity in an otherwise happily engineered human condition, I guess I find myself of the other persuasion.

And I've gone on too long already. Only one more point. Buckminster Fuller's own analysis of our immense technological advance during this century specifically relates it to the two world wars; a further step in the analysis specifically relates warfare and technological progress to commerce; but he will not acknowledge the possibility, if not the likelihood, that these relations are as necessary as they are intimate, and that they work in both directions, human sacrifice on an immense scale be-

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ing the price paid for longevity and other benefits.

I suppose I mean that the triumph of techne, like any other sweet fruition of an earthly crown, is as cruel as it is splendid. Not, as some writers have said, a reflection of man's inability to choose himself, but a reflection of the tragic circumstance that whatever of himself man chooses to actualize, he is compelled to choose something else along with it, as to whose spectral nature I might better keep quiet than speak.

Smack into Human Nature

HOWARD T. SENZEL

Reading through the Spring issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, I was tempted to scrawl "Prophets of Doom" across the cover and file the issue away. Over and over I was told that we were faced with a changing world that we can understand, but that we are not prepared to cope with. Over and over erudite authors explained how the obsolescent human psyche was unable to deal with its fantastic technological creations.

Marshall McLuhan explains it, saying that growing up is absurd because we enter the electric world looking backward through the rearview mirror of nineteenth-century crafts and jobs. Buckminster Fuller states, our communications problem is that we are leaving to the politicians the job of allocating resources. This is the job of technology, not politics. Robert McClintock says, we are building machines whose functions are more fully developed than our ability to understand them. David Hertz says, our institutions are too inflexible to incorporate the information available to them. Thus, they continue to make decisions on the basis of inadequate information.

To say that our society has developed in such a way that no system of organization can deal with its complexity is more optimistic than we care to admit. When we cry "Impossible!" this implies that we will begin to build new institutions to cope with the situation, or that the complexity will diminish to a point where we can cope with it.

Developing new institutions to cope with the complexity is the current vogue of social prophets. This new hope for understanding and controlling our society calls itself the Electronic Revolution. When we ask, "Why is the world's population still hungry, uneducated and without medical facilities?" or "Why don't we have domed cities with controlled climate, electronic libraries with instantaneous retrieval of information and efficient high-speed urban transportation?" we get the pessimistic analyses mentioned above, but optimistic predictions. "The Technological Revolution has given us the material means," we hear. "The Electronic Revolution is developing the systems of control that will allow us to use these means most efficiently."

Allowing for the possibility of coherent social planning is far too optimistic. What we must realize is that the Electronic Revolution has not encountered a typical resistance to change, but that it has run smack into human nature. The fact that we now have the information and communications networks to begin managing our complex world does not mean that we can begin to do so.

A rationalized, cybernated system cannot be controlled if goals are allowed to vacillate. We cannot begin to manage through the Electronic Revolution until we can decide on our goals, and we do not even know how to think about deciding on coherent social goals.

We could probably gain a better understanding of the Electronic Revolution if we had the authors of the Spring 1966 issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR write their predictions in a time machine cranked back thirty

HOWARD T. SENZEL is a graduate student at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D. C.

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years. It is my guess that the visionaries would not recommend investing in either Queens, New York, real estate or automobiles. "It is absurd," they might say, "to think that people will spend two to four hours a day in overcrowded inhumane subways commuting to the same kinds of supertenements that are available in Manhattan." "It is absurd," they might say, "to think that people will continue to demand cars when roads become so crowded that it will become almost impossible to get in and out of our cities."

The historical lesson is that we accept as normal any situation that we are forced to live with. The facts are that (1) more people are getting in one another's way more of the time, and (2) we are developing electronic systems that will allow us to control this complexity. But the evidence does not show that we will apply the control systems to the problems that they can solve.

The crisis of the Industrial and Technological Revolutions was met without any solution. Social forces were manipulated without any manipulators. The system has learned to run without any managers. Benefit or harm is allocated without any coherent intent on the part of the system. A side thrust of the Technological Revolution was a consolidation of manipulatory power; the total thrust of the Electronic Revolution is the consolidation of manipulatory power. But the evidence shows that this intensification will not lead to a new kind of coherent control and operation, but to merely an intensification of the old incoherent manipulation.

In considering the consolidation that the Electronic Revolution has effected, mankind is not questioning the goals that this new force should serve. In fact, this new force is being adapted to old goals.

Information and communication have not brought us more education, but more advertising. Affluence has not coupled with information and communication to bring us freedom from hunger for all, but rather throw-away soda bottles instead of those we must return to the store.

Any analysis that says things must eventually get better because they are getting worse at a rate that will very shortly make them intolerable, is inadequate. An adequate analysis must focus both on the forces in our society that are making things worse, and on the counteracting elements within those forces that are making things better.

An adequate analysis of the Electronic Revolution cannot simply examine electronic innovation. It must look at existing social forces and then try to understand how electronic innovation changes the effects that these forces have on our society's institutions.

New in Degree, But Not in Kind

DOUGLAS BUSH

Huckleberry Finn, after some rounds with *Pilgrim's Progress,* concluded that "the statements was interesting, but tough." I, after reading the reports in the Spring Scholar from the adventurous pilgrims of science and technology, cannot use either of Huck's adjectives without qualifications. Most conferences on the new world of science seek, among other things, to rouse reactionary humanists from their slumber and if possible (to echo the fat boy) to make their flesh creep. At such gatherings (I have attended a number) the accomplished masters of what may be called "conference lingo"—that is, a ready flow of abstract jargon—have a good time, but the benighted humanist, who has an instinct

✪ DOUGLAS BUSH, Gurney Professor of English Literature at Harvard University, has been emeritus since July 1. *John Keats* and *Engaged and Disengaged* are his most recently published books. The latter, writes Mr. Bush, is "a collection of my fugitive pieces . . . a sort of *Festschrift* got up by my colleagues in the department of English and the director of the Harvard University Press."

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for the concrete, may emerge a sadder if not a wiser man. I freely admit that, in my own case, such unsatisfactory results may be due partly, perhaps mainly, to my lack of knowledge and understanding; at the same time I would firmly deny that that is the only cause.

In regard to the issue before us, I share the general attitude set forth or implied by J. W. Krutch and G. W. Johnson (not without a momentary sigh over the latter's "Quintillian"). Our primary concern, now more than ever, is with the thoughts, feelings and actions of individual man, which are more and more shaped or crushed by the pressures of mass civilization (pressures partly created by technology), and for the primary questions science, with all its powers, does not supply answers. Mr. Hoggart, who, like Messrs. Krutch and Johnson, is well aware of the revolution in science and technology, expounds the central values of literature which remain essential and invulnerable so long as man is man and not a robot manipulated by social engineers. Similar reassurances appear in the paper by Mr. Bronowski, one of the very few scientists who have spoken and can speak about literature (the majority seem content to talk about humanists' ignorance of science, although it is the humanists who have written the hundreds of books and articles on science and literature).

But, seen through Professor McLuhan's spectacles, or telescope, Mr. Krutch and Mr. Johnson and their kind are still living in the nineteenth century, unaware that their simple creed is obsolete, that the new electronic culture is visceral, kinetic and auditory. (p. 203) We may get the impression that television, or the computer, is some sort of self-directing organism, an omnipotent, beneficent Frankenstein which, from on high, is molding the new civilization—or precivilization—that we must accept. Against that exhilarating vision may be set W. H. Ferry's realistic arraignment: that the various forms of mass communication are mainly concerned with the profits to be made from espousing and exploiting all that is trivial, ignorant, debased and self-righteous in "the American way of life" and in the popular American view of foreign "enemies."

Mr. Ferry's paper is also, one may think, an astringent antidote to Mr. White's endeavor to dispel "intellectual gloom." No one, surely, would deny "*that technology and science are, and always have been, integral to the human adventure,* and not things curiously alien from the concerns of our race." (p. 225) But one may not share Mr. White's optimistic view of the "democratic culture" now being built; one may see rather a very large element of crude vulgarity (to use the last word in its literal sense). Art of all kinds—except perhaps the most ancient and primitive—is in its very nature an "aristocratic" thing, whether practiced or enjoyed by high or low, since it requires, for creation or response, aesthetic, imaginative and ethical sensibility as well as knowledge and cultural discipline. Is "pop art"—or the measure of "consensus" on Vietnam—a heartening proof of the new democratic culture?

To come back to Mr. McLuhan, his books have of course made a great stir in *avant-garde* culture, although even sympathetic critics have sometimes confessed a degree of bewilderment. Obviously he has a very fertile and agile mind, but he seems to be the high priest of the Aristophanic god Whirl. As he soars and swoops in the ether, it is continually a problem—at least for me and other simpleminded people—to know what he is really talking about, and what his new world and new culture really are. Quite often one may have a horrid suspicion that his gospel implies the repudiation of the whole body of thought, literature and art that man has produced and that remains our most precious possession. Since one cannot suppose that a professor of English would take that line, one is left in some confusion. At any rate one's general doubts of Mr. McLuhan as a Promethean culture-hero, a guide into the future, are heightened by some of his assertions about the past. Thus we are told that "for two hundred years after printing there

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was hardly anything printed except medieval texts" (p. 199): this purports to be historical fact, and it is of course wildly untrue. On the same page we read: "The sudden discovery of nature was made possible by the railway and the factories that were so very different from nature. The romantic movement was a product of the mechanical age by way of a contrapuntal environment." This is not, like the former assertion, a simple matter of bibliography, but it is an even more obvious misstatement of historical fact: as everyone knows, the romantic movement had been in active progress for generations before railways appeared, and by that time it was, if not ended, at least taking new forms that belonged to the century as a whole. If in matters of historical fact Mr. McLuhan is so irresponsible, how far do we trust his speculations about the future?

The whole great problem of a scientific and technological civilization is new in degree, but not in kind. A century and a half ago Shelley, an addict of science, could say that "man, having enslaved the elements, remains himself a slave." Shelley was thinking in mainly social terms; but there are other kinds of slavery. We may doubt if mankind is going to be led into the promised land by that new pillar of cloud and fire, the computer, which works more quickly but not more wisely than the minds that feed it.

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Wings and Seeds

MEREDITH FULLER

Greenly soft and warmly wrapped in grass
I lie upon the ground and think of you.
To my hand a wing of maple seed is cast
As I lie here with wings of thought for you,
And too I think of me:
Us two,
Casting out a seeded wing,
Catching on a bigger wind to bring
Us to the cupping hand
Of some great new creative plan
Of seeds and wings, and wings and seeds.

For see, my love, how it is very much the same:
If I lie here, my body on the grass,
My heart's rivers running through the grass,
The grass spreads over me, and surely in your name.
And must it not also be
That when my heart beats to the earth
And when my arms embrace the earth
The earth, as you, embraces me?

Thus surely if I take the seed upon my hand
And give it to the earth
From its suggestive fall and my mind's will
There will come a birth
Within two hands.

For is not every seed upon the land
Caught in the wind upon the wing of two?

✪ MEREDITH FULLER, who is at present a senior at Wellesley College (and has recently married), wrote "Wings and Seeds" when she was eighteen. While taking a degree in art history, she intends to continue her writing.

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Marcel, Maritain and the Secular World

H. STUART HUGHES

In March 1929 the philosopher Gabriel Marcel joined the Catholic Church. It was the last of the great conversions which in the course of forty years had brought to Catholicism so distinguished a roster of France's literary and intellectual spokesmen. First had come the poet Paul Claudel a decade and a half before the turn of the century, then Jacques Maritain twenty years later, Charles Péguy on the eve of the First World War, and during and after the war a succession of essayists and imaginative writers. If Marcel's conversion closed the series, its emotional tone also differed from most of the others. It came without painful struggle, without the sense of forcing a stubborn will, without any sacrifice of intellectual independence or agnostic friendships. Its quiet effortlessness was consonant with Marcel's own harmonious personality. It was likewise a sign that by the end of the 1920's the enrollment of a leading thinker in the ranks of Catholicism no longer gave cause for public scandal or jubilation; the new position of religious faith among France's intellectual elite had become accepted as a normal feature of literary life in the interwar years.

Yet it was normal in France alone. Elsewhere in the Western world, the situation of Catholicism—or of Christianity in general—was not much different from what it had been in the late nineteenth century; it was marginal to the main course of intellectual endeavor. In a country like Italy, which resembled France in being nominally Catholic, nearly all the dominant thinkers remained outside the Church. In countries of mixed religion such as Germany and the United States, the Protestants held a clear lead over their Catholic fellow citizens. Indeed, the revival of Protestant theology in Germany was the only movement of the 1920's comparable to what was taking place within French Catholicism. But its range was narrower: the neoorthodoxy of Karl Barth was more austere than French neo-Thomism and had fewer aesthetic connections and affiliations. Only in France did Catholic thinkers—in large proportion converts to the faith—succeed in establishing their view of the universe at the center of intellectual and literary discourse.

Why did this happen in France alone? Or perhaps better, why did a revival of Catholic thought appear first among the French? In France, as elsewhere on the European continent, the last generation of the nineteenth century had been dominated by the defiantly irreligious; the first generation of the twentieth—the generation that came to intellectual maturity in the 1890's—had reacted against the bleak skepticism of their fathers by a rediscovery of religious values. But this return to religious concerns had been detached and impersonal. While Émile Durkheim and Henri Bergson and their American counterpart William James had demonstrated the indispensability of

✪ H. STUART HUGHES, professor of history at Harvard University, is currently at work on a sequel to his *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930*. The present essay is a selection from this new study, tentatively entitled *The Obstructed Path: French Social Thought in the Years of Desperation 1930-1960*, and scheduled for publication in early 1968.

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faith for ideal aspiration and social solidarity, they had refrained (at least until the very end of Bergson's life) from proclaiming a religious commitment of their own. They had been fascinated by the works of belief, but they had not become the advocates of any particular belief themselves. That was to be the calling of men a generation younger, born in the 1880's, in whom their elders' abstract will to believe had been translated into a longing for the infinite that gradually suffused their whole being and led them to find in the Catholic Church the inevitable and unchallengeable vessel of transcendence in the secular world.

The Church that welcomed them was far from typical of twentieth-century Catholicism. We may find in the very special situation of the Catholic Church in France —its public humiliation and weakness, its hidden wellsprings of spiritual energy, its desperate factional quarrels and spectacular mutual condemnations—the signs of a vitality that offers a preliminary answer to the question why so many men of intellectual and aesthetic distinction sought shelter within its fold.

The events of the decade from 1926 to 1936 faced French Catholics with a set of unavoidable choices. The ten years that stretched from the papal condemnation of the Action Française to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War made it impossible for Catholics to remain neutral observers of the social and ideological struggle. These were the years when there began what Marcel called a process of "laying utterly bare . . . our human condition." Thinkers who through training or temperament had adopted a stance of detachment were forced to take sides; others who had already committed themselves were obliged to revise or repudiate their earlier allegiances.

From our post-Johannine vantage point —from our perspective on the far side of Pope John's pontificate and the Second Vatican Council—it requires a mighty effort of imagination to appreciate the shock that ran through French Catholicism when Pius XI put on the Index the works of Charles Maurras and the newspaper that was his mouthpiece. To us the condemnation seems only natural; our question would rather be why it was not done earlier. For Maurras had made no secret of his own disbelief and positivist philosophy; he was quite frank in stating that the Action Française favored the Catholic Church for instrumental reasons—as spiritual support for political reaction. But most of the French Catholic elite had been blind to such distinctions. Obsessed with the sins of the godless Republic, they had given thanks to heaven for ideological support from however suspect a source. The Action Française had grown up in the wake of the Dreyfus Case and the separation of Church and state that had been its sequel. In *this* perspective, Maurras and his co-workers appeared as avenging angels, come to rescue French Catholicism from intellectual scorn and material spoliation. To the great majority of the *bien-pensants,* it seemed incredible that the Holy Father himself should have repudiated the gallant defender of the Church in France. For them the association of Catholicism with royalism and reaction was simply assumed as the normal order of things human and divine.

Before 1926, nearly all the chief figures in the Catholic intellectual revival—with rare exceptions such as Claudel and the novelist François Mauriac—had been either members of the Action Française or within its ideological orbit. After the papal condemnation, such an association could no longer be automatic. Each individual was obliged to examine his conscience and to make his personal decision. After 1926, the French Catholic was on his own in a fashion almost without precedent. Two decades earlier the act of separation had cut him off from the material reassurance of state support; now he was required to break a further tie—either with Rome or with the secular organization that had long appeared his strongest bulwark. Most conservative Catholics, quite predictably, tried to avoid the choice: they made formal submission to the papal ban while sabotaging it in practice. Such was the path of a number of the literary mediocrities who popu-

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lated the French Academy. The more rigorous thinkers scorned so slippery an evasion. Very few defied Rome openly: it took the exceptional ruggedness of a Georges Bernanos to go for years without the sacraments as witness to his political allegiance. It happened much more frequently—as in the case of Jacques Maritain—that the condemnation reinforced doubts which had earlier been held just under the surface of consciousness and pointed the way to a radical rethinking of positions which had had behind them little besides mental inertia and the approval of literary peers.

The French Catholic community was far from recovered from the controversy over the Action Française when the eruption of civil war in Spain faced it with a new and contradictory dilemma. This time the Pope and the *bien-pensants* were on the same side; in France, as nearly everywhere else in the Catholic world, the overwhelming preponderance of Catholic opinion favored Franco and the Nationalist forces. Once more the adherents of the Action Française found that they and the Vatican had the same enemies. The renewed alignment of the Pope and the French reactionaries in their attitude toward Spain could not fail to encourage friendlier feelings in both parties. The turn to the right in papal policy which the Spanish War entailed almost inevitably prompted second thoughts on the condemnation of 1926. When Eugenio Pacelli was elevated to the papal throne as Pius XII at the beginning of 1939, one of his first acts was to accept the submission of Maurras and to lift his predecessor's ban on the Action Française.

By the outbreak of the Second World War, then, it might seem that French Catholicism's position in the secular world had come full circle—that its authoritarian wing was once more dominant. But in fact a return to the *status quo ante* was out of the question. Too much had happened in the meantime: too many consciences had been torn and shaken during the decade of ideological uncertainty. The majority of French Catholics might still acclaim Franco as the strong right arm of the Church—but in France, almost alone in the Catholic world, a scrupulous and well-informed minority refused to accept the legend of the Spanish Nationalist insurrection as a holy crusade. Some of these, like Maritain, were men whose eyes had already been opened by the events of 1926. More surprising was the case of Bernanos, who without denying his reactionary sympathies could not refrain from telling the truth about Nationalist atrocities. By 1936, a certain independence of mind had become characteristic of French Catholic intellectuals. And increasingly this independence expressed itself in social consciousness and in a political evolution toward the Left. The years of disarray in the ranks of the Action Française had also been years of economic depression and fascist advance. In the first half of the 1930's the Catholic trade unions and workers' youth organizations had met these new dangers in a mood of militancy and self-confidence. At the same time and with the same sense of social peril, leading intellectuals were more and more inclined to throw their support to the Catholic Left. The end of the decade found French Catholicism at least as divided as before: on balance, however, the conservatives had lost ground; the forces of social and intellectual renovation now felt that they had the future on their side.

After the Second World War, the French Church—both laymen and clergy—emerged as the most "left" and reformist among the major national branches of Catholicism. This situation was already implicit in the evolution of the 1930's. Still more, it had been latent since the early years of the century. After the separation of 1905, the most promising course for French Catholics was to find virtue in the state of penury to which their Church had been reduced—to cut their remaining links with the established powers and set out to rechristianize the poorer classes. Such had been the contention of Marc Sangnier and the other founders of the French Catholic Left. But the circumstances of the time had made this impossible: Sangnier's movement, the Sillon, incurred papal disapproval for a

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mixture of reasons that the Vatican never disentangled: to the valid charge of organizational indiscipline it had added the less justifiable accusation that the Sillon was tainted with doctrinal "Modernism." In 1910, Saint Pius X had formally condemned it. The parallel action against Maurras—which had been prepared as early as 1914—was allowed to lie buried in the Vatican archives.

Not until the Liberation of 1944 did Sangnier and the younger men who had followed his lead receive the ecclesiastical sympathy he had been denied a generation earlier. French Catholicism of the post-Liberation period was very different in tone from the faith of those who had supported the Action Française. It had shed its conformism and authoritarianism: it had become both more personal and more social. In its openness of mind, in its willingness to experiment, the Church in France stood as the model for progressives and reformers throughout the Catholic world. That it had become so was in great part the work of obscure men—of Christian trade union leaders and parish priests who had labored among the poor. It was also the result of a mighty effort of intellectual restatement. One aspect of this renewal had been expressed in imaginative literature, as in the novels of Bernanos and Mauriac. Another aspect was the work of historical scholars such as Daniel-Rops and Étienne Gilson. But the voices of French Catholicism that carried farthest were those of its philosophers—more particularly the exemplary and sharply contrasting figures of Jacques Maritain and Gabriel Marcel.

"What am I?" Maritain wrote to Jean Cocteau. "A convert. A man God has turned inside out like a glove." Of all the great conversions of the twentieth century's opening years, Maritain's was to become the most celebrated. It concentrated in a single personal experience the full range of characteristic influences on a sensitive man of his generation—an impeccably republican and freethinking upbringing, a period of growing despair with the mentality of bleak "scientism" that ruled the Sorbonne, a marriage based on deep sympathy rather than social considerations or closeness of milieu, the friendship of Péguy and the tonic of Bergson's lectures, finally the shock of meeting in the person of Léon Bloy a secular saint *manqué* who took his Catholicism with total seriousness.

By 1906, when he was baptized into the Church, the twenty-three-year-old Maritain had already behind him the most severe emotional trials of his life. Each element in his adolescence and youth seemed calculated to bring to maximum lucidity his anguished search for spiritual shelter. His mother—separated from his father and almost solely responsible for his education—was a strong-willed woman, the daughter of the elder republican statesman Jules Favre, formally a Protestant but in practice an adept of the strenuous Kantian ethic of the late nineteenth century which found no need for divine sanction. His closest friend was Ernest Psichari, whose similarly free-thinking antecedents were suggested by the fact that his grandfather was Ernest Renan. Together the two had discovered Péguy, who had taken them to hear Bergson. And along the way the young Maritain had also found his life companion—a fellow student, Raïssa Oumansoff, whose Russian Jewish parents had fled from Tsarist persecution when she was ten years old and who like her future husband was desolated by the positivist tone of the teaching imparted to her.

In the case of Jacques Maritain, this scientism impinged in a form that was depressing to the point of caricature. His chosen field was biology, and his mentor, Félix Le Dantec, seriously proposed to fabricate human life by synthesis in his own laboratory. As against such an influence, the teachings of Bergson could not have been more appropriate: for young men of Maritain's generation, they came just at the point they were needed most. But unlike the run of his contemporaries, Maritain did not remain content with the Bergsonian philosophy: for him it served as no more than an avenue of approach to an unsuspected world of the spirit. For his initiation into the Catholic faith he sought out the

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neglected, impoverished and totally authentic Bloy. For the intellectual formulation of his new commitment he went directly to Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Curiously enough, the man who was to become the most prominent exponent of contemporary Thomism originally believed that his conversion to Catholicism entailed renouncing philosophical speculation. He went off to Germany to continue his biological studies, and it was not until his return to France and nearly three years after his conversion that he began a serious reading of Saint Thomas. Once launched in this direction, however, Maritain's progress was both rapid and surefooted: he had discovered in Thomism a method so congenial to his nature that it sufficed him for more than half a century of intellectual endeavor. By 1910 he had published his first essay on Aquinas; two years later he began to teach Thomism at the Collège Stanislas in Paris. And after two further years he was called to the Institut Catholique, the greatest center of French Catholic learning. By the outbreak of the First World War, Maritain—just over thirty—was an established influence in the literary life of his country. Still more, he had clearly marked out his own differences with Bergson and unequivocally broken with the philosophy of the *élan vital.* His first book, published in 1913, was a thoroughgoing critique of his earlier allegiance; in his *Bergsonian Philosophy* Maritain rejected intuition as a way to metaphysical understanding, proposing in its stead the severe intellectualism that was to become the hallmark of his thought.

The First World War marked less of a hiatus in Maritain's career than one might suppose. Himself rejected for military service on physical grounds, he lost his friends Péguy and Psichari in the first months of combat. But the war as such found strangely little reflection in his published writing. At this stage in his life his commitment to Thomist study was so intense that it left little mental energy for the affairs of the secular world. And he maintained the same critical detachment into the immediate postwar years. By the mid-1920's, a permanent impression of Maritain seemed fixed in the public mind: his writing was austere, difficult and mercilessly abstract; his personal polemic could be devastating, as his break with Bergson had shown; his own predilection was against nearly all the manifestations of the modern world—in brief, reactionary. In 1922 he had published a little book, *Antimoderne,* whose title gave sufficient evidence of its contents, and in 1925 *Three Reformers,* whose targets, predictably enough, were Luther, Descartes and Rousseau.

Had the great explosion over the Action Française not intervened, Maritain might never have attained to the serenity and humanity that were characteristic of his later judgments. Nor would he have figured in a prominent place in the history of contemporary French social thought. Maritain himself was fully aware of the significance of this turning point. Several years later he noted in his diary:

> Today more than ever, I bless the liberating intervention of the Church which . . . exposed the errors of the Action Française, following which I finally examined Maurras' doctrines and saw what they were worth. There began for me then a period of reflection devoted to moral and political philosophy in which I tried to work out the character of authentically Christian politics and to establish, in the light of a philosophy of history and of culture, the true significance of democratic inspiration and the nature of the new humanism for which we are waiting.

Before 1926, Maritain had never formally adhered to the Action Française. But the influence of the priest who was his spiritual director and his own polemic against the modern world had led him to extend to it his sympathy and to write on occasion for its journals. Among the wider public many assumed him to be *the* philosopher of the movement. His "apostasy"—as Maurras's adherents called it—surprised both ideological wings of French Catholicism; to the democratic and social Catholics it brought welcome reinforcement in the struggles that lay ahead.

The condemnation of the Action Française impelled Maritain into the public

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arena. Here he was to remain for the next quarter-century, gradually establishing himself as the most widely listened-to spokesman for Catholic social principles, first in France and subsequently in the United States. By the end of the 1920's his home in Meudon near Paris had become the gathering place for an extensive circle of Christian artists and writers, which included the painter Georges Rouault and the exiled Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev. The range of these associations seems to have broadened Maritain's sympathies: his prose became less arid, and his intellectual exchanges more forgiving; in 1937 he was reconciled to Bergson, now old and sick and moving toward Catholicism.

By 1934, Maritain was ready to formulate his new view of the social universe. *True Humanism,* based on lectures he delivered in that year in Spain and published as the Spanish Civil War was breaking out, became the cornerstone of everything further he was to write on the subject. All his subsequent volumes of polemic and public philosophy were footnotes to or expansions on the themes that *True Humanism* had announced.

The course of recent history, Maritain now recognized, could not be undone: democracy and its stepchild, socialism, had come to stay. What *True Humanism* set out to do was to suggest how the heroic and saintly values of the Middle Ages could be translated into terms applicable to the contemporary world. Basing himself, as always, on the method of Aquinas, and proceeding in the architectonic order of his master, Maritain traced the historical origins of the kind of humanism he proposed, and projected into the future his vision of a Christian society. One would be greatly mistaken, he argued, to see in the popular political faiths of the last two centuries no more than the work of atheist corrosion. The historical roles had been reversed: the purveyors of apparent evil had in fact become the heralds of beneficent change. Such a one was Marx—whose "cynicism," like that of Freud, had unveiled a number of important truths. More precisely, Marx had exposed the materialism and heartlessness of capitalist values—its treatment of human beings as tools rather than persons—and had awakened the working class to a consciousness of its dignity and humiliation. For a Christian, the answer to Marxism was clear. It was to make a reality of the teaching in the gospels. The encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*—the latter having appeared just three years before Maritain's own lectures—had already pointed the way.

Within this ideological framework, Maritain only lightly sketched the outlines of the future democratic society he had in mind. Its emphasis would be on fraternity and understanding among the classes rather than on a fictitious equality. Its institutions would be pluralist and permissive: while Christian values would give the lead, the Catholic element would not attempt to impose its will on fellow citizens of other faiths or no faith at all. This was the view that Maritain developed more fully in the works he subsequently published in the United States, *Christianity and Democracy,* of 1942, and *Man and the State,* which appeared in 1951 and closed the ideological phase of his career.

The first of these suggested why its author had so long hesitated to use the word democracy at all. As his polemic against Rousseau had implied, Maritain had earlier considered the term almost irremediably corrupted by sentimentality, intellectual confusion, and a general failure to live up to its professions. "The tragedy of the modern democracies," he now explained, was that they had "not yet succeeded in realizing democracy": its political accomplishments had no sufficient counterpart in the social realm; modern society had proved itself impotent "in the face of poverty and the dehumanization of work." Such had been the melancholy balance sheet of more than a century of ideological struggle in western and central Europe at the time that the great democracies had succumbed to fascist domination.

Across the Atlantic Maritain found greater reason for confidence in democratic values. "The very name democracy," he discovered, carried "a different ring in

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

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America and in Europe." In the United States, "despite the influence wielded by the great economic interests," it had "penetrated more profoundly into existence, and . . . never lost sight of its Christian origin." Logically enough, it was in an American setting and in lectures delivered in the English language that Maritain succeeded in completing the definition of the democratic society he had projected in his earlier writings. In *Man and the State* he finally reconciled his previous insistence on authority with his subsequent belief in popular government. A democratic ruler, he surmised, in trying to rise above the passions of the moment, might well incur "the disfavor of the people"—yet such a leader could still be acting "in communion with the people, in the truest sense of this expression." And if he were "a great ruler," he might "perhaps convert that disfavor into a renewed and more profound trust." Here, as throughout Maritain's political and social writings, the emphasis was on the mutual responsibility between rulers and ruled, and of each individual to his fellow citizens. And—as at the very start of his ideological inquiry—the key term was pluralism, to which he now added the "personalist" note that a younger Catholic thinker, Emmanuel Mounier, had in the meantime brought into general currency.

When these final lectures were delivered, Maritain had become a stranger in his own country. The high tide of his influence in France had been suddenly and brutally interrupted by an involuntary exile that was gradually to extend into two decades of absence from home and a growing alienation from the French intellectual scene.

On the eve of the Second World War, Maritain's position in France seemed assured: to his earlier role as the greatest contemporary interpreter of Saint Thomas, he had added that of a militant spokesman for social Catholicism. Abroad, he was becoming almost equally famous. He had lectured throughout Europe and in Canada and South America as well. He had made three lecture trips to the United States. On a fourth such journey events overtook him: the fall of France left him stranded in the country that was to become his second home.

Here he adjusted rapidly to his new surroundings. He taught at Columbia and at Princeton. Together with Raïssa he made his apartment in Greenwich Village an intellectual and social haven for others similarly exiled from France. Toward his own country his attitude was unequivocal: he had refused to back Franco in 1936; he extended the same refusal to Pétain in 1940. Maritain's wartime writings were a series of appeals to his countrymen to stand fast for the values of liberty and humanity; they were briefer, simpler, more direct than what came before and after. Although he never formally rallied to De Gaulle, Maritain's Free French sympathies were amply apparent. It was only natural that after the Liberation the General should have called on him for assistance in the task of rebuilding the moral confidence of his countrymen. De Gaulle asked Maritain to go to Rome as ambassador to the Vatican, and the philosopher—now sixty-two—felt obliged to accept.

This second exile (and this time self-imposed) lasted until 1948. There followed a third and more puzzling period of life abroad. On resigning his embassy—having done what public duty seemed to demand—Maritain did not return to France to resume his old life as a teacher and writer which had been interrupted for nearly a decade. He went instead to the United States, to take up for five years a professorship at Princeton and then to live in retirement in New York. Not until the death of his wife at the end of 1960 did he resolve to go back to France. And when he did so, it was as an old man, with "a great thirst for silence," come home not for a public role but to prepare himself for death.

By 1961, Maritain's ideological phase was far behind him. He now spoke of his political and social writings as though they were past history. He had no wish to return to the theater of intellectual encounter. France's old intelligentsia pleased him "less than ever"; the young intelligentsia of the new society, which was closer to the world

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of reality and of manual labor, did not need him as a guide. In these young people, whose way of thinking struck him as "healthier and better ventilated" than that of their immediate forebears, Maritain vested his hopes for the future of Thomism in France. As for himself, he had come full circle: he had returned to the longing for quiet contemplation that had first led him into the Church more than half a century before.

I think we can find in Maritain's disgust with the intellectuals who were holding the front of the stage—the "mandarinate" of the immediate postwar years—a clue to his reluctance to go home in 1948. A France in which Jean-Paul Sartre was the philosophical star could scarcely be to Maritain's liking. Under the influence of Sartre and those close to his teaching, Marxism had become the standard pattern of thought for the segment of the French intelligentsia that considered itself ideologically advanced: to Maritain Marxism was an atheist counterfeit of the eternal criteria for a just society. Similarly Sartre and his school had popularized (and travestied) the works of Freud on French soil: Maritain saw in psychoanalytic theory no more than a fragment of the truth, "a punishment inflicted upon the pride of that conceited, pharisaic personality, which rationalism had built up as an end supreme in itself." By 1948, French Catholics had already absorbed what Maritain had to teach them. The others were not prepared to listen.

In America the situation was reversed. Here the intellectual revival among Catholics had just begun. And there were few of the native-born who could hold their own in an exchange with the irreligious. The Church in the United States desperately needed a spokesman like Maritain. Although the American hierarchy pretended most of the time that he did not exist, the growing reform element among the clergy and laity were eager for his message. Just at the time that Maritain was being neglected in France, he was becoming intensely relevant in the United States. The wisdom of his choice of where to spend the last decade of his active life became apparent only after his return to his own country. In the early 1960's the response of American Catholics to Pope John and the Vatican Council vindicated Maritain's efforts in his final years of teaching.

Born in 1889 and seven years younger than Maritain, Gabriel Marcel from the start seemed to live in a different mental universe. Where Maritain prized clear formulations, Marcel saw in words and in reasoning no more than the external trappings of the mysteries of being. While Maritain very early in life discovered his philosophical master, Marcel groped his way for two decades among contradictory influences and inspirations. The fact that both found a spiritual home in Catholicism was evidence in itself of the permissive range within the French Church. Marcel was anything but a Thomist. Most frequently he is referred to as an existentialist, but the label is not particularly helpful in assessing his thought. Although he was the first French writer to use the term—as early as 1925—he was not simply the disciple of Karl Jaspers, the man who transplanted a German doctrine to French soil, that he has sometimes been called. By the time he read Jaspers, Marcel had already arrived at his own highly personal philosophy of existence. By that time, by the opening of the 1930's, his philosophical and religious course had finally been set.

For Marcel the central metaphors of his endeavor were "search" or "journey"—or better still, the response to a "call." Born, like Maritain, of a prominent and relatively prosperous family, Marcel experienced even earlier than he had a sense of desolation at the mental world within which he was confined. His childhood was inordinately protected; his family took enormous care over his schooling, and the little Gabriel had no recourse but to be the model student they expected of him. His father, who held the rank of Councillor of State and was later administrator of France's museums, was a man of disciplined mind and impressive cultural equipment. "Imbued with the ideas of Taine, Spencer

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and Renan, his position was that of the late nineteenth-century agnostics; acutely and gratefully aware of all that . . . art owes to Catholicism, he regarded Catholic thought itself as obsolete and tainted with absurd superstitions." The elder Marcel was a widower. His deceased wife's sister, who brought the boy up, although Jewish by origin, had been converted to an ultraliberal form of Protestantism. In his conscious mind, the boy Gabriel loved and respected his father and his aunt. Deeper down, he felt that he lived in a "desert universe," and even as a child he was haunted by unexpressed thoughts about death.

His "whole childhood" and, he suspected, his "whole life" had been overshadowed by his mother's death when he was four years old. This figure, whom he scarcely remembered, "remained . . . mysteriously . . . present" to him. In the boy's secret cult of his mother's memory lay the origin of his later emphasis on fidelity—on a loyalty extending beyond the grave. It was also responsible for his sense of a "hidden polarity between the seen and the unseen" and for his interest in metapsychic experiments and in extrasensory perception.

At the age of eight Marcel went to Stockholm, where his father had been appointed French Minister. Although his stay in Sweden was only brief, it revealed to him that other ways of life were possible besides the austere intellectualism of his home, and it opened vistas on the adventurous and the exotic. From this point on, Marcel was to have a passion for travel; his longing to discover and to explore was of a Proustian intensity. And when he finally came to read Proust himself, it was with the sharp emotion of discovering an abiding affinity between the novelist's search for a lost past and his own quest for a world beyond that of everyday things to which the memory of his mother beckoned him.

Perhaps it was inevitable that such a boy should become a philosopher—but of a very special and unsystematic variety. He might also have been a musician or an imaginative writer. Music was one expression of the infinite that Marcel cultivated as a gifted amateur; the drama was another. In the dialogue of the stage he found the ideal vehicle for the exchange between the "I" and the "thou" which was central to his view of human relations. As a child playing in the Parc Monceau or in the gardens along the Champs Élysées, Marcel, lonely and constrained, had invented imaginary characters to people his solitude. The richness of his thought on the relations between himself and another may have been born of this suffering at an isolation too heavy for a child's heart to bear. As a man in his mid-twenties, chance handed Marcel an opportunity to touch the lives of others under tragic circumstances. On the outbreak of the war, too frail for combat service, Marcel found congenial employment as head of the information service organized by the Red Cross. Here his job was to deal with the constant requests for news of soldiers listed as missing in action. Every day he "received personal visits from the unfortunate relatives who implored" him to find out what he could; "so that in the end every index card" became "a heart-rending personal appeal."

The war was the first great shock to Marcel's life. It broke up the security of the *grand bourgeois* universe within which he had earlier been both protected and confined. It was responsible for a new tone of anguish in the *Metaphysical Journal* to which he was confiding his search for ultimate reality. At the same time he was grateful for the state of illusion in which he had earlier lived, since it had enabled him to get over the most difficult part of his apprenticeship as a philosopher.

By 1910—at the almost unbelievably early age of twenty—Marcel had passed the *agrégation* in philosophy, but he never went on to the doctorate or to become a university professor. Instead he taught from time to time at various *lycées,* as inclination dictated and his private means permitted. Just after the war he married into a leading Protestant family. Although his wife was a woman of talent to whom he was totally devoted, the idea of conversion to her faith never occurred to him.

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The contrary happened: three years before her death in 1947, she followed him into the Catholic Church. Their life together displayed the harmony that Marcel brought to all his concerns. A Parisian by birth, but far from convinced of the virtues of a great city, he finally found the quarter that suited him, between the Luxembourg and the Sorbonne. He also bought a small château near the Dordogne, which served as his refuge during the Vichy era. A luminous conversationalist, widely read and on terms of easy familiarity with the arts, going almost nightly to the theater, such was this worldly philosopher whose technical specialty was ontology and whose aspiration was for the infinite.

His philosophical antecedents similarly put him into no clear category. First he had turned his attention to the Romantics —especially to Samuel Coleridge and Friedrich Schelling—then to Americans like Josiah Royce and William James and William Ernest Hocking. Quite predictably he followed Bergson's lectures "with passionate interest," and he remained faithful throughout his life to the inspiration Bergson had given him. But his debt to American philosophy was primary. It enabled him to shake himself clear of German abstractions and more particularly of the "idealism based on the impersonal or the immanent" which became his *bête noire*. In the Americans he discovered that pragmatism and a feeling for transcendence—which conventional academic philosophy kept apart—could live comfortably together. He was searching for a kind of understanding that would be both transcendent and tangible; and such a conjunction, he gradually realized, could come only through an intense focus on the interpersonal. This was what he meant when he gave one of his essays the extraordinary title "Position of and Concrete Approaches to the Ontological Mystery."

Marcel preferred to think of himself as a Christian Socratic. He liked to make explorations rather than to propound final answers. His *Metaphysical Journal* did not appear in print until he was in his late thirties. He waited another eight years before publishing his second major philosophical work, *Being and Having*, in 1935. Meantime he had become a Catholic. Yet in a sense he had been a believer all along. His concern for fidelity, for trust, for hope, for witness and promise and natural piety had led him effortlessly toward the Church. One day he received a friendly letter from François Mauriac who asked him quite simply: "Why aren't you one of us?"—to which he reacted, equally simply, with the realization that it was among the Catholics that he belonged. Once more, as so often in his life, he responded to a call. His conversion changed his definition of his *métier* scarcely at all. He became in no sense a polemicist or an official apologist for the Church. He had always resisted and continued to detest the theatrical attitude toward religion—the giddy sense of a desperate wager—characteristic of Pascal and of so many contemporary converts. Marcel remained a philosopher writing primarily for the irreligious, and deeply embedded in the secular world.

If Marcel arrived only slowly at his articulate philosophy, he came more slowly still to the formulation of his social thought. In this realm, according to his own account, the key date was the year 1936. But the events of what in retrospect was to appear the decisive spring and summer in the advent of the Second World War impinged on him with less explosive force than in the case of Maritain or Bernanos. They entailed no radical revision of his earlier convictions. He did not feel it necessary to take sides in the Spanish Civil War; on the contrary, he believed it wrong for a Frenchman (as an outsider) to do so. The events of 1936 confirmed, rather, the sense that had been growing on him of a "broken world"—which was the title of a play he had written three years earlier. Such a world was like a watch that had ceased to tell time, or a heart that had stopped beating. Externally things went on as before; within, the human soul was empty.

In 1936, what impressed Marcel most of all was not the Spanish Civil War or the Popular Front government of Léon Blum

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—which he dismissed as a "failure"—but the pervasive "spirit of surrender . . . concealed . . . by an anti-Fascist rhetoric in which no clear intelligence could place any trust." The defeat of 1940 turned these forebodings into bitter reality. Like the good Frenchman he was—and for all his foreign travel Marcel was strictly faithful to his national heritage—he suffered profoundly from the distress and humiliation of his country. Yet in another sense the experience of German occupation gave Marcel's philosophy a topical relevance that it had never had before. In this context, themes that might once have seemed the disembodied musings of a gentle spirit took on an anguished urgency. It is significant that the first of Marcel's books to deal even tangentially with current problems was a collection of his essays and lectures dating from the years of occupation. Its title, *Homo Viator*—"man the voyager"—sounded a note that was to recur throughout his later thought; its contents stressed the themes of exile, of separation, of captivity and of hope—above all, of hope—which his audience or his readers did not need to be told how to interpret.

The publication of only one of these wartime essays was actually forbidden by the Vichy censor. In this case the reason was quite apparent: in distinguishing between the concepts of "obedience" and "fidelity," Marcel had come too close to a direct attack on the cult of "systematic docility" that Pétain's government was fostering. Most of the time he restricted his critique to less transparent abstractions. Yet even in discussing a theme ostensibly as inoffensive as "a phenomenology and a metaphysic of hope," Marcel deftly slipped in a series of unmistakable references to his countrymen's current perplexities. A quasi-theological demarcation of the confines of hope and despair imperceptibly passed over into quiet defiance of the Vichy orthodoxy of passive acceptance. "Must not the true believer," Marcel innocently inquired, "be ready to accept the death and ruin of his dear ones, the temporal destruction of his country, as possibilities against which it is forbidden to rebel? . . . If these things come about, must he not be ready to adore the divine will in them?" Having put the matter in terms of a situation at the limits of human endurance, Marcel could readily reject the *bien-pensant* affirmative answer and proceed to a condemnation of the "softening processes" that made such a chain of reasoning possible. And two paragraphs later he was ready to go over to the counterattack:

> Here I take the example . . . of the patriot who refuses to despair of the liberation of his native land. . . . Even if he recognizes that there is no chance that he will himself witness the hoped-for liberation, . . . he refuses with all his being to admit that the darkness which has fallen upon his country can be enduring. . . . Still more: it is not enough to say that he cannot believe in the death of his country, the truth is much more that he does not even consider he has *the right* to believe in it, and that it would seem to him that he was committing a real act of treason in admitting this possibility.

When he reissued these essays almost two decades later, Marcel found that the passage of time and the "radical transformation of the historical context" had not brought much change in his "general perspectives." Yet his tone had become more somber. He now believed that the results of the second war had been even worse than he had feared. Most pointedly, he saw contemporary life as "dehumanized" on a frightening scale.

His anxieties about his own era Marcel had conveyed in another series of informal essays entitled *Men against Humanity*, which he had published in 1951. Now at last applied to contemporary society, Marcel's ideas conformed no better to conventional demarcations than they had while they remained on the level of philosophical speculation. His temperamental reactions seemed to be conservative: he was unimpressed with the ideology of the Resistance and appalled at the injustices committed in the purge of suspected collaborationists; he doubted whether wars of colonial repression were as iniquitous as most intellectuals thought; he distrusted the dominance of a technology that he believed

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could *"end only in despair."* At the same time he coupled these counsels of prudence with other ideological stands ordinarily associated with the French Left: he spoke out unequivocally against all forms of racial or religious persecution, and he found *"anything"*—even "capitulation"—preferable to the universal havoc of thermonuclear war. Such apparent inconsistencies troubled Marcel not at all. He was unconcerned about whether a particular attitude he adopted might give temporary comfort to one or another of the contestants in his country's ideological battles. What did concern him was to keep from being the "vassal" of any organized political allegiance—and by the same token to resist "the spirit of abstraction" which he found responsible for the violence in the contemporary world. Against the spirit of abstraction, Marcel pitted the force of love. His plea was for a restoration of simple human values—for the introduction of a social and political order that would rescue "the greatest number of beings possible" from a state of mass "abasement or alienation."

Whether one called such a goal conservative or leftist was quite immaterial. Marcel himself rejected the terms as productive of "frightful confusion." His social philosophy, fragmentary and amateurish though it was, was of a piece with his speculative writings. It sprang from grief at human distress and a longing to give meaning and depth to concrete personal relationships. In this sense it had the eternal validity to which Marcel aspired. It was also conditioned and limited by the era in which it was composed. Like George Orwell's *1984,* for which Marcel expressed his unqualified admiration, it conveyed an atmosphere of impending catastrophe—a tone better suited to the tormented Europe of the 1940's than to the complacent Continent of two decades later. The anguished, almost hysterical character of Marcel's social writings had begun to date even while their author was still alive. This is one of the major problems that confronts us in trying to assess the enduring viability of the independent Catholic style of thought for which he stood.

"Gabriel Marcel . . . has his Left where Maritain has his Right and vice-versa." Thus one of the latter's most subtle and sympathetic expositors, Henry Bars, has epitomized the difference between the two. Marcel was the more permissive on matters of faith, Maritain the more "advanced" in his social philosophy. Readers who were exhilarated by the flexibility and openness of Marcel's speculative writings might find certain of his political attitudes reactionary. Those who admired Maritain's ideological stands were frequently repelled by his uncompromising adherence to the Thomist method. At one time or other both combatted the works of the modern world, but from the 1930's on, Maritain became more at home in it, while Marcel grew less reconciled to mass industrial society.

One winter they saw a great deal of each other at the Versailles home of a fellow convert, Charles du Bos. But the experience failed to bring them intellectually closer together. Maritain, after trying in vain to persuade Marcel of the merits of Thomism, simply refrained from mentioning him in his own writings. Marcel referred periodically to Maritain, and usually in disparaging terms. On one occasion he went so far as to call him a "fanatic." Apparently the temperamental difference between the two was too great to be bridged. One had been a philosophical prodigy, who at the age of thirty had done battle with the great Bergson himself: the other had spent nearly two decades struggling toward the light. One was rigorous in his use of language and unsparing toward his readers: the other wrote in a relaxed, conversational style. One cultivated a severe intellectualism: the other distrusted the usual paths of the intellect and searched out epiphanies and vistas on the infinite. One was the leading spokesman of the most prestigious variety of Catholic thought: the other held his religious faith half-veiled within a texture of discourse to which a nonbeliever might well subscribe.

The listing of contrasts between Maritain and Marcel could be extended further. Enough has already been said to suggest

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why they remained so far apart. Yet if we shift our focus from their philosophical differences and direct it toward human sympathies and life styles, a new series of parallels—and this time suggesting a latent understanding—begins to emerge. Both Maritain and Marcel came of mixed religious backgrounds; in both cases a liberal Protestant influence entered through the woman responsible for the boy's upbringing; in both cases there was also a Jewish aspect which each took pains to emphasize —Marcel, the antecedents of his mother, Maritain, the parentage of his wife. In this matter of origins, it is notable that each came to Catholicism quite innocent of any previous family association with the Church: each made a radically free choice. Both had been brought up by strong-willed and intelligent women; both selected remarkable wives; both marriages, although unusually close, remained childless.

Perhaps one can do no more with such parallels than to align them, as I have, in bare outline. A number of emotional affinities readily spring to mind. The high valuation both Maritain and Marcel put on warm personal relations is one. The kindness with which they reached out to near-strangers is another. Rather surprisingly, in view of Maritain's intellectualism and Marcel's absorption with human anguish and the dread of death, both were notable for their cheerfulness of manner. One is tempted to refer to them as merry philosophers. Although they cherished their own country, they were quite at home abroad. Each was an enthusiastic traveler, and each had ties to the United States that were far closer and more understanding than was usual with Frenchmen of their generation.

Even from the more strictly philosophical standpoint, Maritain and Marcel had in common a distaste for both idealism and positivism in their familiar late nineteenth-century forms. Both were equally opposed to the tradition of Descartes. Indeed, they can be thought of as offering the first examples of French thinkers of our time to work quite outside the tradition of Cartesian classicism. Bergson had earlier tried to found a non-Cartesian school of philosophy—but his prose had remained in the French classic mold. Bergson wrote graceful and skillfully organized books. Maritain and Marcel published collections of essays. In the case of the latter, the informal cast of his thought was thoroughly consonant with the essay form. In Maritain's case, the jumbled heterogeneity of his writings is more surprising: his individual books overlap and repeat each other endlessly. If a man whose mental processes were as disciplined as Maritain's could take so little care with the ordering of his literary production, there arises a basic question as to the nature and applicability of such thought in our own time.

Neither Marcel nor Maritain considered himself a *Catholic* philosopher—that is, in the sense of an official expositor of the teachings of the Church. Even the latter, although he stood for a way of thought to which Leo XIII had given papal endorsement, remained primarily in a secular context. After all, when he settled in the United States, it was at Princeton rather than a Catholic university that he chose to teach. Both, then, could more properly be described as "philosophers who were Catholics." And as such, their life-situation was of necessity ambiguous. They lived enmeshed in a society to whose central values they were radically opposed. They wrote in large part for an audience that could neither share nor even understand their religious beliefs. Maritain offered an intellectual method that the majority of his readers refused to embrace; Marcel's method—if such it can be called—was too personal and elusive to be transmitted to others. Hence of necessity they wrote in fragments. They offered evocations and possibilities rather than a full exposition of an alternative way of life and of thought. In the 1930's and 1940's they had shown their countrymen a way out of an intellectual and moral impasse. At that point only a few had been prepared to follow them. A quarter-century later, when they were old and tired, their words found an echo in Rome itself. But this was in a very

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different historical context and on the level of applied social philosophy rather than of abstract thought.

As a formal philosopher, Maritain had been acutely aware of the incomplete and tentative nature of his own writings. He had known that he would never write a *summa; that task had been performed once* and for all by his master Aquinas. Nor did he believe he lived in an era whose philosophy bore the stamp of classical confidence. If one was looking for *that,* one might as well go back to Descartes—and this was the last thing Maritain would have urged on his readers. Superficially regarded, Maritain's lifelong hostility to the Cartesian tradition sounds odd; the two seem to have in common a schematic order and a penchant for lapidary formulations. But in Maritain's case the intellectualism was no more than the scaffolding of his thought; in Descartes it was the thought itself. What the former could never forgive Cartesianism was its radical separation of mind and body—of the process of thinking from the world of external reality. And he conceived his own role less as that of a systematizer or modernizer of Thomism than as that of a liberator of philosophy from the deadening influence of Cartesian categories. He thought of himself as a realist whose work was necessarily changing and growing under the pressure of historical actuality—a man ceaselessly rethinking the eternal verities in terms of a consciousness of time and its fluctuations that was thoroughly contemporary.

All the above is almost equally applicable to Marcel. In this final guise of philosophers embedded in the history of their own time and yearning to unite metaphysical certainty with a down-to-earth awareness of actual human relationships, Maritain and Marcel pushed one stage farther the revolution in French thought that Bergson had projected; they gave twentieth-century anti-Cartesianism a new concreteness, and they did not hesitate to apply it to specific historical situations. In *this* perspective, the fragmentary character of their thought had its unsuspected advantages: it meant that these philosophers "who were Catholics" could not be dismissed as mere dogmatists; it left their readers free to choose the individual aspects of their work to which they were ready to give assent. At the end of the 1950's, when French intellectuals began to find a way out of their perplexities, the work of Maritain and Marcel gained a renewed relevance. Although their methodologies had begun to look quaint, their words of paternal counsel were being taken up not only in Rome but still more widely among those Catholics and non-Catholics, both in France and abroad, who had become quite suddenly conscious of the ethical goals they held in common.

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played a kind of genius for being in interesting places at interesting moments." Many of the moments, it could be added, would not appear so interesting had the Adamses not observed them, participated in them, recognized their importance, and finally recorded them. The immensity of the record that they accumulated poses the problem that their papers may be read only by scholars. This would be both unfortunate and unnecessary, because the editorial plan, while it leaves nothing to be desired by the scholar, has been devised for the easy access of the general reader. The volumes admittedly look down rather imposingly from the shelf, but once opened they are easy to read if one understands the plan.

The papers of the central figures are being issued in three series, which divide their works by genres. Series One gives us all three men in their private diaries; Series Two shows them in their family and social lives through letters to and from relatives and friends; Series Three prints their public and professional papers. The first volumes of Series Two, *Family Letters,* are in fact an expanded reissue of a nineteenth-century best seller, *The Familiar Letters* of John and Abigail Adams. It is with these two volumes, which are discussed further on, that the general reader should begin.

The editing of the Adams Papers is a story in itself, in which the editors deserve to become as famous as some of the people and events that they have resurrected out of a mass of often seemingly meaningless notes and undated materials in their possession. The two editors of John Adams' *Legal Papers,* for example, have reconstructed the seemingly indecipherable, disconnected jottings on over sixty cases that Adams either witnessed or participated in, and have produced a specialized but highly significant work on American legal practice in the eighteenth century.

The first volume of the Adams Papers appeared in 1961; today, with a dozen volumes issued after fourteen years of work, the editors are about a tenth of their way through the project. Already in 1802, when John Adams began after his Presidency to go over the papers that he had accumulated for fifty years, the family archive was immense; when, one hundred and fifty years later, in 1952, his descendants arranged to deed the family's accumulation to the Massachusetts Historical Society, and the present project began, no one could estimate their extent or describe their contents. The editors first arranged and cataloged the accumulation, then put it on over six hundred microfilm reels, and finally began, in 1961, to put out a selection of the material that they hope to limit to a hundred volumes. (Unlike the Jefferson, Franklin, Hamilton and other American statesmen's papers which have been recently coming out, the Adams Papers cannot possibly be printed in full since they contain the works of an entire family.)

Even without the fourth generation of Henry Adams, Brooks Adams and Charles Francis Adams, Jr., there is more material in the papers than can be described in an essay. John Quincy Adams, in addition to his public papers, kept his diary for seventy years (for fifty of which he hardly missed a day). A volume could be made up of his commentaries on the Bible which were sent from Russia in letters to his sons; his poetical works would total twenty volumes; finally, his correspondence alone could fill out the entire planned edition of the Adams Papers.

This vast production tells in itself something of the nature of the Adamses and their impact on their times. The invariable Adams tactic in each generation, whether in a legal trial, political debate or diplomatic crisis, was to overwhelm the opposition with arguments and lists of authorities and precedents delivered both orally and in writing.

Contrary to popular belief, politics and diplomacy are not governed exclusively by sheer power. Some questions are negotiable, and the more skillful negotiator can triumph over his opponent. Such was certainly the case in the peace negotiation with Great Britain that ended the Revolutionary War. The American Commissioners in Paris, with Adams at their head, were cut off from Congress by the several months necessary for an exchange of letters

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across the Atlantic, while the English Commissioners had to wait several weeks to hear from Britain across the Channel. Under these circumstances certain disputed issues had to be negotiable by the agents at the scene. Adams' instructions from Congress were to cede our rights to fish off the coast of Newfoundland if the British insisted. This the Americans never had to do, thanks to the barrage of reasons presented by Adams to show that the fisheries were an historic right, that it was not to England's advantage to restrict the Americans from them, and that New Englanders could not be kept out of these waters—indeed, they should be officially permitted to continue using the coast of Newfoundland to dry and cure their fish. Adams' persistence no doubt tended to be rather dreary and dulling, but it carried the point, for no one could effectively counter his detailed knowledge of the subject. After a page-long résumé of his arguments about the fisheries in his diary, Adams, on the day the issue was carried, concluded:

> I have not time to minute the Conversations about the Sea Cow Fishery, the Whale Fishery, the Magdalene Islands and the Labradore Coasts and the Coasts of Nova Scotia. It is sufficient to say they were explained to the Utmost of our Knowledge and finally conceeded.

In October of 1828 Charles Francis Adams recorded in his diary a dinner conversation between John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay concerning a certain Jonathan Russell's charges against the elder Adams' conduct of the peace negotiations with Britain to end the War of 1812. The fisheries had again been at issue in 1814, and John Quincy Adams had insisted on the fishing rights with as much vehemence as his father had in 1782; now he was passing on to his listening son the family concern with the issue. The editorial note on this scene, as so often is the case in the Papers, tells as much as the diary entry:

> Jonathan Russell (1771-1822) who had been one of the American commissioners at Ghent, in 1822 charged that JQA had been willing to surrender the right of free navigation on the Mississippi River to the British at the end of the War of 1812 in exchange for American control of the northeastern fisheries. JQA exposed Russell's errors in a devastating pamphlet entitled *The Duplicate Letters, the Fisheries and the Mississippi,* Washington, 1822. See JQA, Writings, 7:250-335.

This note, quoted in full, typifies the sense repeatedly given by the editors' scholarship, as much as by the papers themselves, of a deliberate continuity in the Adams family's history. Not only is there the repetition of the fisheries issue, but also the charge of malfeasance so often brought against the leading members of the family, and the typical reply in the form of a devastating pamphlet. Like his father before him John Quincy Adams had done the paper work of the peace commission, and, again like his father, had laboriously recorded the proceedings in his diary and also copied into it all relevant letters, and early drafts of documents. In controversy about the past in which the Adamses tended to become involved late in their careers, they were able in nearly every case to document their actions from the materials in their own diaries.

The final chapter of this family story is revealed at the very end of the editorial note, in the reference to John Quincy Adams' *Writings,* for the man who edited them and devoted nearly a hundred pages to reprinting the pamphlet on the fisheries was his son Charles Francis Adams.

No single person, not even an Adams, could ever produce an edition with the scholarly perfection of the present Adams Papers. Charles Francis Adams did, however, edit the papers of both his father and grandfather, in addition to the *Familiar Letters* already mentioned, with a completeness and accuracy that was, according to the present editors, unheard of in his time. Even when the present edition is completed, it will necessarily retain numerous references like the one above to Charles Francis Adams' editions of a century before.

As the numerous new editions of the writings of American statesmen and writers have been prepared, scholars have been finding that the old editions put out by

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by Ralph Harper Mr. Harper deals here with two different kinds of love—existential and mystical—which are usually regarded as irreconcilable opposites. He contends that both are real and that the full range of human love includes both. The real question is how the two are related to one another. For the answer, the author analyzes a variety of literary and religious texts, among them: *The Song of Songs,* St. John of the Cross's "The Spiritual Canticle," the letters of Heloise and Abelard, *Wuthering Heights,* and Alain-Fournier's *The Wanderer.*

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their descendants during the nineteenth century contained subtle editorial changes which cumulatively gave a distorted picture. The now notorious bowdlerizing of Hawthorne's notebooks by his wife had its counterpart in the family editions of the writings of the Founding Fathers. Charles Francis Adams did regularize the spelling and punctuation of his forebears, and he did omit many personal matters which he considered to be not of public interest (or, rather, which he considered to be none of the public's business); however, as the editors point out, he never *changed* anything that they had written. Furthermore, his excisions were based on a general notion of propriety, and, unlike his contemporaries', not on a particular idea of how his family should appear in public dress. Since he was not a scholar, Charles Francis Adams' high standards of accuracy obviously attested to his confidence in the family record as it stood. At the same time, his work evidences an inherited passion to preserve that record exactly as he had received it—in two hundred years only a handful of items were ever permanently allowed out of the family's possession.

The two volumes of Charles Francis Adams' diary so far published extend only through his twenty-second year, yet they show an increasing involvement with the family tradition which was to lead to his editing of the family papers and to his later following in his father's and grandfather's footsteps as minister to England. The death of his grandfather occurred on the Fourth of July, 1826, the fiftieth anniversary of independence, within a few hours of Jefferson's death. On the day that he received news of this event, Charles Francis Adams wrote the most striking entry in his diary, predicting, at the age of nineteen, his own future involvement in the family destiny:

> My grandfather . . . [was] Bold, energetic, ardent, he was ignorant of the power of self restraint. This worked him evil for it made him sincere. Falling into the hands of artful adversaries and ambitious friends, he has been a martyr to their intrigues and this character, the boldest, the most enthusiastic, the most passionate in it's support of liberty, of all those who figured in the history of the American revolution, has been handed to us with more of odium attached to it than any other. But the country will do him justice, she has begun and I trust in God she will continue to do so. His posterity will only demand a hearing, his Son will redeem his fame. But should it so happen by the will of the Deity, that he shall call to him this Son before he shall have fully prepared his vindication, the duty will fall on *us*, his grandchildren, those whom he looked upon with combined feelings of pride and high expectation. Should it so happen then, I trust that we shall not come unwillingly to the task and I hope at least so far as it lies with *me*, that not an act shall be done, not a sacrifice shall be avoided, till my utmost efforts have been made to restore him to the place which is his justly due.

Charles Francis Adams' excessive propriety kept his edition of John Adams' writings from conveying his own sense of his grandfather's passionate character; now, John Adams for the first time breathes in his full vigor in Mr. Butterfield's Adams Papers.

The picture of John Adams given by the volumes so far published extends, although there are gaps, from his Harvard College diary, in which he consciously prepared himself for greatness, to his autobiography, in which, as a proud and cantankerous old man after his defeat by Jefferson for the Presidency, he set down a justification of his life. He was to live another twenty years, during which he continued to write prodigiously, but the later record, including his correspondence with Jefferson after their reconciliation in 1812, is not yet at hand. There are only glimpses of him in the diary of Charles Francis Adams, where he appears as a very old man bitterly disappointed in his sons even though one of them is in the White House. It is customary to think of tragedy and disappointment as having entered the family in the generation of Henry Adams, whose wife committed suicide and who lapsed into a cosmic pessimism in his later years. The papers now reveal a pattern very different from the one usually assumed for the successful statesmen of the first three generations. Both Presidents suffered crushing defeats after their single terms in office, and

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both learned immediately thereafter of the death of a son—John Adams' through illness, John Quincy Adams' by suicide.

John Adams' diary entries begin with student notes at Harvard College, then become the musings of a lonely young rural schoolteacher debating with himself whether to pursue medicine, the ministry or the law. There is a good deal of "gallanting" with the girls, the flirtations being carried out under pseudonyms taken from the Greek pastorals. John Adams is "Lysander," Abigail Smith, whom he is to marry, "Diana," and Hannah Quincy, to whom he nearly proposes, is "Orlinda." These early days are touchingly re-created fifteen years later during the Revolution when the circle of friends readopt their fanciful names to prevent identification of their letters.

In the meantime, the young law student berates himself in his diary for indolence, dissipation and flightiness:

> JUNE 5TH. [1760] THURDSDAY. Arose late. Feel disordered. 8 o'Clock, 3 ½ Hours after Sunrise, is a sluggard's rising Time.

This is not the subtle self-congratulation such an entry might signify with someone else. Such entries appear throughout every Adams diary, and are always put down in dead earnest: their volumes of diaries fill up to the accompaniment of the cry "I have neglected my Journal!"

Even after his admission to the bar, Adams continued the rigorous regime of self-improvement that his diary at once recorded and accomplished. At first his eye was directed inward, to his own "absence of mind, and to a morose, unsociable disposition." Within a few years, however, his critical eye turned to equally demanding estimates of others, especially his contemporaries at the bar whose character types he kept trying to categorize. At the same time there was a conscious assimilation and recording of the facts of local life and business—the techniques of farming, commerce, sailing and industry—which evidently made him a formidable arguer in court, and were later to be so useful to him in matters like that of the fisheries.

Except for a few jottings there is a break in the diary from 1763 to 1765, when a new John Adams appears. The curiosity about men and phenomena remains—the diary could be titled *The Education of John Adams*—but rather than forming his character, new experiences now contribute to a matured man who knows what he is looking for. The integration of character is signaled by a new integration of style. Where previously the letters and essays, which occasionally appeared in draft form in the diary, stood out because of their stilted formality, there is suddenly an almost complete regularity of style among all entries.

Bernard Bailyn, in identifying the shift from subjective to objective man, credited it to Adams' marriage in 1764 to Abigail Smith. Equally important, though, was his sudden involvement at this time in public affairs. Within a few months he was elected to two local public offices, published both his analysis of repressive political systems, "A Dissertation of Canon and Feudal Law," and three newspaper letters, signed "Clarendon," on American rights under the British Constitution, and drafted a denunciation of the Stamp Act in the form of the Braintree Instructions (to give a partial list of his public involvements). The new voice was a response to public events:

> The Year 1765 has been the most remarkable Year of my Life. That enormous Engine, fabricated by the british Parliament, for battering down all the Rights and Liberties of America, I mean the Stamp Act, has raised and spread, thro the whole Continent, a Spirit that will be recorded to our Honour, with all future Generations.

John Adams' energies were directed to the Revolutionary struggle from this time until the end of his life. His involvement began just when he had thought himself about to settle down to an extensive legal practice and to his family and farm. The renunciation of these things, beginning in 1765, coincided with the appearance of the characteristic Adams tone of complaint—still in reference to the Stamp Act—at the end of the entry quoted above:

> Thirty Years of my Life are passed in Prepara-

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tion for Business. I have had Poverty to struggle with—Envy and Jealousy and Malice of Enemies to encounter—no Friends, or but few to assist me, so that I have groped in dark Obscurity, till of late, and had but just become known, and gained a small degree of Reputation, when this execrable Project was set on foot for my Ruin as well as that of America in General, and of Great Britain.

With the placing of his own ruin before that of two countries, Adams here assumed the personality that made him of all the Founding Fathers, the one least congenial to modern tastes. One's feeling of distance from him is increased by his sharing that assurance of purpose that makes the men and events of the Revolutionary period stand out with the clarity of the seminal periods of Greek and Roman history. More remarkable than a modern's feeling that such a parallel exists was John Adams' own awareness of it and his easy sense of continuity between his own historical moment and those we can now think of only, along with his own, as semimythical.

John Adams was fortunate in the choice of his wife. Abigail Adams shared her husband's sense of their historical moment, and, if less formidable, was a no less powerful personality than her husband.

"I wonder I write to you with so little restraint," wrote Abigail Smith to John Adams shortly before their marriage, "for as a critick I fear you more than any other person on Earth, and tis the only character, in which I ever did, or ever will fear you." One would have thought that in the fields of love and diplomacy, above all others demanding tact, John Adams' bluntness would have been his downfall, yet it was not. He threatened several times in his letters to send Abigail a list of her "Faults," and she finally demanded that he do so. "In the first Place, then," he wrote, "give me leave to say, you have been extreamly negligent, in attending so little to Cards." With complete seriousness he proceeded to list and analyze her five other faults: she was too modest in company, did not sing, did not always sit straight because of an "inexcusable . . . Habit of Reading, Writing and Thinking," often sat cross-legged, and, lastly, walked with her toes turned in, which gave, "an Idea, the reverse of a bold and noble Air, the Reverse of the stately strutt, and the sublime Deportment."

Abigail's answer showed her undaunted by her formidable suitor: "I . . . must confess I was so hardned as to read over most of my Faults with as much pleasure, as an other person would have read their perfections." Refusing to be less modest or less intelligent "till I am convinced that an alteration will contribute to his happiness," she admitted that she did not sing or dance, and finally, maintaining her poise and good humor even over the point that had most hit home, twitted him in his own terms:

The 5th fault, will endeavour to amend of it, but you know I think that a gentleman has no business to concern himself about the Leggs of a Lady, for my part I do not apprehend any bad effects from the practice, yet since you desire it, and that you may not for the future trouble Yourself so much about it, will reform.

John Adams was greatly lucky to find Abigail, for even though she possessed the virtues that he had decided he must marry, she had the wit and the warmth of spirit to be the necessary humanizing influence of his life.

The letters after the marriage show Abigail Adams suffering the dangers of the Revolution and long years of separation from her husband with grace and a growing dignity. In 1775 she could write, "In the 12 years we have been married I believe we have not lived together more than six." In that interim, the consciously elevated and elegant style of her youthful letters had grown into a sermonlike, Bible-quoting, high formality:

If the prayers and petitions assend unto Heaven which are daily offerd for you, wisdome will flow down as a stream and Rithousness as the mighty waters, and your deliberations will make glad the cities of our God.

At the same time, her letters were full of homely detail on the weather, crops, local people, the children, her care of the sick, and the prices of and difficulties in obtain-

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ing items like paper and sewing needles in the inflation—she had the Adams habit of writing almost daily but never sitting down to a letter without having something to report. Abigail Adams' tribute came in a letter of 1775 from that sternest judge of character, John Adams:

> It gives me more Pleasure than I can express to learn that you sustain with so much Fortitude, the Shocks and Terrors of the Times. You are really brave, my dear, you are an Heroine. And you have Reason to be. For the worst that can happen, can do you no Harm. A soul, as pure, as benevolent, as virtuous and pious as yours has nothing to fear, but every Thing to hope and expect from the last of human Evils.

Wherever they have been able to supply them the editors have included letters to and from relatives who corresponded with Mrs. Adams at Braintree and John Adams at the Continental Congress and then in Europe. The extremes of style in these letters emphasize the strength and purity of expression in those of the two main figures. John Adams' brother, Peter Boyleston Adams, responding to a request for news, is nearly incomprehensible:

> So far Sincable of my duty to Comply with your Dissier to write to you I now Take my pen in hand to give you a narative of the Evelotions thats hapned Since you left us.

The varied correspondence that John Adams maintained while at the Continental Congress was, considering the prodigious amount of work his diary reveals him to have carried on there, a feat in itself—and of course this impression is made before the coming appearance in Series Three of his general correspondence and public papers. From Adams' notes of proceedings of the Continental Congress one sees that his colleagues there recognized his capacity for work by letting hardly a day go by without appointing him to a committee. It was an altogether natural event in the course of things that Adams was appointed to the committee to draft a declaration of independence. Luckily, however, Jefferson drafted the committee report. Had John Adams written the Declaration of Independence it would have been forty pages long.

John Adams' influence on the history of this period came not so much from the impress of his personality or his ideas as from the cumulative effect of his daily load of work. As anyone familiar with the committee system knows, a main legislative body may amend a report, but the bill it finally passes will usually be based on the report. This was the case with Jefferson's declaration, of course, and so was it with the scores of reports drafted by Adams. Always, the Adams influence came from an ability to work, or was the fruit of work done in the past. During the peace negotiation with England in 1783 John Adams began a diary entry:

> At 10 Mr. Jay came in, and I shewed him a Variety of Projects, which I had drawn up last night, concerning the Removal of Troops, opening the Ports, tranquilizing the Tories now within the Lines, Articles for Commerce, in Explanation of the provisional Treaty &c.
>
> We drew together a Proposition, for with drawing the Troops, opening the Ports and quieting the Tories, and went with it in my Carriage to Mr. Laurens, who thought it might do.

Without studying the intricacies of this negotiation, one can rather clearly see that as usual the all-important first drafts came from Adams' pen. And just as usual too in the history of this family, as the entry reveals, the Adams secret for getting the work done was to take the initiative by drawing up proposals late into the night. (After having done which, of course, Adams continued up to write his diary.)

With these papers now in publication scholars have begun to define the direction of John Adams' ubiquitous influence on affairs. The questions to be answered by the papers are scholarly and historic, but the answering will require a literary sense, for interpretation often depends on the weighing of Adams' several slightly differing versions of an event. In following the cross-references supplied by the editors for the Boston Massacre trials in which he participated, for example, one finds the affair mentioned in the letters, then dealt with at greater length in the diary, the autobiography and the legal papers. The entire

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

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

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

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

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third volume of the *Legal Papers,* which is centered around John Adams' trial notes, constitutes, in fact, the first complete documentation of this event to appear any place. The sense of a given event with which a reader of the Papers will emerge depends on the order in which he decides to read about it, his use of the footnotes, and finally a complex balancing in the mind and critical evaluation of differing versions of events—John Adams' fuller but perhaps less accurate versions written when he was seventy against his often scrappy but fresher contemporary diary entries. The mind boggles rather in the way that it does in reading Nabokov's *Pale Fire,* with its nonchronological format and its purposely confusing footnotes and cross-references. Unlike Nabokov's protagonist the Adams narrators were not mad, and their present editors are never obscure; yet John Adams, at least, had a highly developed literary sense, especially for dialogue, which makes the texture of the Papers quite as intricate as Nabokov's artful construct.

Charles Francis Adams had no inhibition about rearranging his grandfather's papers, and so combined the diary and autobiography into a continuous chronicle. The modern editors print everything just as John Adams wrote it—where his autobiography consisted of direct transcriptions from his diary, these are printed exactly as he copied or miscopied them. The editors have rightly reasoned that to do less would but pave the way for still another, more definitive edition. Yet the demand that modern scholarship refrain from editorializing does not necessarily bring the reader closer to truth than did the older, heavily editorializing approach. The only criticism of the present editorial layout that might be offered is that it could have been accompanied by a suggested reading plan by which a reader could get through the events of John Adams' diary and autobiography without repetitions, before setting out on his Nabokovian quest.

John Adams' special contribution to the Revolution, of which he was an early advocate, is suggested by his participation in the Boston Massacre trials and in a similar case four years later in 1774. In both he opposed the radical revolutionary party, the Sons of Liberty, to which his cousin Samuel Adams belonged, and in the first case fully believed that in so doing he was risking his reputation and livelihood.

The story of his defiance of public opinion in defending the soldiers who fired on the Boston populace is fairly well known. His later suit on behalf of Richard King, whose house was broken into by a mob, was equally significant for its revelation of Adams' character. "These private Mobs, I do and will detest," he wrote to his wife after taking the case of King, a loyalist, and continued:

> If Popular Commotions can be justified, in Opposition to Attacks upon the Constitution, it can be only when Fundamentals are invaded, nor then unless for absolute Necessity and with great caution.

In other words, the British monarch had attacked the Constitution with his repressive taxes on Americans, and this justified "Popular Commotions," that is, a revolutionary response. Despite the grievance, however, private mob action against a loyalist could not be condoned. The violence of the Revolutionary mob which had broken in on King was of the sort that Hawthorne evoked in his famous story "My Kinsman, Major Molineux," which Robert Lowell recently adapted for the stage under the title *The Old Glory.* Adams' summation to the jury on King's behalf echoed the summation twelve years earlier by James Otis in the Writs of Assistance case. It was characteristic of John Adams that he rose to his greatest height of eloquence in defense of fundamental rights, and at a time when these were threatened by his own party:

> An Englismans dwelling House is his Castle. The Law has erected a Fortification round it—and as every Man is party to the Law, i.e. the Law is a Covenant of every Member of society with every other member, therefore every Member of Society has entered into a solemn Covenant with every other that he shall enjoy in his own dwelling House as compleat a security, safety and Peace and Tranquility as if it was surrounded with Walls of Brass, with Ramparts

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and Palisadoes and defended with a Garrison and Artillery.—This covenant has been broken in a most outragious manner. We are all bound then to make good to the Plantiff his Damages.

Every Englishman values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride and he glories justly in that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that delightfull Tranquillity which the Laws have thus secured to him in his own House, especially in the Night. Now to deprive a Man of this Protection, this quiet and Security in the dead of Night, when himself and Family confiding in it are asleep, is treating him not like an Englishman not like a Freeman but like a Slave—like a miserable Turke, or Tartar. Is not this a base Affront? No Man who has a Soul, who has the Spirit of a Man in him can ever after during his whole Life, ever forget such an Indignity, tho he may forgive it. He can never think of it without Pain of Mind, without Impatience, Anger, Resentment, Shame and Grief.

If the integration of his public and private style reflected an integration of John Adams' personality it reflected also an integration of his public and private opinions. In this case he was saying the same thing in the courtroom that he had said in the letter to his wife, and meant what he said both times. The separation from Great Britain was really a moral issue with John Adams. He did not stand personally to gain from independence, and he genuinely preferred his farm and family to a role in national affairs. The English no doubt found difficult his distinction between public and private in mobs, but the scholastic distinctions of John Adams were less removed from the spirit of his times than those of Henry Adams unfortunately were from his. A few months later Abigail Adams was able to report to her husband on another mob which had broken into British powder stores and got hold of outstanding arrest warrants:

They then made a circle and burnt them, they then call'd a vote whether they should huzza, but it being Sunday evening it passed in the negative.

We have had so thorough a grounding in the economic interests governing the American Revolution as to forget the genuinely high ideals that played their part in it. At the same time, we have learned, quite properly, to distrust idealistic and patriotic rhetoric, and so tend to forget that it once could be the language of conviction.

The Adams virtues—patriotism, probity, high-mindedness and self-sacrifice—may still be recognized as virtues, but they are no longer of the kind that fire the imagination. Out of modesty we no longer claim these virtues for ourselves; out of skepticism we rarely find them in others. John Adams, on the other hand, could write to his wife:

Your Sentiments of the Duties We owe to our Country, are such as become the best of Women, and the best of Men. Among all the Disappointments, and Perplexities, which have fallen to my share in Life, nothing has contributed so much to support my Mind, as the choice Blessing of a Wife, whose Capacity enabled her to comprehend, and whose pure Virtue obliged her to approve the Views of her Husband.

We have learned to forgive evil when it is interesting (in John Adams' contemporary, the Marquis de Sade, for example), but no longer enjoy putting up with goodness. Ours is an age of aesthetic ethics, and we cannot bring ourselves to admire a self-righteous man—even if he is righteous.

Even in his own time John Adams' opposition to the mob was taken by many to be an expression of aristocratic disdain; despite his Revolutionary credentials he was defeated after his single term as President largely on the strength of imputations that he had aristocratic and even monarchical tendencies. A continuing drama in the Adams Papers results from the reappearance of such allegations in each succeeding generation. In a democratic country there is no possible response to the accusation that one is a snob. The Adamses understood this, and so trusted in the judgment that posterity would render on their private records of their public conduct.

The papers in which they vindicated themselves, however, were for the eyes of the family alone. "It is not for the Public but for my Children that I commit these Memoirs to writing," wrote John Adams in his autobiography, and the same intent is

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

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declared near the beginning of nearly every Adams diary, memoir, or series of personal letters. "My Excuse," he explained,

> is, that having been the Object of much Misrepresentation, some of my Posterity may probably wish to see in my own hand writing a proof of the falsehood of that Mass of odious Abuse of my Character, with which News Papers, private Letters and public Pamphlets and Histories have been disgraced for thirty Years.

Each Adams assumed, often with reason, that he was under constant public suspicion requiring that he justify his every action. At the same time, despising the collectivity that could doubt an Adams, he refused to defend himself from any judgment but that of the family.

The habit of daily recording their lives and times preceded the Adamses' passion for self-justification, but the record they had amassed quite naturally became the source of their apologies. John Adams' autobiography was mostly a transcription with commentary of those parts of his diary and public correspondence that he thought useful to preserve. Later Adams generations were able to justify their forebears simply by continuing to print the private records. Charles Francis Adams, despite his inherited passion to justify the family, did not make any substantive changes in that record because there was nothing in it to be ashamed of. Moreover, he was so certain that the record could stand by itself that he systematically excised from John Adams' diary most of the frequent defenses of his own character paired with denunciations of his detractors—especially Alexander Hamilton (these diatribes are happily restored in the present edition). John Adams recorded in his diary matters ranging from the day-to-day weather to the most intimate councils of government: college lecture notes, drafts of letters, dinner conversations, and a history of the politics of the Revolution. In some fashion, the diaries themselves seem to have been more important than their contents: it is almost as if the events and people were grist for the preexisting diaries into which they found their way. The keeping of diaries was the central discipline of the Adamses' lives. Without them, they would not have achieved greatness. John Adams carried his diary with him as a necessity:

> JUNE 27, WEDNESDAY MORN. [1770]
> Very fine—likely to be hot—at my Office early. The only Way to compose myself and collect my Thoughts is to set down at my Table, place my Diary before me, and take my Pen into my Hand. This Apparatus takes off my Attention from other Objects. Pen, Ink and Paper and a sitting Posture, are great Helps to Attention and thinking.

Nowadays we try to get to the root of our problems instead of seeking for mechanical supports; John Adams had the "Apparatus" of his diary, and it worked. It worked also for his descendants: as the Jews were the people of the book, the Adamses became the family of the diary.

Looking back on its history from the fourth generation, Brooks Adams rightly believed that his family's psychology was a product of its Puritan heritage. Part of that heritage lay in the Puritans' resemblances to the ancient Israelites. Freud's characterization in *Moses and Monotheism* of the Jews and of Moses, the founder of their tradition, can be applied to the Adamses and John Adams, the founder of their tradition:

> The man Moses created their character by giving to them a religion which heightened their self-confidence to such a degree that they believed themselves to be superior to all other peoples . . . Admixture of blood made little difference, since what kept them together was something ideal—the possession they had in common of certain intellectual and emotional values.

Like the Jews, the Adamses shared character traits that related to a collective identity more than to personal idiosyncrasy. The women who mixed their blood with that of the family did not change the tradition: Abigail Adams, for one, was a true Adams.

Freud credits the renunciations demanded by the Mosaic code with the Jews' success in maintaining their tradition. Like the Jews, the Adamses paid a high price in

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renunciations for their greatness; the pride at giving up so much made both groups exclusive and in both cases resulted in long histories of suffering from popular distrust and resentment. The Adamses' sense of themselves as chosen people—a crucial product of the Mosaic code for the Jews according to Freud—accounts for their unthinking assumption of superiority. The Adams snobbism is not petty because it is impersonal, largely based on something outside the individual. Both John Adams in his autobiography and Henry Adams in his, for example, were masters of impersonal self-assertion. (John Adams in his autobiography occasionally slipped into the third person narration that Henry Adams adopted as a literary device in *The Education of Henry Adams.)*

Like the Jews in their ever-faithful observance of the rigors of the Mosaic code, the early Adamses adhered to a code of morality that existed for others only in official rhetoric. The identity of public and private style in their papers establishes them as true believers.

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LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW. *By Paul R. Hays. Yale University Press. $4.50.*

Reviewed by BERNARD DUNAU

Judge Hays's central and surprising thesis is that labor arbitration is not fit to survive. Basic to the indictment is his conviction that a "system of adjudication in which the judge depends for his livelihood, or for a substantial part of his livelihood or even for substantial supplements to his regular income, on whether he pleases those who hire him to judge is per se a thoroughly undesirable system." Judge Hays would substitute a simplified system of judicial administration said to preserve the procedural flexibility of arbitration without sacrificing the independence of judgment supposed to inhere in the judge's tenure. For those who still prefer arbitration as a means of resolving their contract controversies, he would insist that adherence to the institution depend entirely on the voluntary action of the parties, with courts withholding enforcement of both the executory promise to arbitrate and the rendered award. One measure of Judge Hays's deeply held yet retrogressive view is that even at common law, while the promise to arbitrate was generally not judicially enforceable, courts would compel compliance with an award issued in a completed proceeding in which the parties had voluntarily participated.

But for Judge Hays's thorough knowledgeability, born of years of experience as a teacher, arbitrator and judge, it would be simple to dismiss his views as cranky. His high credentials, however, require examination of the merits of his position. And the analysis might as well begin by acknowledging that his indictment is not without at least a modicum of factual support. It is probable that some arbitrators at some times have consciously based decision upon what they deemed would better promote their economic self-interest in maintaining their acceptability to those who select arbitrators. The importance of this excrescence can, however, be easily overstated. Some lawyers at some times have recommended courses of action better designed to fatten their fees than to serve their clients' interests; some doctors at some times have recommended courses of treatment better designed to enhance their profits than their patients' health; some judges at some times have taken bribes. Yet no one for that reason suggests that the services of lawyers, doctors or judges should be abolished. It is hard to see why arbitrators as a class should be condemned for a default not unique to them but unhappily indigenous to human behavior however disinterested the calling is supposed to be.

Labor arbitrators are not our only ad-

BERNARD DUNAU is a Washington lawyer, who specializes in labor relations.

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judicators who are not immunized from the reality of economic self-interest and the temptation to yield to it. While federal judges have life tenure during good behavior, many state judges are elected to office; and federal and state agency heads, exercising highly important adjudicatory functions in such tribunals as the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Communications Commission, are appointed for terms ranging from five to seven years. Inherent in the desire for reelection or reappointment are distractions from disinterested judgment at least as potent as any that face an arbitrator. Many an appointee has paid the price of his independence by incurring the disfavor of a power bloc sufficiently influential to prevent his reappointment, and it is highly likely that many an appointee has been tempted to temper his judgment, and some have doubtless yielded, to avoid fatal disfavor. In some respects the situation of the arbitrator is indeed happier than that of the judge or agency head facing periodic reelection or reappointment. An established arbitrator who becomes *persona non grata* with one or another union or employer will ordinarily have other unions and employers who are still content with his services. He can count on continuing appointment, however shifting the identity of the particular parties who choose him. An arbitrator can thus survive disfavor and therefore need not fear that extinction is its consequence.

But the weakness of Judge Hays's thesis is more fundamental than any of these considerations. It lies instead in the quality of a good judge, whether his forum is judicial, administrative or arbitral. He requires, as Judge Hays says, "knowledge, training, skill, intelligence and character." And of these character is preeminent—the patience to hear the tedious controversy through without flagging attention and without irritability; the manners to probe positions incisively and to suffer stupidity without manifesting disrespect or impoliteness; the humility to withhold reaching a final determination until the parties have completed their presentation even though the point seems evident almost immediately; the drive to understand even apparent wrongheadedness to be sure that the controversy is truly comprehended; and the passion for a just result within the legal or contractual limitations that circumscribe the judge's authority to decide. A judge with these qualities will be alert to guard against the intrusion of economic self-interest and by his wariness can avoid yielding to it. A judge without these qualities has much more wrong with him than exposure to the temptation. For a judge with deficient qualifications, economic self-interest is not even the most important of the impediments to judicious performance. He may fall in with his prejudice for or against a class, movement or interest, surrender to the pressure of community feeling, or curry social or political esteem. He may be arrogant, stupid, insolent or self-righteous. And so, in relationship to the totality of attributes that makes a good judge, the impediment inherent in economic self-interest is not overly significant. It is unfortunately true that the level of judging, whether judicial, administrative or arbitral, is in the overall quite mediocre, but for those who have worked in all three forums the arbitrator does not suffer by comparison. Among union and employer representatives who select arbitrators, the encomium bestowed on the good arbitrator is that "he calls them as he sees them," and any system of adjudication would be hard pressed to profess or practice a higher ideal.

As a preface to his condemnation of labor arbitration, Judge Hays severely criticizes the Supreme Court's panegyrical description of the arbitrator's talents and role (*Steelworkers* v. *American Mfg. Co.*, 363 U. S. 564 [1960]; *Steelworkers* v. *Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.*, 363 U. S. 574 [1960]; *Steelworkers* v. *Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.*, 363 U. S. 593 [1960]). The censure is merited but misses the transcendent problem that the Supreme Court faced. The need overriding all others that confronted the Court was to formulate a stand-

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ard to coordinate the work of judge and arbitrator granting the fitness of labor arbitration as an adjudicatory method. This the Court accomplished by cleanly and unequivocally divorcing inquiry into the merits of the dispute (the arbitrator's function) from the question of whether the parties had promised to submit the dispute to arbitration (the court's function). And the arbitrator's determination of the merits is not to be displaced by the court upon a proceeding to confirm or set aside the award. This sound and workable accommodation preserved the arbitral process from the damage that heavy judicial review threatened. The Supreme Court's "extravagant praise for arbitration" is at worst a rhetorical flourish emphasizing for the judiciary that its displeasure with the merits of a claim or an arbitrator's decision of it is no reason for a court to stand in the way of arbitration or its result.

The point is illustrated by Judge Hays's bland statement that a "lower Connecticut court vacated on public policy grounds an award reinstating an employee who had been discharged for gambling on the premises of the employer." Judge Hays cites this case among others in approving judicial review of arbitration awards on the basis of public policy. But there is a story behind this Connecticut case that Judge Hays does not tell. The arbitrator in that case had found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the employee had gambled on company premises. The arbitrator had also found that the employee had certain gambling articles in his possession within the plant but concluded that possession itself should not be "considered gambling 'on the premises'. . ." And the arbitrator determined that, while possession of gambling articles was a criminal offense under Connecticut law, the collective bargaining agreement should not be construed to incorporate the statutory prohibition as just cause for discharge. It was an award based on this reasoning that the lower Connecticut court voided as "contrary to public policy." The arbitrator was Paul R. Hays.

Perspectives on Alienation

CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AND THE WEST, 1872-1949. *By Y. C. Wang. University of North Carolina Press. $10.*

Reviewed by PAUL A. COHEN

In 1872, some three decades after the Opium War, the Chinese government pioneered in sending a group of young Chinese to the United States to master the secrets of Western learning. By 1949, when mainland China came under Communist control, roughly one hundred thousand Chinese had spent prolonged periods studying either in the West or in "Westernized" Japan. Y. C. Wang's book is about these students and the role they played in modern Chinese history. Unfortunately, it is about so many other things as well that the impact of an otherwise splendid study tends in places to become blurred.

On the most general plane, Wang advances the bold proposition that modern Chinese history has witnessed the conversion of a highly moral traditional elite into an amoral modern elite, and that this conversion was due largely to the education received by the new elite in the West. One could quibble with the assertion that "amoralization is an inevitable tendency in modern society." But my principal objection to Wang's thesis is that it is founded on what appears to me to be an overly static and idealized image of traditional Chinese society. To combat the modern fashion of depicting the traditional scholar-officials as ruthless exploiters of the peasants, one need not take the equally extreme position that the elite-peasant relationship in traditional China was marked by mutual understanding and sympathy, that "the scholars lived to serve the people. . ." Moreover, even if such a generalization had a degree of validity for certain periods in the Chinese past, it would hardly stand up as a description of the scholar-peasant relation-

✪ PAUL A. COHEN is the author of *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*. He teaches Chinese history at Wellesley College.

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ship in nineteenth-century China. The view of the nineteenth-century scholar-official as corrupt, demoralized, self-serving, and alienated from the populace he was supposed to serve, did not originate with twentieth-century iconoclasts. It was first advanced by Confucian moralists and Western-influenced reformers of the last century. What is more, the Wang T'aos and Yen Fus of that era, in their desire to instill into the Chinese elite a sense of public spiritedness and concern for the common good, were as likely as not to turn to the West for their models. If it is valid, then, to speak of an "amoralization" of the elite in twentieth-century China—and in some respects perhaps it is—the genesis of this phenomenon would seem to be more complex than Wang suggests.

Much has been written about the twentieth-century Chinese intellectual's alienation from his country's past traditions. But little attention has been paid to his fateful alienation from his compatriots in the countryside, the peasant masses. It is this theme that forms the leitmotiv of Wang's study, and the author's versatility in exploring it from a variety of different perspectives is the real strength of this book. After his introductory portrait of traditional Chinese society, Wang provides (in Part II) a heavily documented survey of the movement of Chinese to study abroad between 1872 and 1949. His approach here is sociological. He is concerned with such matters as the procedures by which students were chosen to go abroad, the Chinese government's policy toward foreign study, sources of scholarship aid, the goals of study abroad, the social background and geographical origins of the Chinese who went abroad, their academic achievements and specialties, the degree of prominence they achieved after returning to China, problems of readjustment and unemployment, and patterns of expatriation.

Some of Wang's conclusions are worth noting. He finds that, whereas in 1920 the goal of overseas study was to prepare for patriotic service, by the 1940's personal motives had become the foremost consideration of those going abroad. Since government scholarship aid dropped severely during the first few decades of the present century, and a prerequisite to foreign study was previous Chinese education, which was beyond the reach of a large majority of Chinese, few but the wealthy could afford to study in foreign lands. (Japan provided a partial exception to this, but returned students from Japan proved unable to command the prestige of those who had enjoyed the far more expensive education supplied in America.) Wang also brings out the interesting fact that in the first half of the twentieth century, the three provinces of Kwangtung, Kiangsu and Chekiang, although having only about sixteen percent of China's population, furnished between fifty-seven and eighty-two percent of the Chinese students in America. This unequal distribution was aggravated over time by the strong tendency of students returning from foreign countries to settle and seek employment in such urban areas as Shanghai (in Kiangsu). Education abroad thus served to bring about a growing cleavage between the urban-oriented intellectual elite and the peasant masses. And since the central government came to be dominated by members of the new elite, "policy at the national level inevitably reflected an ignorance of rural conditions . . . with serious political consequences."

In Part III Wang shifts his approach and, in the first few chapters, examines in detail such diverse topics as the political thought of Yen Fu and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the 1911 revolution, and the thought of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Sun Yat-sen. Little effort is made to relate the contents of these chapters to the book's broader themes, and the reason for their inclusion remains unclear. Happily, in the final chapters of the book—especially those on Chinese education in the Republican period, the changing character of the intelligentsia, and the financial policies of the Kuomintang—the author's main themes resurface. We find, for example, that on the Chinese side the emphasis on higher education (over primary and secondary), the congregation of colleges in large cities, the high financial cost of modern education, the use of for-

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eign materials, and the excessive stress on science and technology all "served to produce an elite unconnected with the life surrounding them and . . . not really aware of actual conditions in the country at large."

Thus the social alienation generated by study abroad was reinforced by the foreign-influenced educational conditions that evolved in China in the first half of the twentieth century. This is, to my mind, the most important conclusion of this study. What some readers will wonder—especially in view of the entirely different impact that foreign (and foreign-influenced) education had on modern Japanese development*—is whether the author has not overemphasized the causal role of foreign education per se in China's failure to modernize rapidly, and placed too little stress on such factors as the persistence of traditional patterns of behavior and the chaotic political-military context in which modernization was attempted during the Kuomintang era.

* See John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (Boston, 1965), p. 271.

A Scientific System of Ethics

SCIENCE AND ETHICAL VALUES. *By Bentley Glass. University of North Carolina Press. $3.75.*

Reviewed by GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON

This small book consists of the texts, evidently unexpanded, of three John Calvin McNair Lectures read at the University of North Carolina. They develop, in different words and with further inquiry, subjects previously considered by the author in several essays and an earlier series of lectures and resulting book, *Science and Liberal Education* (Louisiana State University Press, 1959).

The first chapter, "The Evolution of Values" (also titled "A Natural History of Value"), is mainly a masterfully brief and clear account of levels of organic integration, from molecule to biome, and the adaptation occurring at each level. Adaptation is equated with value; for example, pain and death are interestingly specified as adaptive and, hence, as evolutionary values. The account closes with the equation of human consciousness of values with the fall of man as set forth in Genesis.

Chapter two, "Human Heredity and the Ethics of Tomorrow," opens with a discussion of simple Mendelian genetics and the evolutionary significance of sex, abbreviated almost beyond the limits of the possible and nevertheless written with the author's customary lucidity. The main topic of the chapter, "The Ethics of the Gene Pool," treats in succession the problems of induced mutation (as by bomb testing), of eugenics or control of human reproduction,

✪ GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON is Alexander Agassiz Professor of Vertebrate Paleontology in the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard University. Fossil mammals are his basic specialty, but he also works on organismal biology, particularly principles of evolution, and, as Mr. Simpson says, he is "excited by the human implications." Among his books on those subjects are *The Meaning of Evolution* and *This View of Life.*

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and of gene flow or interracial reproduction. There is probably nothing new to be said just now on those only too familiar problems, but each is clearly stated and it is a sign of wisdom that more questions are posed than answered. One may, nevertheless, wonder whether an attempt at balance of judgment has not gone too far with the suggestion that wearing trousers is more dangerous for human genetics than testing nuclear devices.

The last chapter, "The Ethical Basis of Science," is the longest of the three (yet only thirty-two and a half pages), and in it passes, in breathless review, a remarkably varied sequence of subjects. This is only a partial list: biological fitness as reproductive efficiency; the evolutionary origin of human values; the value of knowledge and of science as a source of knowledge; progress as increase in physical power; the adaptive significance of individual size, life span and, again, death; the definition of ethics; the subjectivity of science (*fide* Schrödinger); the opinion that scientists are not always honest but should be; defects in current systems of refereeing manuscripts and grant proposals; and the five obligations and four commandments of scientists. The last points, especially dear to the author and supported by considerable quotation and citation of his previous studies, merit minimal specification here. Obligations: (1) Communicate fully to other scientists; (2) Have your work abstracted and indexed; (3) Write critical reviews; (4) Communicate with nonscientists; (5) Teach. Commandments: (1) Cherish truth; (2) Do not aggrandize self at the expense of colleagues; (3) Defend freedom of inquiry and opinion; (4) Communicate, as in obligations (1) to (5).

Enough has been said to indicate that this book's subjects are of utmost interest and importance and that the writing is clear, authoritative and literate. It will be a boon to a reader unsophisticated in these matters and anxious for quick access to their rudiments. That does imply some drawbacks, without impugning the author's skill or erudition. A text designed to be read aloud to unprepared audiences and

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

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to cover enormous fields in only three fifty-minute sessions cannot seem other than inadequate and superficial when issued as a book to read and ponder. Footnote citations support a few statements and give some sources but are thin and erratic. Of the two modern biologists who have probably had most to say on the subjects of this book, one of them is once mentioned in passing, and slightingly, and no work by either is acknowledged or cited. There are many other examples—for one more, Theodosius Dobzhansky is cited in other connections, but not on mutation loads and future evolution, about which he has said much that is relevant here. (Elsewhere Mr. Glass is critical, even excessively so, of "unacknowledged borrowing.")

Most disappointing, however, is the author's failure really to come to grips with what the title, jacket copy, preface, and even the text all promise: the validation, development and discussion of a scientific or naturalistic system of ethics. From this point of view, the first third of the book is one long example of the naturalistic fallacy (that for "is" one can read "ought") and of the shifting term (that "value" as "usefulness" and as "goodness" is the same). It is adaptive, therefore useful, therefore of value, for, say, a tapeworm to be able to live in the human gut and to produce millions of eggs of which only two or three are likely to mature—but is it not surely fallacious to consider this "value" an *ethical good*? (Of course, it would be equally fallacious to consider it ethically bad, or directly ethical at all.)

There are ways out of that apparent impasse and correctives for those fallacies, and one reads on with some confidence that all will be well in the end. But when "is" and "ought" are explicitly contrasted in the last chapter, all that emerges is the banal, evasive or, at best, irrelevant quotation from J. Bronowski that, "We *ought* to act in such a way that what *is* true can be verified to be so." Further, in the end the naturalistic fallacy and shifting term, instead of being renounced or refuted, are wholeheartedly accepted, with support from the Scriptures (duly cited).

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There are contradictions in this book, and a reviewer may be allowed a paradoxical conclusion: this is an excellent, disappointing work.

Challenges to Democracy

MODERN CAPITALISM: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power. *By Andrew Shonfield. Oxford University Press. $10.50.*

THREE WORLDS OF DEVELOPMENT: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification. *By Irving Louis Horowitz. Oxford University Press. $8.50.*

Reviewed by ASHER LANS

In the just over two decades since Wendell Willkie wrote optimistically of "one world," the international maldistribution of wealth has become accentuated. The economies of the advanced industrial states, such as the United States, England, France, West Germany and, for that matter, Soviet Russia, have grown at unprecedented rates, while avoiding significant cyclical downturns. On the other hand, a state of primordial economic stagnation has continued in most of the underdeveloped nations, scarcely abated by their newly won political independence. The growing economic disparity between rich and poor nations is an exemplification on an international scale of Karl Marx's so-called "iron law" of the increasing pauperization of the domestic proletariat. These are the introductory themes of the two books under review.

Andrew Shonfield describes the postwar economies of Western Europe and America with extraordinary attention to detail and to the effects of prior national history. Irving L. Horowitz analyzes factors that have retarded or accompanied the lagging takeoff into industrialization of the backward nations. Assuming that our separate approaches to affluence facilitate coexistence with the Russians, how will we cope with the hundred nations, the billion peo-

A practicing attorney in New York, ASHER LANS specializes in corporate and international law. He has been a lecturer in economics at both Brooklyn College and Hunter College.

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Philip P. Hallie is William Griffin Professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan. His previous books include *Maine de Biran, Reformer of Empiricism* (Harvard, 1959) and *Scepticism, Man, and God* (Wesleyan, 1965).

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ple whose sharpened expectations are being so slowly fulfilled?

The author of *Modern Capitalism* finds that the economic structures of the West have adapted themselves since the end of the Second World War with dazzling success. The increased and more sophisticated intervention of government has converted capitalism from the cataclysmic failure of the 1930's into a "great engine of prosperity." Fiscal policy has been crucial. Centralized control of nationwide banking systems, a wide sector of publicly controlled enterprise, and lavish allotment of tax credits have been used to induce industrial investment. Concern for public welfare has resulted in an enlarged flow of funds for education, medical assistance and social security. Apart from its social effects, this policy has stabilized consumer purchasing power and contributed to the continuity of business confidence, thereby further increasing capital expenditures. Long-range national planning, or at least forecasting, has coordinated these and other policies to help induce sustained growth in production.

The approach to planning has differed from country to country. An elite group of civil servants and business advisers, using state controlled pension funds and savings banks as a major source of funds, has modernized and regenerated the French economy. The Federal Republic of Germany taxed the whole industrial society to provide capital for a limited group of key industries. The most halting and least appreciable development is found to have occurred in England and (until 1962) in the United States, where government was treated as referee rather than player, and national planning remained in infancy.

Mr. Shonfield's argument is impressively developed and clearly presented with a wealth of detail and sidelight commentary. At least two negative factors, however, are virtually ignored. Little reference is made to the enormous pockets of poverty that have remained in the midst of affluence, such as the forty million persons constituting Michael Harrington's "Other America." Similarly, scant attention is given to the

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failure and apparent lack of interest of postwar capitalist societies in readjusting the uneven distribution of wealth and income.

If Mr. Shonfield's argument is tightly developed, with each country treated as having unique characteristics, Professor Horowitz is frequently forced into high-level abstractions by the sheer mass of cultures and nations included in the "Third World." Yet his loosely written, often contradictory and filiopietistically Marxist book carries enormous impact.

Social and political reforms, rather than economic measures, are the key to rapid economic development and a successful takeoff toward modernity. Repeating, with more numerous and better developed examples, the argument of Robert Heilbroner's *The Great Ascent,* Professor Horowitz asserts that the elimination of traditional class privileges and the increase and constructive use of social savings require authoritarian government. He describes innumerable complexities attendant on rapid economic growth and the still greater difficulties that appear likely to impede the mature development of backward nations. His analysis leads to basically negative conclusions. Most of the underdeveloped countries confront lengthy conversion cycles, likely to be interrupted by dissension and civil strife. Horowitz rebuts the Panglossian optimism of more facile commentators with reminders of the American Civil War, the horrifying nineteenth-century British slums, the general exploitation of child labor and the sharecropper-type bondage of liberated ex-slaves that accompanied the developmental processes of the presently mature economies.

One virtue of Professor Horowitz's work is his examination of underdeveloped nations from their own standpoint, rather than through the prisms of Western parliamentarianism. To speak of the destruction of liberty and democracy in Algeria or Bolivia is to treat constitutional fictions and Sunday sermons as constituting reality. As economic risks are infinite where income is low and progress halting, uncontrolled private enterprise will concentrate on im-

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portation of luxuries or excess manufacture of consumer goods. Coercion, it is reasoned, is the only method for securing balanced economic growth and for creating investment in unprofitable (in the short run) transportation facilities, heavy industry and educational institutions. The surplus values that early capitalist states created by exploitation of the masses can, in contemporary society, be accumulated only by expropriation, by movement of farm labor into urban areas, and by forcible restraint on the immediate increase of living standards.

Although Mr. Shonfield, in the advanced countries, and Professor Horowitz, in the less developed areas, find that economic progress is the prelude to development, both are equally concerned with political consequences. The wonder world of the technocrats subjects the industrial society to virtually uncontrolled decision making by experts and technicians. It minimizes the area of effective political, and therefore popular, control over the decision-making process. The traditional institutions of parliamentary democracy and a judicial structure invented to preserve formal political freedoms need supplementation by new tools of government, if we are to limit the extent of political arbitrariness and economic injustice in an age of nationwide planning.

The one party state, which allies a charismatic leader with a trained bureaucracy and eliminates formal political opposition and therefore dispenses with elections, seems to Professor Horowitz the only effective means of securing rapid development in backward countries. The viable choice is stated, in unclear paradox, as a capitalist state utilizing harsh repression or a socialist society that achieves consensus while maintaining a substantial measure of social mobility and freedom of communication.

Professor Horowitz almost resurrects the motto of Russian apologists that one cannot make an omelette without breaking the eggs. He alleges that the administrators of reform must retain the methods of exploitation used by the latifundists to induce "the peasantry . . . to work hard at long hours." Similarly, "it is manifestly untrue that to reveal to a person his 'true interests' guarantees his participation . . . in the modernization process."

Both these books are valuable compendiums of information regarding the problems of economic growth at different levels of development. Perhaps their most valuable message, however, is in their underlineation of the difficulties of maintaining a free society.

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ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

A biography of the late philosopher Alfred North Whitehead is being prepared. Anyone having letters by him or concerning him or any other materials is requested to write to: Mr. Victor Lowe, Department of Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218.

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

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